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Abstract
Variations on a Theme of Within-Person Variation
by
Arman Daniel Catterson
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Oliver P. John, Chair
Variation characterizes much of everyday life. People's thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors are not static, but change depending on who they 
are, where they are, and with whom they are. For personality psychologists 
interested in describing this variation, new and low-cost methods of 
assessment can describe how people differ from each other on average, as 
well as how people differ from their own average across multiple real-life 
situations and social interactions. Researchers use such within-person 
methods to develop sophisticated models of personality, emotion, and self-
esteem that aim to represent real-life variance in experience.
In this dissertation, I extend this within-person approach to the study of 
emotion regulation and social hierarchy. Researchers consider emotion 
regulation and social hierarchy to be domains of psychological life that 
serve important social functions. Yet few studies have examined these 
domains in real-life social interactions, and no research has examined how 
these domains change across a person's everyday life.
In Chapter 1, I introduce the topic of within-person variation more 
formally with a review of key concepts and differences from other 
approaches to psychology. Specifically, I argue that a within-person 
approach is fundamental for researchers to understand psychological 
processes. I then summarize the methods of assessment and analysis that I 
will use in this dissertation, and develop three broad research questions 
about within-person processes that guide my empirical research.
In Chapter 2, I present research on within-person variation in expressive 
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suppression – a strategy that people use to regulate their emotions by 
hiding expressions in the face and body. In contrast to past research that 
emphasizes the negative consequences of stable suppression use, I find 
evidence that suppression use can serve adaptive functions when used in 
specific situations.
In Chapter 3, I focus my within-person approach on the study of social 
hierarchy. Although past theory differentiates social power (a person's 
ability to exert influence or control in a situation) from social status 
(a person's respect or reputation) and from social class (a person's rank 
in society), these three related dimensions of social hierarchy are not 
well-differentiated at the empirical level. In this chapter, I demonstrate 
ways in which accounting for within-person variation supports existing 
theory and offer new insights that differentiate these related 
hierarchical dimensions.
Together, the findings reported in these two chapters demonstrate the 
prevalence and potential of within-person variation in psychological 
research. In Chapter 4, I summarize the major findings in the two 
empirical chapters, discuss the broader implications and limitations of 
this research and within-person methods of assessment more broadly, and 
conclude with suggested ideas for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
Bus rides in the Bay Area present many opportunities to observe the 
variety of daily life. The Alameda County #12 bus, for example, winds its 
way from downtown Oakland up through the gentrified hills of Lower 
Piedmont and Upper Rockridge before turning onto an impoverished stretch 
of Martin Luther King Blvd that ends in the heart of downtown Berkeley. In 
the span of fifty minutes, one harried passenger late for work may think 
of herself as the least privileged, least conscientious, and most neurotic 
rider at one stop, and may suddenly see herself as someone on the other 
ends of the distribution when some less fortunate passenger appears on the 
bus at the next stop.
Within-person variation describes the person's changing 
psychological experience. Such variation characterizes much of everyday 
life, from the situations and relationships that people find themselves 
in, to the thoughts, feelings and behaviors in those situations. The 
degree to which a person experiences within-person variation depends on 
where they are, who they are, and who they are with.
Yet as variation dominates our daily life, the statistical average 
dominates the daily life of psychological researchers. Social 
psychologists measure the talkativeness of participants who have been 
manipulated to hold power, and compare that average rating to the average 
talkativeness of participants who have been manipulated to lack power 
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Similarly, personality psychologists 
report correlational relationships to show people who are more extraverted 
than the average person also tend to experience a greater subjective sense 
of power than the average person (Anderson & Berdhal, 2002).
These hypothetical patterns of effects are illustrated in the top 
half of Figure 1. The left-hand graph (Figure 1A) represents mean-level 
differences in talkativeness (y-axis) for one person who was 
experimentally manipulated to be high in power (dark gray) and another 
person who was experimentally manipulated to be low in social power (light 
gray). This graph describes that one person who was manipulated to be high 
in power was rated as more talkative than one person who was manipulated 
to be low in power. (If this graph was based on a sample of people where 
were manipulated to be high or low in power, it could also resemble the 
graph in Figure 1B, and should include error bars that describe an 
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Figure 1. Four approaches to psychological variation in social power.
estimate of the amount that the average other person would vary from the 
estimated level of talkativeness.)
The right hand graph (Figure 1B) represents the mean-level 
correlational relationship between three people who, on average, are low 
or high in social power (x-axis) and three people who on average are low 
or high in talkativeness (y-axis). This graph describes that someone who 
sees her or himself as higher in power than average is likely to be more 
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talkative than average.
Though based on hypothetical data, these graphs are no doubt 
familiar to readers of this dissertation. Researchers across different 
disciplines emphasize mean-level differences or mean-level correlational 
relationships in many psychological constructs. The mean is a good 
statistic to use when researchers are interested in understanding patterns 
in general tendencies in how people are measured to behave, or general 
responses to a specific (and manipulable) feature of the situation. 
However, for researchers who seek to explain how people think, feel, and 
act across a variety of situations, the mean is not sufficient because it 
is static: it cannot capture how people change.
This emphasis on averages is not limited to traditional methods and 
research in psychology. The much-ballyhooed predictive success attributed 
to baseball analytics depends on mean performance metrics (c.f., Lewis, 
2004), whereas modern “big data” analytic approaches (e.g., Kosinski, 
Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013) distill large, multi-dimensional matrices of 
complex combinations of online human behavior into a single line estimate 
analogous to the mean of a sample. When variance is reported in academic 
journals, it is often referred to as “error” and commonly reported in 
parentheses alongside the mean as an implicit reminder of its second-class 
statistical status. 
Historically, there have been few methods of assessment and analysis 
that allowed researchers to focus on variance. In 1955, Gordon Allport 
wrote, “Precisely here we find the reason why so many psychologists fail 
to take an interest in the existential richness of human life. Methods, 
they say, are lacking” (p. 11). 
In this dissertation, I seek to utilize modern methods to focus on 
within-person variance: defined as a person's variation in a specific 
construct across multiple time points and social contexts. Such methods 
are not new, and have been used by researchers over the past few decades 
to study cognitive processes like flow, self-evaluations, emotions and 
affective states, and personality (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003; 
Fleeson, 2001; Nezlek, 2005; Zelinsky & Larsen, 2010). My dissertation 
research applies this method in two novel domains of psychological 
research – social hierarchy and emotion regulation.
In Chapter 1, I explain within-person variation in more detail by 
describing ways that it characterizes psychological life, ways that 
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psychologists can now easily assess and analyze this variance, and 
articulate three research questions that can be applied to psychological 
theory and research that more accurately capture that “existential 
richness of human life.” For example, Figure 1B graphs the same two 
participants that were graphed in Figure 1A, but maintains the natural 
within-person variation, whereas Figure 1D graphs the same correlational 
relationship displayed in Figure 1C at the level of the individual (solid 
line) and situation (dashed line). I explain these graphs in more detail 
in Chapter 1; for now it should be apparent that each of the two bottom 
graphs in Figure 1 contain more information than the graphs on top, and 
also expresses relationships at different levels of analysis.
In Chapter 2, I focus on social hierarchy, and test whether social 
power, status, and class – three hierarchical constructs characterized by 
considerable overlap in the existing empirical literature – might be 
better distinguished by features at the within-person level rather than at 
the between-person level. Does the relationship between power and class 
change across situations? Are there situations in which a person might be 
high in power but low in class?
In Chapter 3, I apply this within-person framework to test novel 
predictions about how people will use emotion regulation strategies in 
everyday life. How much do people vary in their use of different emotion 
regulation strategies? What individual difference and situational features 
explain these differences? Might an emotion regulation strategy previously 
considered “bad” actually be “good” when used in certain situations?
In Chapter 4, I summarize how the findings reported in this 
dissertation inform psychological research more generally, and outline 
several ideas for future research on within-person variance. Given the 
momentum in the field, more powerful and detailed methods of assessment 
will soon become available to researchers seeking to understand how people 
vary in real life. I therefore conclude with a brief discussion about what 
consequences these advances might hold, and possible inherent limitations 
to intensive, repeated-measurement designs.
In the Appendix, I provide detailed documentation about the measures 
used and methods employed in distribution and data cleaning, as well as R 
code for all analyses and figures. These materials are intended for future 
journal editors and readers interested in learning more about the 
specifics of the methods and analyses employed for each study.
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CHAPTER 1: VARIANCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
That the anxiety we feel over, say, a looming dissertation milestone 
is at all similar to the anxiety felt on a first date or to the anxiety of 
driving on a highway for the first time or the anxiety that our 
evolutionary ancestors might have felt searching for water or shelter 
demonstrates an incredible quality of human life. Despite no upgrades to 
our basic anatomical and physiological hardware, our software – that broad 
network of psychological constructs that drive human affect, cognition, 
and behavior – is able to handle a radically different environment than 
the one in which it originally evolved to handle. Evolutionary approaches 
to psychology assert that constructs such as extraversion, emotion, and 
hierarchy were passed down the evolutionary tree because they served as 
flexible tools that helped our ancestors adapt to ever-changing 
environments (Buss, 1991; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001). Indeed, genetic variation itself is considered by many to be one of 
the fundamental mechanisms that drives life (Darwin, 1859; see also: 
Dawkins, 1976; Buss, 1999).
Variation also drives the psychological researcher's life. A world 
with no variation would be one in which the psychologist's career might 
resemble that of a computer scientist who first learns the codified rules 
of human behavior (i.e., the programming language) and then works to 
manipulate the code to achieve her or his goal. Instead, psychologists are 
faced with the challenging task of observing a startling variety in human 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and sorting through or synthesizing 
this noise to develop organized psychological principles. 
The Problem of Variation
In order to study variation in a given psychological dimension, 
psychologists employ methods that systematically remove variance in what 
they believe to be dimensions that are unrelated to the phenomenon of 
interest. The way that psychologists approach studying variance in one 
dimension by minimizing it in other dimensions depends on her or his 
research tradition. For example, personality psychologists (whose 
interests lie in understanding the broad individual differences between 
people that influence behavior) remove extraneous variation by (1) 
averaging multiple items to create a composite personality score (i.e., 
removing variance across measures of a construct) and (2) instructing 
participants to rate what they are like “in general” (i.e., removing 
variance due to features of the situation). Social psychologists, in 
contrast, want to understand the ways that specific situations influence 
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human behavior and thus utilize methods that artificially create variance 
in one specific feature of a situation (via experimental manipulation), 
while ideally holding all other individual difference and situational 
variables constant (i.e., removing variance across persons).
Both research traditions advance the science of psychology by 
understanding between-person differences. However, the attempt to study 
variance in one dimension (i.e., individual differences) by eliminating or 
ignoring variance in other dimensions (i.e., situations, relationships) 
often leaves both personality and social psychology disconnected from the 
real-life behaviors and psychological processes that they seek to explain. 
Many common psychological methods are therefore not able to jointly 
measure the manifestation of internal traits as expressed across multiple 
situations (Buss, 1987; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Funder, 2009). 
Traditional methods may allow personality and social psychology 
researchers to study individual differences and situational influences on 
behavior, respectively, but do not allow researchers to examine how 
individual differences are manifest across different situations. 
This limitation was inherent to the person-situation debate, a 
decades-long argument between psychologists over whether global measures 
of personality were relevant predictors of a person's behavior, or whether 
behavior was determined mostly by features of the situation (e.g., 
Mischel, 1968; Kenrick & Funder, 1988). As acknowledged by most 
psychologists today (and as would likely seem common-sense to any non-
psychologist), both individual differences and situational forces matter 
in determining human behavior (for a system of how these features 
interact, see Buss, 1986). By averaging over variance caused by 
situations, personality psychologists were not able to account for the 
influence of situations on behavior, and by controlling for individual 
differences, social psychologists were not able to account for the 
influence of individual differences on behavior.
That psychologists spent considerable energy engaged in a debate 
about the importance of differences between people and situations reflects 
a problem in depending on methods of study that isolate variance in one 
factor at the exclusion of others. However methodological advances now 
allow researchers to better represent real-life. For example, Fleeson 
(2001) demonstrated that there are substantial and reliable differences 
between people (in support of the personality approach to psychology) and 
substantial and reliable differences within how the person responds across 
different situations (in support of the social approach to psychology). 
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His integration of personality and social psychological research 
traditions via experience sampling not only provided empirical evidence to 
help settle the person-situation debate (Roberts & Pomerantz, 2004; 
Mischel, 2004; Fleeson, 2004), but has also since served as an analytic 
model that researchers use to describe variability in other constructs 
(e.g., Oishi, Diener, Napa Scollon, & Biswas-Diener, 2004; Kashdan & 
Rottenberg, 2010; Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, and Mauss, 2013).
Within-Person Variation
Definition and Use in Psychology
Within-person variation is defined as the way a person's thoughts, 
feelings, or behaviors can change in response to different situational or 
relationship contexts. Whereas between-person variation describes the 
differences in how people think, feel, or behave on average, within-person 
variation describes how a person varies from her or his own average. 
Someone with large within-person variation in a given psychological 
dimension would change a lot in that variable as she or he goes from one 
situation to another, whereas someone with little within-person variation  
would change less across different situations.
Figure 2. Example of within- and between-person variation in social power.
Figure 2 illustrates both within- and between-person variation in 
social power as density distributions for two people across multiple 
situations. Each distribution describes how one person rated her or his 
own social power across different situations. The vertical line that 
bisects each distribution illustrates the mean of that distribution (i.e., 
the person's average score). In this illustration, one person has greater 
average power than another person, which would describe a between-person 
difference.
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In contrast, within-person variation is illustrated in the amount of 
spread between around each person's own average rating of power. Though 
the dark-gray person appears to hold more power on average than the light-
gray participant, she or he also experiences greater variability in power, 
and even appears to hold less power at times than the dark-gray 
participant. Additional analyses and graphs might help researchers further 
explain when and why this variance occurs. Yet even this simple graph can 
illustrate the greater complexity that within-person approaches hold, and 
the way in which focusing on between-person, mean-level differences alone 
can mask important psychological differences.
Advances in Assessment: Capturing Within-Person Variability
Researchers use within-person methods to assess variation in a wide 
array of psychological constructs, such as positive or negative moods 
(Perunovic, Heller, & Rafaeli, 2007; Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, and Mauss, 
2013), specific positive and negative emotional states such as happiness 
and well-being (Emmons, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003; 
Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) and the Big Five personality dimensions 
(e.g., Fleeson, 2001/2007; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Judge, Simon, Hurst, 
& Kelley, 2014). However studies that use within-person methods are less 
common than other methods, and for good reason: data on how multiple 
people respond and behave across multiple situations have been and 
continue to be difficult to collect. 
Pioneers of the within-person approach tried a variety of methods 
(for a review, see Wilhelm, Perrez, & Pawlik, 2012). For example, in the 
18th and 19th centuries there was a trend among scholars (notably, Darwin, 
in his 1877 “Biological Sketch of an Infant”) to take daily notes about 
their children's physical, sensory, and emotional development. More 
recently, Barker and Wright (1951) recruited a group of observers to 
monitor a day in the life of the 7-year-old boy known as Raymond. Craik 
(2000) extended this method in his “lived-day approach” by recruiting 
research assistants to video tape participants as they navigated their 
daily responsibilities. These approaches suffered from a variety of 
methodological limitations; Craik (2000) himself wryly notes, “Obviously, 
following a person around with a video recorder all day has its inherent 
constraints as a field study method, particularly with regard to its 
reactivity” (p. 238). Nonetheless, these approaches represent early and 
earnest efforts to capture people's real-life psychological experiences.
More recent technological advances have reduced the barriers for 
researchers to attain intensive yet unobtrusive assessments in real-life. 
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One method, known as experience sampling, involves surveying participants’ 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors across multiple real-life situations 
(for reviews, see: Christensen, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Lebo, Kaschub, 
2003; Conner et al., 2007; Conner, Tennen, Fleeson & Barrett, 2009). The 
original experience sampling methods were relatively expensive, and 
required people to carry beepers, notebooks, and pencils, enter responses 
in notebooks that they carried, and then turn these notebooks in at the 
end of the assessment period for researchers to analyze (a burden for 
participant, researcher, and research assistant). 
Today, however, experience sampling studies are easily deployed by 
taking advantage of the smartphone. This ubiquitous device of modern 
society not only allows people to access information almost any place at 
any time, but also enables researchers to access participants in almost 
any place at any time (Lipsman, Aquino, & Flosi, 2013).
As the barriers to real-life assessment rapidly evaporate in the 
bright light of modern technology, researchers have been quick to adopt 
experience sampling methods in their own research. Figure 3 illustrates 
this exponential trend in terms of of the number of studies published in 
psychology journals that contain the phrase “experience sampling” (the y-
axis) as a function of time (the x-axis). 
Figure 3. Trends in Experience Sampling Research.
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Advances in Analysis: Modeling Within-Person Variability
Experience sampling methods not only allow researchers to understand 
psychological processes of interest at more detailed and ecologically 
valid level of analysis, but also to examine both between-person effects 
(i.e., variance explained by differences in what people are like in 
general) and within-person effects (i.e., variance explained by 
differences how the person responds across different times or situations) 
within the same study. These methods thus permit researchers to test novel 
hypotheses and address gaps in the literature caused by traditional 
reliance on individual difference or experimental methods.
Researchers interested in describing the amount of variability tend 
to aggregate experience sampling data by estimating the standard deviation 
of the participants' responses across multiple situations (e.g., Fleeson, 
2001/2007; Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, and Mauss, 2013). On the one hand, 
this statistic allows researchers to describe the amount of within-person 
variation that people experience (i.e., the degree to which a person 
varies from his or her own average). On the other hand, estimating the 
standard deviation of a participant's score across situations reduces 
within-person variability into a between-person construct. By aggregating 
within-person variation (i.e., when a person is feeling extraverted in 
each situation) into a between-person effect (i.e., the extent to which a 
person is variable), researchers lose the ability to examine within-person 
processes – that very level of analysis at which life is lived and that 
researchers seek to understand via experience sampling methods. 
To fully understand how people think, feel, and behave within 
situations, more advanced statistics are needed. Fortunately, around the 
same time that experience sampling methods were being developed by social 
scientists, statisticians began to develop new kinds of linear models that 
would help researchers unify between-person and within-person effects into 
one parsimonious statistical model of behavior.
In what he termed the “ecological fallacy,” Robinson (1950) 
articulated a problem inherent to psychological research that uses 
between-person analyses to make inferences about within-person processes. 
For example, research that suggests people who tend to be high in power 
tend to be more talkative (a between-person effect) does not provide any 
information about whether people who are in situations where they are more 
powerful than they usually are are also more talkative than they usually 
are. Indeed, researchers might find that social power and talkativeness 
are negatively related at the within-person level, but positively related 
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at the between-person level: the two levels of analysis are conceptually 
and statistically orthogonal.
This concept is illustrated 
in Figure 4 by the contrast 
between the solid line, which 
describes a positive relationship 
between individual differences in 
power and talkativeness (a 
between-person effect), as well 
as a negative relationship 
between situations where people 
report having power and being 
talkative (a within-person 
effect). People who on average 
are high in social power are, on 
average, high in talkativeness. 
However, in situations where 
people feel more power than they 
do on average, people are less 
talkative than they are on average Figure 4. The ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950)
Various methods were developed in an attempt to address the 
ecological fallacy (e.g., Davis, Spaeth, & Huson, 1961). However it wasn't 
until the 1980s that researchers had the statistical tools and computer 
processing power needed to simultaneously examine between- and within-
person effects. These “multilevel” models (also called “random effects,” 
“mixed effects,” or “hierarchical” models) preserve both between- and 
within-person variability, and allow researchers to examine between- and 
within-person processes.
Three Research Questions that Capitalize on Within-Person Variation
Given these new technological and statistical methods, researchers 
are now able to more easily understand within-person processes. Below, I 
develop three research questions that multilevel models can address, and 
that will serve as a conceptual framework for my dissertation.
How much within-person variation is there? First, multilevel 
models are able to estimate the amount of within-person variation in a 
given construct. Unlike the “aggregate” approach, in which within-person 
variation is calculated as the standard deviation in a person's scores 
across the different assessments, multilevel models estimate unique 
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intercepts for each participant (i.e., a “random slope”), and describe the 
variance in these intercepts to estimate the between-person variance 
(Snijders, 2011). Within-person variance is described as the variance not 
explained by these between-person effects. Conceptually, this method is 
similar to the “aggregate” approach used by Fleeson (2001) and others, and 
should yield the same results. However, the multilevel approach is 
preferred from a statistical standpoint because it allows researchers to 
control for variables such as time that might violate important 
statistical assumptions (Scollon, Prieto, & Diener, 2009; Snijders, 2011).
Researchers can therefore use multilevel models to reliably estimate 
both between-person and within-person variance for psychological 
constructs. To provide a “benchmark” to help contextualize the amount of 
between- and within-person variance, I will compare estimated between- and 
within-person variances in related constructs, and will compare variances 
from this dissertation research to variances reported in past research.
What predicts within-person variation? Second, multilevel models 
preserve variability at the level of the situation (Scollon et al., 2009). 
This means researchers can measure other situational variables and use 
those variables to make predictions about when people vary at the 
situational level. For example, Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) used 
experience sampling to measure variability in a person's level of 
happiness, amount of mind-wandering, and situational activity (i.e., what 
the person was doing), and found mind-wandering was related to decreased 
levels of happiness, even when accounting for what the person was doing.
In this dissertation, I used experience sampling methods to examine 
those features of persons, situations, and emotions that influence 
psychological constructs. Rather than take a kitchen sink approach, in 
which all potential predictors are thrown into a model to see which one 
best predicts the dependent variable of interest, I sought to test 
competing hypotheses based on past theory and research. Furthermore, in 
addition to examining the standardized relationships between constructs, I 
also report the percentage of within-person variance in a psychological 
dimension that is explained by the presence of other personality and 
situational factors.
What does within-person variation predict? Finally, researchers 
can also use multilevel models to answer questions about the consequences 
of within-person variability. Though experimentation is the preferred 
method of establishing causality, researchers can conduct time-lagged 
analyses to determine whether changes in one construct at one time point 
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predict changes in another construct at a future time point (Bolger & 
Laurenceau, 2013; Duckworth, Tsukayama, & May, 2010). For example, 
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) used time-lagged analyses to make the 
claim that mind-wandering causes decreases in happiness by demonstrating 
that mind-wandering predicted subsequent decreases in happiness, but 
levels of happiness did not predict subsequent changes in mind-wandering.
A final goal of this dissertation was to test whether variation at 
the within-person level holds different consequences for individuals than 
variation at the between-person level. Might existing psychological theory 
be succumbing to the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950), in which 
consequences at the between-person level may not necessarily hold at the 
level of the situation? Or do between-person approaches adequately account 
for the way in which a psychological dimension operates at the level of 
the situation?
The Present Research
Psychological Domains to Study at the Within-Person Level
In this dissertation, I utilized the assessment and analytic 
advantages of experience sampling methods and multilevel models in to 
extend these three questions about within-person variation and to further 
understand two psychological domains. The historical emphasis on mean-
level differences is particularly problematic for psychological constructs 
that are defined by dynamic social and situational processes. Below, I 
summarize the two dynamic psychological constructs that served as the 
focus of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2: Social Hierarchy. Hierarchical differences between 
social mammals have been a focus of a considerable amount of theory and 
research across research disciplines. Anthropological accounts of non-
human primates describe interactions where one individual male in the 
group dominates others and enjoys increased reproductive success compared 
to lower-ranking males in the group (Altman et al., 1996; Cummings, 2005). 
Social theory describes a similar struggle between the people and 
institutions who control systems of production and the people who are 
controlled by those same systems (e.g., Marx, 1894; de Beauvoir, 1949; 
Bourdieu, 1996). Psychologists, in turn, examine the consequences of 
hierarchical differences on people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
(e.g., Keltner, Anderson, & Gruenfeld, 2003; Piff et al., 2010; Adler, 
Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011).
Typically ignored in this research, however, is an account of the 
dynamic nature of social hierarchy. One person's hierarchical standing is 
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not necessarily fixed, but is likely to change as a function of where they 
are, with whom they are, and how they feel. To better understand this 
natural variability in social hierarchy, I used experience sampling to 
describe within-person variation in social power, status, and class.
Chapter 3: Emotion Regulation. Emotion scholars have long 
recognized the importance of context to understanding emotional 
experiences, expressions, and social functions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; 
Keltner & Kring, 1998; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, 
Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). However, considerably less research has examined 
the way in which contextual features shape people's efforts to regulate 
these emotions. This dissertation will build on past theory and research 
on two emotion regulation strategies – suppression and reappraisal – to 
test whether the use and consequences of these strategies in real-life 
contexts might differ from the use of these strategies in experimental 
settings (e.g., Butler et al., 2003) or at the individual difference level 
(e.g., Gross & John, 2003).
Two Qualifications to the Current Research
Experience sampling methods have traditionally relied on self-report 
methods (Fleeson, 2001/2007; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010; Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russell, & Barrett, 2013), and my 
research in this dissertation is no different. Self-reports – flawed as 
they are – are meaningful, and represent one valid source of information 
about what people are like and how they will behave (Hogan, Hogan, & 
Roberts, 1996; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2009; Orth, 
Robins, & Roberts, 2008; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Though self-report 
methods have achieved a bad reputation in the field of psychology, they 
are more common in the field than many researchers recognize; self-reports 
are often used as the sole criterion by which to gauge the effects of an 
experimental manipulation or the validity of new “big data” methods and 
experimental designs (e.g., Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 2013). In the 
conclusion to this dissertation, I describe ways in which future 
experience sampling research might branch out to incorporate informant 
reports or behavioral measures (Vazire, 2006; 2010).
However, within-person analyses are inherently more complex than 
between-person analyses. In the interest of readability, I have elected to 
report summaries of statistical models in Chapters 2 and 3 that emphasize 
key findings from the results of more exploratory and comprehensive 
models. I have worked to ensure these results are both reliable (i.e., 
they generalize between samples) and valid (i.e., they reflect a priori 
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hypotheses). In addition, a complete account of the models tested for this 
dissertation, R code for all analyses, and links to download data are 
reported in the Appendices.
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CHAPTER 2: A WITHIN-PESON APPROACH TO SOCIAL HIERARCHY
Summary
Psychological theory suggests that social hierarchy is characterized by 
differences in social power, status, and class, yet few empirical articles 
account for how these related hierarchical states differ from each other. 
In this chapter, I study how social power, status, and class vary across a 
person's everyday life, and use this within-person approach to develop 
hypotheses about how these hierarchical dimensions differ from each other. 
In two experience sampling studies (total N = 106), I demonstrate that 
social power, status, and class exhibit considerable overlap at the stable 
individual difference level. However, these constructs differ in terms of 
their situational stability and antecedents. Specifically, I find evidence 
across both samples that these three dimensions of social hierarchy: (1) 
differ in their amount of within-person variation; (2) are less related at 
the level of the situation than at the level of the person; (3) each have 
unique patterns of effects across situations and social interactions; and 
(4) hold different associations with each other over time. Together, these 
studies provide empirical evidence that supports existing theory, and 
demonstrate how a within-person approach can help differentiate the 
effects of power, status, and class in ways that advance new ideas for 
future research on social hierarchy.
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A Within-Person Approach to Social Hierarchy
A person's hierarchical standing in society is not fixed, but can 
change as a function the person, situation, and time. A revolution 
replaces one monarch with another; a powerful banker (or academic) is 
rendered powerless when faced with his own child's temper tantrum; a 
chorus of clicks and shares makes a struggling band go “viral,” the social 
dynamics of a group of students (or academics) shifts when the cool person 
leaves the room.
Such dynamic variation in people's subjective sense of social 
hierarchy is part of everyday life. However the majority of psychological 
research focuses on static hierarchical differences that characterize 
interactions between people or institutions. In this chapter, I take a 
first step to providing a situational account of how people vary in their 
subjective sense of hierarchy across real-life situations. Below, I 
outline a new conceptual approach that integrates existing theory and 
research on social hierarchy, and describe how this approach can advance 
hypotheses about how related hierarchical constructs such as power, 
status, and class differ from each other.
Power, Status, and Class: Three Dimensions of Hierarchy
Conceptual Clarity
Psychological researchers typically focus their studies of social 
hierarchy on one of three related dimensions. One line of research extends 
from Fiske's (1993) article on social power, defined as a person's control 
over resources and ability to exert influence over others (Fiske, 1993; 
Fiske & Depret, 1996; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee., 2003; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Research from this tradition might examine 
how differential access to resources enable people with power to take 
greater risks, see the world optimistically, and express uninhibited 
behaviors that are more likely to represent their true selves (e.g., 
Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Chen, 
Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011).
Other research focuses on the ways in which various perceptions can 
influence (and be influenced by) a person's social status, defined as 
respect and esteem in a social group (e.g., Anderson, John, Keltner, & 
Kring, 2001; Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972). 
Research from this tradition might examine gender differences in the 
personality correlates of status attainment (Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, 
Spataro, & Chatman, 2006) or the ways in which people can achieve status 
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by adopting strategies that assert their dominance or prestige (Cheng, 
Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013).
More recently, psychological researchers have turned their attention 
to the study of social class, defined as a person's objective or 
subjective rank in society (e.g., Adler et al., 1994; Kraus, Piff, 
Mendoza-Denton, Rheinschmidt, & Keltner, 2012). Research from this 
tradition might examine how differences in people's sense of their own 
social rank in society are associated with various cognitive, 
motivational, and behavioral tendencies, such as reduced feelings of 
dependence on others and greater tendency to behave in self-interested 
ways (e.g., Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012).
Together, these research traditions on power, status, and class 
represent three broad dimensions of social hierarchy that are related, yet 
theoretically distinct in important ways (Blader & Chen, 2012/2014; 
Emerson, 1962; Ridgeway 2001). For example, Blader and Chen (2014) suggest 
that social power and status should be differentiated by their 
antecedents, behaviors, and consequences. Under their framework, one 
critical distinction between status and power lies in their antecedents, 
as status is considered to be based on others' judgments and evaluations 
(e.g., Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), whereas power is considered to be based 
on the person's own subjective or objective ability to exert influence and 
control in a situation (e.g., Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Less research has 
considered the differences between social class and either power or 
status, though Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) recently point out that 
people from upper classes are more likely to have power via their 
increased wealth and more likely to have status via their increased rank 
than people from lower classes.
Muddled Methods
Despite such differentiation at the theoretical level, these 
hierarchical dimensions are not well-differentiated at the empirical level 
(Simon & Oakes, 2006). This lack of differentiation takes several 
different forms. Sometimes, researchers employ methods that are designed 
to measure or manipulate one hierarchical dimension that might also 
unintentionally measure or manipulate other hierarchical dimensions. For 
instance, Galinsky et al. (2008) primes participants with stereotypically 
high power words, such as “authority” and “boss” - words that could very 
well also prime status and class. Other common manipulations ask 
participants to write about a time when they felt high in power (e.g., 
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Galinsky et al., 2003; 2008), yet it is likely that these recollections 
also involve a time when participants felt high in status or class.
Other times, researchers find evidence for similar patterns of 
effects that are labeled under different names. For example, researchers 
have found that increases in social power and social class are both 
associated with increases in testosterone (e.g., Sapolsky, 2004; Carney, 
Cuddy, & Yap, 2010) and a tendency to focus more on the self and less on 
others (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2006; Piff et al., 2012), that both social 
status and social power are associated with greater experience of positive 
emotion (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Steckler & Tracy, 2014), and that 
people tend to anchor their ratings of others' social power, status, and 
class to their own self-reports (Catterson, Carney, Chen, John, & Naumann, 
under review).
Some researchers are beginning to test hypotheses about the unique 
effects of specific hierarchical dimensions. For example, Fragale, 
Overbeck, and Neale (2011) differentiated participants' levels of power 
and status through an experimental manipulation, and found that people 
form less positive impressions of a high-power, low status target relative 
to other combinations. Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) demonstrated 
that the apparent effects of social class on unethical behavior (Piff et 
al., 2012) were explained entirely by differences in social power. 
Such research is beginning to develop a more nuanced understanding 
of social power, status, and class, and represents important progress in 
the science of social hierarchy. In contrast to past approaches that 
differentiate power, status, and class in terms of the unique antecedents, 
behaviors, and consequences associated with stable differences in each 
construct (Blader & Chen, 2014), I take an approach that examines 
situational differences — the extent to which power, status, and class 
change as a function of where the person is and who the person is with. 
Below, I describe how this approach might offer researchers a new 
explanation for how power, status, and class differ from each other across 
a wide variety of social contexts.
Situational Stability?
Theories of social hierarchical acknowledge that dimensions such as 
power, status, and class depend on a person’s social context (e.g., 
Emerson, 1962; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; 
Overbeck, 2010; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). However, researchers still 
know very little about how these hierarchical dimensions change across 
people’s everyday lives.
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The few studies that examine change in social hierarchy tend to 
focus on the effects of longitudinal or manipulated change in hierarchy 
(e.g., Coie & Dodge, 1983; Cohn, 1978; Marr & Thau, 2014). This research 
thus does not offer an account of the everyday, moment to moment changes 
that characterize real-life. To date, no research has examined the extent 
to which and consequences of change in social hierarchy over time and 
place.
Instead, researchers are primarily interested in understanding 
stable differences in social hierarchy, and design studies that focus on 
comparisons between people who have been measured or manipulated to be 
high or low in a specific hierarchical dimension. Such methods are well-
suited for researchers interested in examining the consequences associated 
with differences in hierarchy between people, but do not allow researchers 
to measure differences within-persons. 
Questions and Predictions About Social Hierarchy Within-Persons
Are power, status, and class best characterized as stable individual 
differences? Will someone high in power in one situation be high in power 
across all situations? Or do these constructs vary and change depending on 
where the person is and who the person is with? To answer such questions, 
I focus on how hierarchical constructs such as power, status, and class 
vary across a person's everyday life. Whereas past approaches to social 
hierarchy generally emphasize the extent to which one person differs from 
another person on average (i.e., between-person differences), I examine 
the extent to which people differ from their own average across situations 
(i.e., within-person differences).
Within-person methods have helped researchers develop new theories 
and resolve long-standing debates (e.g., Denissen, Penke, Schmidt, & Van 
Aken, 2008; Fleeson, 2004; Micshel, 2004; Rottenberg & Gross, 2003). For 
example, researchers differentiate related affective states by the extent 
to which they change over time and place. Whereas an emotion is defined by 
fast affective reactions that serve as a response to specific features of 
a situation, a mood is defined by slow, long-lasting affective states that 
do not vary in response to situational features (Rottenberg & Gross, 
2003).
However no research has used within-person methods to advance 
understanding of social hierarchy. Below, I outline three broad research 
questions generated by this within-person approach to social hierarchy 
that I test in the current research. In this chapter, I focus on social 
power, status, and class because they represent three dimensions of social 
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hierarchy that are the most common subjects of research (e.g., Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008; Blader & Chen, 2014).
Question 1: How Does Social Hierarchy Vary Within-Persons?
Past theory and research suggests that dimensions of social 
hierarchy may hold different patterns of within-person variation. For 
example, researchers typically describe social power to be a dimension of 
hierarchy that is rooted in a person's psychological construal of the 
situation (e.g., Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003; Galinsky et al., 2006). This suggests that people's 
perceptions of their own social power will change as the situation 
changes. In contrast, past theory on social class suggests that 
differences in who ranks high or low on the ladder are related to broad 
historical, cultural, and environmental forces (e.g., Marx, 1848; Wark, 
2005; Weber, 1922/1978). This suggests that people's perceptions of their 
own social class will remain relatively stable as the situation changes.
It is less clear whether people will vary more or less in social 
status across different situations. On one hand, past theory and research 
on social status emphasizes that a person's reputation is based on 
evaluations made by other people (Anderson & Kilduff 2009; Blau, 1964). As 
people are often aware of others' evaluations of the self (Carlson, 
Vazire, & Furr, 2009), a person's subjective sense of social status should 
vary to the extent that those others' change. On the other hand, people 
are often seen consistently by others, particularly in terms of their 
status or reputation (e.g., Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Craik, 2009). If 
others' have consistent views about what a person's status is like, then 
self-perceptions of status may not change across situations even if a 
person is sensitive to others' evaluations.
Hypothesis 1: Dimensions of social hierarchy will differ in 
their amount of within-person variation. Based on this research, I 
expect that people will exhibit substantial within-person variation in 
social power. Compared to social power, I expect that people will exhibit 
significantly less within-person variation in social class. I do not hold 
specific predictions about the amount of within-person variation in social 
status relative to power or class.
Past research demonstrates that people differ in their average level 
of social power, status, and class (e.g., Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson, 
John, & Keltner, 2013; Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). Differences between-
persons (i.e., how one person's average hierarchical standing differs from 
another person's average hierarchical standing) are conceptually and 
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statistically independent of within-person differences (i.e., how a person 
differs from his or her own average; Fleeson, 2001). Although I expect to 
find a certain amount of within-person variation in all three dimensions 
of social hierarchy, I also expect to find significant and stable 
individual differences in social power, status, and class.
Question 2: What Predicts Within-Person Variation in Social 
Hierarchy?
If there is substantial within-person variation in social hierarchy, 
then a next step is to try and explain this variance. Are these divergent 
patterns of within-person variation random noise, or are they explained by 
features of the situation in ways that are consistent with past research? 
Hypothesis 2: Dimensions of social hierarchy will differ more 
in their correlational relationship at the within-person level than 
at the between-person level. If dimensions of social hierarchy hold 
unique patterns of variance across situations, then it is also likely that 
power, status, and class will differ from each other more at the within-
person level than at the between-person level. That is, whereas someone 
who has high power on average should be likely to also have high status on 
average, it's likely that there are certain situations in which someone 
might have high power but not status.
Although past research has not tested this hypothesis, theoretical 
approaches to social hierarchy support this idea. Researchers often use 
highly contextualized and specific anecdotes to illustrate the ways in 
which constructs like status and power differ. For example, Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) write that “it is possible to have power 
without status (e.g., the corrupt politician) and status without relative 
power (e.g., a readily identified religious leader in line at the 
Department of Motor Vehicles)”, whereas Dubois, Stern, and Galinsky (2015) 
point to the Queen of England as someone who is high in class but has 
little power.
I expect to find more differentiation in dimensions of social 
hierarchy at the within-person level than at the between-person level. 
That is, the relationship between a person's average social power and the 
person's average social class should be stronger than the relationship 
between a person's social power in one situation and the person's social 
class in that same situation.
Hypothesis 3: Dimensions of social hierarchy will have 
different situational antecedents. Because power and status are 
considered to be based on specific situational or relationship contexts 
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(e.g., Keltner, Gruendfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 
2012; Overbeck & Park, 2010; Schmid Mast, 2010), a large percentage of 
variation in social power and status should be explained by variance in 
the situation. In contrast, because social class is considered to be based 
on broader social and environmental forces (e.g., Weber, 1978), I predict 
that variation in social class will not be explained by what the person 
was doing. Someone from a low class background is likely to feel low class 
across many situations.
Based on past theory and research that suggests social status is 
conferred to people by others (e.g., Weber, 1978; Simon & Oakes, 2006; 
Anderson & Kilduff 2009), I expect that differences in whether people are 
in social vs. non-social situations will explain more variance in social 
status than in either social power or social class. In contrast, less 
variance in social class and power should be explained by variation in the 
number of other people in the interaction.
Question 3: What Does Within-Person Variation in Social Hierarchy 
Predict?
If dimensions of social hierarchy are differentiated at the within-
person level and hold different antecedents, then it is possible that they 
will also be associated with different outcomes. One unresolved question 
in research on social hierarchy is how dimensions such as social power, 
status, and class are related to each other over time. Do changes in 
social power lead people to experience greater status, or does status lead 
to power? Does power allow people to achieve higher rank and social class, 
or does class afford people greater power?
Hypothesis 4: Dimensions of social hierarchy will hold 
different consequences. If social class represents the broadest, most 
stable dimension of social hierarchy, then changes in social class should 
cause people to experience changes in social power and social status in 
future interactions. That is, someone who feels like they gained social 
class in one situation should be more likely to feel like they also gained 
social power in a future interaction than someone who feels like they lost 
social class.
In contrast, if social power and social status represent more 
variable dimensions of social hierarchy, then changes in these measures 
may not necessarily be related to changes in social class. Someone who 
feels like they have gained social power in one situation may or may not 
feel like they also gained social class in the next interaction.
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Methods
To test these hypotheses, I examined people's subjective ratings of 
their social power, status, and class across real-life relationship 
contexts. I used an experience sampling paradigm to measure people's 
subjective ratings of different hierarchical dimensions in real-life 
situations in two independent samples. Experience sampling methods are 
common in research on within-person variation in personality and emotion, 
and allow researchers to examine psychological processes in real-life over 
time and across multiple situations (e.g., Fleeson, 2001; Nezlek & 
Kuppens, 2008).
Because participant population, assessment procedures, and measures 
of social hierarchy were identical across samples, I combined both samples 
into a single composite. Effects replicated across the two samples.
Participants
Participants were 106 (74% female) students at a large public 
university on the West Coast. On average, participants were 20.8 years old 
(SD = 2.2 years) and were of diverse ethnic backgrounds (42% Asian, 24% 
White, 11% Latino, 3% Black, 2% Middle Eastern, 6% Other, 12% did not 
report). Participants completed the study for partial course credit and 
personality feedback.
Procedures
Participants were sent text messages six times a day for six 
consecutive days on a fixed schedule at the hours of 10:00, 12:00, 14:00, 
16:00, 18:00, and 20:00. Participant ratings were cleaned following 
guidelines and recommendations established in past experience sampling 
research (e.g., Christensen, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Lebo, & Kaschub, 
2003). After cleaning procedures, 86% of ratings remained. An R script for 
all cleaning procedures is available in the Appendix.
Measures
At each time point, participants were asked a variety of questions 
about the objective features of the situation they were in and their 
subjective assessment of their personality, emotion, and social hierarchy 
in that situation. I report all available measures of social hierarchy 
administered during the study. A full list of other measures of 
personality and emotion that were administered in these samples is 
available in the Appendix.
Objective features of the situation. I first asked participants 
to describe the features of the situation that they were in when assessed.
Activity. I asked participants to rate what they were “doing in the 
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last 30 minutes (i.e., just before receiving this text)” from a list of 
possible options. This list was based common situations reported in 
development of the Day Reconstruction Method (Kahneman et al., 2004), has 
been used in past experience sampling research (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010), and includes a wide variety of situations such as “Housework”, 
“Outdoors”, “Hanging out with friends”, and “Browsing the Internet.”
Social interaction. I also asked participants to rate the number of 
other people they “were directly interacting with in this situation.” 
Participants indicated whether they were alone (47% of completed 
responses), with one other person (19% of responses), with two other 
people (10% of responses), with three to four other people (11% of 
responses), with five to ten other people (6% of responses), with 11-20 
other people (2% of responses), or in a group of more than 20 people (6% 
of responses).
Dimensions of social hierarchy. In each situation, I also asked 
participants to rate their self-perceptions of social hierarchy. All 
ratings were made on a scale from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Very Much).
Social power. To assess social power (M = 2.4, SD = 1.2, Range = 1 - 
5), I asked participants to rate the extent to which they “Had a great 
deal of power (e.g., could exert influence).”
Social status. To assess social status (M = 2.4, SD = 1.2, Range = 1 
- 5), I asked participants to rate the extent to which they “Had a lot of 
social status (e.g., was respected by others).”
Social class. To assess social class (M = 2.2, SD = 1.1, Range = 1 - 
5), I asked participants to rate the extent to which they “Were high in 
social class (e.g., had high rank in society).”
These ratings are graphed in Figure 5. The majority of students 
rated themselves as relatively low (i.e., below the midpoint of the scale) 
across all three measures of social hierarchy.
Figure 5. Histograms of dimensions of social hierarchy.
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Results
Hypothesis 1: Dimensions of Social Hierarchy Differ in their Amount 
of Within-Person Variation
To test my first hypothesis, I used the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in R (version 3.1.2) to run a series of 
multilevel models that predict either social power, status, or class from 
a random intercept grouped by participant. This random intercept term 
describes the percentage of variance explained by stable individual 
differences in social hierarchy (i.e., between-person variance). The 
residual variance describes the extent to which dimensions of social 
hierarchy are dynamic (i.e., within-person variance).
Figure 6. Between-person and within-person variance in dimensions of hierarchy. Note: error bars represent 95% 
Confidence Intervals estimated using bootstrapping (999 simulations; normal approximation).
As predicted, I found that dimension of social hierarchy differ
in the extent to which they vary between- and within-persons. These 
effects are illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure 6, with the dark 
22
gray bars representing the percentage of variance described by between-
person effects, and the light gray bars representing the percentage of 
variance descried by within-person effects. Social power exhibited the 
most within-person variance across situations (σ2 = 68%, 95% CI [64, 73]), 
followed by social status (σ2 = 61%, 95% CI [54, 68]), followed by social 
class, which exhibited the least within-person variance across situations 
(σ2 = 49%, 95% CI [44, 56]). Confidence intervals for these variance 
estimates were generated through bootstrapping (999 simulations; normal 
approximation), and suggest that the difference in between-person variance 
between social class and social power and status do not overlap, and thus 
are unlikely to be due to chance.
These findings suggest that all three dimensions of social hierarchy 
are characterized both by stable individual differences as well as 
substantial within-person variation. This within-person variance across 
situations is illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 6, which 
depicts density distributions for social status, power, and class. Each 
line represents one participant's ratings of a specific hierarchical 
dimension across situations standardized by his or her own average. 
Although there is substantial variability in people's ratings of power, 
status, and class, the shape of these distributions illustrates that there 
is less overall variation in social class than either social power or 
status.
Hypothesis 2: Dimensions of Social Hierarchy Will Differ More in 
their Correlational Relationship at the Within-Person Level than the 
Between-Person Level
To test my second hypothesis, I calculated separate between-person 
and within-person effects for each construct. A between-person effect 
estimates a person's average rating across the experience sampling 
measures, and describes the extent to which a person is generally high or 
low in a given construct. A within-person effect describes the extent to 
which a person's specific situational rating of power, status, or class 
was above or below the person's own average rating of that same 
hierarchical dimension.
To determine whether social power, status, and class would differ 
more in their contextual relationship than their stable relationship, I 
tested a series of linear multilevel models that predicted variation in 
one from variation in between-person and within-person effects in another 
dimension. The results of these analyses are summarized in Figure 7, which 
illustrates the relationships among between-person differences in social 
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hierarchy (left panels) and the relationships among within-person 
differences in social hierarchy (right panels).
Figure 7. Relationships between power, status, and class at between-person level (left panels) and within-
person level (right panels).
As predicted, I found greater divergence at the within-person level 
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than at the between-person level across all three pairwise relationships. 
For example, the relationship between social class and power was much 
stronger at the between-person level (  = .69, 95%CI = [.60, .79]) than atβ  
the within-person level (  = .34, 95%CI = [.31, .37]). Almost 50% of the β
variance in a person's average level of social class is explained by the 
person's average level of social power – over four times the amount of 
shared variance at the within-person level (12%).
Hypothesis 3: Dimensions of Social Hierarchy Will Have Different 
Situational Antecedents
To test whether within-person variation in social power, status, and 
class would be explained by variation in the kinds of situations that 
participants reported being in, I again tested a series of multilevel 
regression models that predicted each domain of social hierarchy as a 
function of what participants were doing and the number of other people 
with whom participants were interacting. Because there were moderate to 
strong relationships between these different dimensions, I calculated 
residual scores for each domain of social hierarchy that remove the 
effects of the other relationships. Tests of these linear models suggest 
that assumptions of normality and heteroscedascity were not violated. 
These residual scores are plotted as histograms in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Histogram of residual scores for unique effects of social power, status, and class. 
As expected, I found that what participants were doing explained a 
significant amount of within-person variation in social power (χ2 = 100.1, 
df = 26, p < .01), as well as social status (χ2 = 106.8, df = 26, p < .
01). In contrast, less within-person variation in social class was 
explained by what participants were doing (χ2 = 39.6, df = 26, p = .04), 
suggesting that people's ratings of what they were doing were less 
influential to ratings of social class than ratings of social power or 
status.
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These effects are illustrated in Figure 9 for social class (light 
gray), power (dark gray), and status (medium gray). Each bar represents 
the predicted value of the residual score of a hierarchical domain 
compared to the average of that domain across five specific situations. 
Error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals for each effect, calculated 
using bootstrapping. For example, when people report using online social 
networks (e.g., Facebook) they report feeling significantly higher in 
social power than they tend to feel on average, significantly lower in 
social class than they do on average, and do not feel any different in 
social status than they do on average. In contrast, when participants 
report that they are relaxing, they report being significantly lower in 
social power and status, but significantly higher in social class.
Figure 9. Unique effects of social power, status, and class across six different activities. 
I also found that whereas the number of other people participants 
were directly interacting with explained a significant and substantial 
percentage of variance in social status (χ2 = 183.1, df = 7, p < .01), the 
number of other people explained less variance in social power (χ2 = 17.4, 
df = 7, p = .02) and social class (χ2 = 13.4, df = 7, p = .06). Together, 
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these findings suggest that in real-life contexts, social status is more 
influenced by others than social power or class.
Figure 10. Unique effects of social power, status, and class across different social interactions.
These effects are illustrated in Figure 10. Whereas people report 
feeling low in status when alone than they do on average, they report 
feeling higher in status than on average when with other people. In 
contrast, the unique effects of power and class demonstrate that people 
are less sensitivity to the number of others in the situation for these 
dimensions of social hierarchy.
Hypothesis 4: Dimensions of Social Hierarchy Hold Different 
Consequences
Finally, I tested the prediction that changes in a social class – 
the more stable dimension of social hierarchy – would cause changes in 
social power and status – the less stable dimensions of social hierarchy. 
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To test this hypothesis, I conducted a series of lagged hierarchical 
regression analyses (Duckworth Tuskayama, & May, 2010), predicting one 
domain of social hierarchy (i.e., social power) at Time N+1 from all three 
domains of social hierarchy (i.e., social status and class) at Time N.
The results of these lagged analyses are reported in Table 1. The 
bold fixed effects estimates on the diagonal represent the test-retest 
reliability for each of the three hierarchical domains. Social hierarchy 
at Time N was positively related to social hierarchy at Time N+1 for 
social power (  = .09, 95%CI = [.04, .14]), social status (  = .05, 95%CIβ β  
= [.00, .11]), and social class (  = .18, 95%CI = [.13, .23]). That socialβ  
class exhibited the greatest test-retest effect compared to power or 
status is consistent with its relatively lesser amount of within-person 
variation.
Table 1. 
Predicting Residual Lagged (N+1) Ratings of Power, Status, and Class from Previous (N) Ratings of Power, 
Status, and Class, Controlling for Time of Assessment.
Time N+1 (Lagged) Predictor Variables
Power Status Class
Time N Random Effects
Participant .19 .25 .35
Residual .68 .61 .48
Time N Fixed Effects
Intercept .02 .02 .02
Social Hierarchy Domain
Power .09 ** .03 .02
Status -.01 .05 * -.01
Class .13 ** .13 ** .18 **
Time of Assessment -.01 .01 .01
Model Fit
Deviance 6685 6438 5863
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01
Critically, I also found support for my prediction that the 
relationship between changes in domains of social hierarchy would be 
asymmetrical. Ratings of social class at one time point predict 
significant changes in subsequent ratings of social power (  = .13, 95%CI β
= [.07, .19]), and social status (  = .13, 95%CI = [.07, .18]). However, β
neither changes in social power nor social status predict changes in other 
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domains of social hierarchy at later time points (average  = .02).β
General Discussion
This chapter contributes to research on social hierarchy in three 
ways. First, these results provide new empirical evidence that 
differentiates social power, status, and class from each other. Second, 
these findings outline several ways that a within-person approach can 
advance researchers' understanding of social hierarchy. Third, there are 
several limitations to the within-person approach used in this chapter 
that identify new opportunities for future research.
Differentiating Dimensions of Social Hierarchy
I found replicating evidence across two experience sampling studies 
that related dimensions of social hierarchy can be differentiated at the 
within-person level. Below, I summarize key results from this chapter, 
organized for each of the three dimensions of social hierarchy I studied.
Social power. These results suggest that the majority of variance 
in social power is characterized by substantial within-person variation. 
People's subjective feelings of how much influence and control they can 
exert change as a function of what the person is doing, and to a lesser 
extent who the person is with. However I also found evidence for 
individual differences in social power – between-person variance explained 
a significant (but small) percentage of total variance, and a person's 
social power at one time point was positively related to the person's 
social power at a second time point. Social power at one time point was 
not related to either social status or social class at later time points.
Social status. Like social power, the majority of variance in 
social status was described by within-person variation. Like social power, 
I found evidence for stable individual differences in social status, both 
in terms of explained between-person variance and test-retest reliability. 
Like social power, changes in social status do not cause people to change 
in other dimensions of social hierarchy at a later time point. What 
appears to differentiate social status most from other dimensions of 
social hierarchy is that more variance in social status is explained by 
who people are with than what people are doing. This suggests that 
researchers interested in the effects of social status might focus on 
specific features of relationships, such as the duration or kind of 
relationship.
Social class. Unlike social power and status, stable individual 
differences explained the majority of variance in social class. This does 
not mean that social class is invariant within-persons; however people's 
29
perceptions of their own social class change from situation to situation 
significantly less than their perceptions of social power. Consistent with 
this idea, ratings of what the person was doing or the number of other 
people the person was with were weak predictors of variation in social 
class.
Implications for Research on Social Hierarchy
Together, these findings demonstrate the utility that examining 
within-person processes can hold for researchers interested in social 
hierarchy. 
Overlap in power, status, and class. In real-life situations, 
dimensions of social hierarchy are characterized by considerable overlap. 
Even at the within-person level where they showed the most amount of 
divergence, social power, status, and class were strongly related to each 
other. Researchers seeking to make claims about processes related to one 
dimension should therefore include measures of multiple constructs in 
their studies, and control for this shared variance. In this chapter, for 
example, I found evidence that the unique effects of social status, but 
not social power or class, was related to variation in people's social 
interactions.
Although my results empirically demonstrate that dimensions of 
social hierarchy are highly related at the level of the situation, that 
power, status, and class are less related within-persons than between-
persons suggests that researchers seeking to understand the ways in which 
hierarchical dimensions are different from another might examine specific 
social contexts rather than focus on broad individual difference measures. 
Past work is supportive of this point; conceptual definitions and 
experimental research that highlights differences between power and status 
often evoke certain roles or situations (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003; Fragale, Overbeck & Neal, 2011; Dubois, Rucker, & 
Galinsky, 2015).
The “trickle down” effects of social class. Furthermore, these 
findings provide another way to think about the differences between social 
power and class. Whereas Dubois, Rucker, and Galinsky (2015) demonstrate 
that manipulations of power lead to the same effects as manipulations of 
social class (Piff et al., 2009), in this chapter I found that social 
class predicts subsequent changes in social power. My findings suggest 
that one reason why social class and power appear to hold similar effects 
is that manipulations and measures of class will correspond to similar 
manipulations and measures of social power. That is, Piff et al. (2009) 
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may have found that changes in social class lead to more self-interested 
behaviors because those changes in class “trickle down” to social power.
Future research could examine this “trickle down” effects of changes 
in social class further. For example, will manipulations of social class 
correspond to stronger changes in social power than will manipulations of 
social power on social class? Will interventions that help people feel 
higher in social class be more effective than interventions focused on 
helping people feel higher in social power?
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Methodological limitations. This contextualized approach to social 
hierarchy is only as good as its method, and several methodological 
limitations bear mention. First, experience sampling methods are difficult 
to collect (e.g., Conner, Tenne, Fleeson, & Barrett, 2009). Thus, sample 
sizes for studies using these methods average around 40 (e.g., Fleeson & 
Gallagher, 2009). Although I replicated findings across two samples, these 
samples were drawn from the same population. It is possible that these 
effects might vary in other samples. Future research should examine if 
differences in culture, age, personality, and demographic background shape 
the way that people vary in hierarchical dimensions across everyday life. 
Another limitation of this research is I used single-item measures 
of power, status, and class. This decision was based on the intensive 
repeated-measure design required for experience sampling methods, and past 
research that suggests single-item measures can adequately represent 
psychological processes (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swan, 2003; Robins, Hendin, 
& Trzesniewski, 2001). However, single-item measures limit the scope of 
these results in three ways.
First, it is not possible to estimate measurement reliability with 
single-measures of social hierarchy. In this chapter, I was more concerned 
with comparing the three dimensions of social hierarchy to each other than 
perfectly estimating the degree of within-person variation. However, the 
use of single-item measures makes it difficult to determine the extent to 
which within-person variation is influenced by error. Although there is no 
reason to suspect that measurement error would influence one dimension of 
social hierarchy more or less than the others, future research should 
assess the three dimensions of social hierarchy with multiple indicators.
Second, it is possible that the greater divergence at the within-
person level (i.e., Hypothesis 2) is due to the principle of aggregation. 
Between-person effects are estimated based on multiple ratings (up to 36), 
and are thus more reliable than within-person effects, which are estimated 
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based on single ratings. The smaller correlational relationship at the 
within-person level may partially or entirely be due to error, and not to 
any meaningful difference between the two levels of analysis. 
Third, the single-item measures were all positively keyed; 
participants rated the extent to which they were high in power, status, 
and class. It's unclear if there would be different patterns of results if 
participants rated the extent to which they were low in power, status, and 
class.
To address these methodological limitations, future research should 
examine other methods of within-person assessment. For example, the “day 
reconstruction method” (Kahneman et al. ,2004) estimates within-person 
variation by having participants answer questions about their thoughts, 
feelings, and behavior in the previous day. Though this method does not 
allow researchers to examine patterns of variance across multiple days, it 
is less intensive for individual participants. Researchers could therefore 
include multiple items for each dimension of social hierarchy and recruit 
more participants.
Conceptual limitations. Like all experience sampling research, 
these studies rely on self-report methods of assessment. Although past 
research has demonstrated ways in which self-reports of social hierarchy 
are relevant to objective measures of status and rank (Anderson et al., 
2001; Kraus et al., 2012), future research might determine whether these 
patterns extend to methods that do not depend on self-report methods. For 
example, would people's ratings of others' hierarchy (e.g., Catterson, 
Carney, Chen, John, & Naumann, under review) show divergent patterns of 
within-person variation? Would peers' evaluations of participants vary 
across real-life situations?
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed a within-person approach to social 
hierarchy that accounts for the way in which social power, status, and 
class vary across a person's everyday life experiences. Together, these 
findings suggest that power, status, and class differ in terms of their 
within-person variance (Hypothesis 1), are more differentiated at the 
within-person level than at the between-person level (Hypothesis 2), hold 
unique situational antecedents (Hypothesis 3), and are associated with 
asymmetrical outcomes (Hypothesis 4).
32
Chapter 3: The How, When, and Why of Situational 
Suppression Use
Summary
One paradox in the emotion regulation literature is why people continue to 
use a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy when less costly strategies 
exists. Whereas past research has examined the use of emotion regulation 
strategies in terms of broad individual differences or responses to 
controlled lab experiments, the current study takes a naturalistic and 
repeated-measures approach to examine the use of expressive suppression in 
real-life situations. Using an experience sampling design, I find evidence 
across two independent samples (total N = 192) that (1) there is 
considerable within-person variation in suppression use, (2) that the 
situational use of suppression is explained both by stable individual 
differences and situational differences in social power and status, and 
(3) that suppression use does not appear to be related to reduced well-
being when used in contexts in which people report feeling low in social 
power. Together, these findings bridge functionalist theories of emotion 
with the emerging literature on emotion regulation, and demonstrate the 
benefits of studying emotion processes in the kinds of situations in which 
they are used.
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The How, When, and Why of Situational Suppression Use
As anyone who has felt sad at a friend's birthday party, nervous 
when trying to impress a first date, or proud about an accomplishment 
others failed to achieve knows, there are many situations in which 
expressing one's internal states to others might interfere with short- or 
long-term goals. People are not passive victims to their emotions, but 
instead utilize a broad range of emotion regulation strategies to modulate 
the experience or expression of emotion (Gross, 1998b, 2002; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Tamir, 2011).
A considerable body of empirical research has outlined the specific 
intra- and interpersonal consequences that are associated with each of 
these emotion regulation strategies. Yet to date, no research has examined 
how people regulate their emotions in the kinds of specific situations 
that they encounter in their everyday lives. In this chapter, I seek to 
examine how people vary in their use of emotion regulation in daily life, 
test hypotheses about certain features of persons and situations that are 
likely to predict the use of emotion regulation, and discuss the 
consequences of this situational emotion regulation.
Emotions and Situations
Emotion scholars have long-recognized the important role that 
situations have in shaping emotion experience, expression, and social 
functions. Darwin (1872) theorized that the physical expressions we now 
associate with various emotional states (e.g., anger) originally served 
specific anatomical functions (e.g., flattened ears, bared teeth) that 
helped individuals survive specific situations, and thus improved our 
evolutionary ancestors’ chances of passing their genes on to the next 
generation. More recently, scholars across research traditions have 
considered emotions as a coordinated response to specific situations 
(Frijda, 1986; Gross, 1998a; Gross & Thompson 2007; Lazarus, 1991). For 
example, the “modal model of emotion” (Barrett, Oschner, & Gross, 2007; 
Gross, 1998b) places situations at the beginning of the emotional response 
process.
Other researchers emphasize that the objective features of a 
situation are less important to the elicitation of an emotion than the 
person's subjective appraisal of that situation (Caspi & Roberts, 2001; 
Ellsworth, 1994; Fridja, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 
1993). In their work, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) found evidence that six 
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dimensions characterize people's interpretations of situations, and that 
these interpretations can differentiate emotions. Other researchers 
describe ways in which the same situation can be considered in ways that 
give rise to different emotional responses (e.g., Caspi & Roberts, 2001; 
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; McCrae, 1984). For example, whether a person 
perceives him or herself as having control in a situation can 
differentiate emotions such as sadness and anger (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 
Tiedens, 2001).
Emotions can also serve important social functions by signaling a 
person's internal states to others (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner & 
Kring, 1998). Social functionalist accounts suggest that even negative 
emotions can serve adaptive social functions when used in certain 
situations (Keltner & Gross, 1999). For example, expressions of sadness 
signal that a person is in need of help, and thus increase the chance that 
others will provide help (Graham, Huang, Clark, & Hegelson, 2008), 
embarrassment can help a person who has violated some social norm appease 
more powerful others by signaling deference (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; 
Keltner & Haidt, 1999), and anger can improve performance on competitive 
tasks (Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). Together, such research not only 
demonstrates that emotions can hold important social functions, but 
suggests that the utility of an emotion depends on the situation (or 
appraisal of the situation) in which it is expressed.
Emotion Regulation
Though the literature referenced above defines emotions in part by 
features of the situation, Gross' (1998b) influential process model 
defines emotion regulation by features of the emotional response that each 
regulation strategy targets. Cognitive reappraisal is an antecedent-
focused strategy that operates before an emotion is fully generated, and 
works to change some aspect of the person's appraisal of the situation 
that triggers the emotional response (Gross, 1998a). For example, the same 
situation (e.g., sitting in traffic on the I-580) can be interpreted in 
ways that give rise to frustration (e.g. “I’m wasting my life in traffic”) 
or in ways that give rise to less intense negative emotions (e.g., “This 
is an interesting opportunity to observe other people.”) By changing what 
an individual experiences internally, cognitive reappraisal subsequently 
regulates the overt expression of an emotion (Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
In contrast, expressive suppression refers to a response-focused  
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regulation strategy that targets only the behavioral component of an 
emotion. Individuals who engage in suppression attempt to reduce the overt 
expression of an emotion, but do nothing to change the events or 
appraisals of situations that give rise to the experience of emotion 
(Gross, 1998b; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997). For example, a 
person who uses suppression to hide her or his visible display of anger 
while stuck on the I-580 would still feel anger on the inside.
Past research has focused on how these two emotion regulation 
strategies differ in terms of their consequences for the experience and 
expression of emotion, well-being, and social functioning. Although 
suppression does little to reduce the internal experience of an emotion, 
it is more effective than reappraisal at reducing the outward expression 
of emotion (Gross, 1998a). Researchers thus consider suppression to be the 
emotion regulation strategy that is most directly relevant to a person’s 
social goals because it interferes directly with the component of an 
emotion that signals a person’s internal states to others (Campos, Walle, 
Dahl, & Main, 2011; McRae, Heller, John, & Gross, 2011; Nezlek & Kuppens, 
2008; Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernandez-Dols, 2003).
It is somewhat ironic, then, that this other-oriented emotion 
regulation strategy is associated with a wide range of negative social 
outcomes. Evidence from both lab-based interactions and studies of 
naturally occurring relationships suggests suppression is associated with 
decreased social support, relationship closeness, social warmth, and 
relationship satisfaction among participants and those they interact with 
(Butler et al., 2003; English & John, 2013; English, John, Srivastava, & 
Gross, 2012; Gross & John, 2003; Impett et al., 2012; Srivastava, Tamir, 
McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009). Reappraisal, on the other hand, is 
considered by many to be the golden child of the emotion regulation 
family, as it is not only associated with various positive well-being and 
social outcomes (English & John, 2013; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 
2004; Srivastava, Tamir, McGonigal, John, & Gross, 2009), but also 
requires less cognitive effort than suppression (Richards, Butler, & 
Gross, 2003; Richards & Gross, 1999).
The Paradox of Suppression
Such research reveals a paradox inherent to the use of suppression: 
why do people use a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy when other 
less costly strategies exist? To address this question, I extend social 
functionalist accounts of emotion to the study of emotion regulation. In 
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contrast to past research that focuses on individual differences in the 
stable use of reappraisal and suppression, I focus on individual 
differences in the situational use of suppression. Below, I develop three 
research questions that guide this research, and examine how, when, and 
why people might use suppression across real-life situations.
Question 1: Do People Vary in the Use Suppression Across Real-Life 
Situations?
To address the question of why people use suppression, it’s 
important to first consider how people use suppression. However, of the 
500-plus articles that have been published on emotion regulation since 
2001, only 12% measured emotion regulation in the context of an actual 
social interaction (Campos et al., 2011). This discrepancy between the 
situations researchers study and the contexts in which emotion regulation 
actually takes place is problematic, since it means researchers may not 
fully understand how suppression use operates in real life.
A few researchers have begun to examine the situational use of 
emotion regulation by examining changes in the use of suppression in 
response to specific situations. For example, Srivastava et al. (2009) 
found that suppression use increased when students transitioned from high 
school to a new college environment. Similarly, McRae et al. (2011) found 
that participants reported using suppression less at the counter-culture 
art festival Burning Man than when they are in their regular home 
environment.
Other researchers have examined change in emotion regulation by 
measuring daily variation in suppression and reappraisal use. For example, 
Nezlek and Kuppens (2008) measured suppression once each day over the 
course of the week, and report that participants differed as much from 
themselves in their use of suppression over the course of the week as they 
differed from each other. Le and Impett (2013) assessed daily variation 
over the course of two weeks, but did not report the extent to which 
people differed from their own average or from each other in their use of 
suppression.
These studies provide preliminary evidence that emotion regulation 
is not entirely stable. However, by averaging across situations with daily 
measures (e.g., Le & Impett, 2013; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008) or examining 
the use of suppression in response to one situation (e.g, McRae et al., 
2011; Srivastava et al., 2009), past research is not able to examine how 
people vary in suppression use as a response to different real-life 
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situations. It is thus unclear whether suppression use is best 
characterized by stable individual differences or by variability across 
situations.
On the basis of past individual difference research (e.g., Gross & 
John, 2003; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Srivastava et al., 2009), I expect to 
find significant between-person differences that characterize the stable 
use of suppression. However, I also expect to find substantial within-
person variation in suppression use that characterizes situational 
suppression use (Hypothesis 1). Between-person and within-person 
differences are conceptually and statistically distinct (Robinson, 1950; 
Snijders, 2001). Thus, people should differ from each other in their 
average use of suppression (i.e., there should be differences in the 
stable use of suppression), and people should vary from their own average 
use of suppression across different situations (i.e., there should be 
differences in the situational use of suppression). 
Furthermore, I predict that there will be greater within-person 
variance in the use of suppression than reappraisal. As a response-focused 
emotion regulation strategy, suppression use occurs after an emotion has 
been elicited and should vary according to the different situations that a 
person finds her or himself inhabiting. Thus, someone who uses suppression 
in one situation may or may not use suppression in another situation. In 
contrast, reappraisal is an antecedent-focused strategy that occurs early 
in the regulatory process, and is related to individual differences in a 
person's general cognitive style (John & Gross, 2004; Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Someone who uses reappraisal in one situation should therefore be 
more likely to use reappraisal in another situation than someone who tends 
not to use reappraisal.
Question 2: When Do People Use Suppression?
Though past theory and research emphasize the ways in which emotion 
and emotion regulatory processes serve as responses to situations (Barrett 
& Campos, 1987; Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996; Gross, Jakobs, 
Manstead, & Fischer, 1999; Gross, Richards, & John, 2006; Tamir et al., 
2008; Tamir, 2009), few studies examine the specific social context in 
which regulation occurs. Individual difference approaches to emotion 
regulation tend to aggregate across situations (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; 
Le & Impett, 2013; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008), whereas experimental 
approaches typically manipulate emotion regulation strategy participants 
are asked to use, and not the feature of the situation or the emotion that 
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is the target of regulation (e.g., Butler et al., 2003; Gross & Levenson, 
1993). Measuring emotion regulation at the level of the situation allows 
researchers to not only distinguish the stable and situational sources of 
emotion regulation, but also to determine what features of situations and 
persons explain when people use more or less suppression at both levels of 
analysis. 
Features of situations. One general feature of situations that has 
received the some attention in the literature is whether or not people 
regulate their emotions in social or non-social situations. Gross, 
Richards, and John (2006) report that of the 19 participants who described 
using suppression when asked, 98% of these responses involved a social 
interaction. Such findings are cited to suggest that suppression use is 
more likely to occur in social interactions (e.g., Campos et al., 2011; 
English, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2012). However, it is unclear whether 
these results mean that people don't suppress their emotions when alone, 
or whether people tend to recall social interactions when asked to 
describe situations in which they suppressed emotions to psychologists. If 
someone stubs her toe in the middle of a forest and does not shout in 
pain, does she still suppress?
I predict that people would be more likely to report using 
suppression in social situations than in non-social situations (Hypothesis 
2A). Based on past theory that suppression use is an response-focused 
strategy, I also expected that a significant percentage of variance in 
suppression use would be explained by differences in the situations that 
people inhabited. However, I did not hold specific predictions about which 
situations or emotions would lead people to suppress.
Features of Persons. Appraisal theory suggests that the specific 
features of a situation may be less relevant to the use of suppression 
than the way in which the person construes or responds to the situation 
that she or he inhabits (e.g., Ellsworth, 1994; Fridja, 1988; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). People often react to the same situation in ways 
consistent with underlying dispositional tendencies (e.g., Caspi & 
Roberts, 2001; McCrae, 1984). For example, at a party one person might 
actively avoid any social contact while another person is simultaneously 
pouring drinks, holding two conversations, and motioning toward others to 
get dancing. In this situation, a person's feeling of extraversion or 
introversion would likely explain these different patterns of behavior.
Past research on individual differences in emotion regulation point 
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to a variety of personality dimensions that are related to the stable use 
of suppression (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004; English & 
John, 2013). For example, individual differences in extraversion not only 
explain the greatest percentage of variance in personality (John & 
Srivastava, 1999), but also appear to be one of the strongest predictors 
of stable suppression use (Gross & John, 2003). 
Hierarchical states such as social power and status are other 
important psychological dimensions that define many situations and are 
related to a variety of consequences for a person's behavior and emotion 
(French & Raven, 1959/1986; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Chapter 
2 of this dissertation). For example, people measured or manipulated to be 
high in social power are more likely to express their emotions and behave 
in disinhibited ways than people low in social power (e.g., Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002; Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), which suggests that they may be 
less likely to suppress their emotions. Indeed, English & John (2012) 
found that people who use suppression report being lower in status than 
people who do not use suppression.
However, just because past research suggests that individual 
differences in extraversion and social power are related to the stable use 
of suppression does not necessarily mean that these same personality 
differences will predict the situational use of suppression. In the same 
way suppression use can be distinguished between its stable and 
situational components, past research by Fleeson (2001/2007) distinguishes 
between the stable components of personality (described by between-person 
effects) and the situational components of personality (described by 
within-person effects). Relationships between constructs such as 
personality and suppression at the level of individual differences are 
conceptually and statistically independent of relationships at the level 
of specific situations (Robinson, 1950). 
I predict that suppression use will be influenced by both between-
person and within-person differences in personality (Hypothesis 2B). I 
expect to replicate past research and demonstrate that people who are high 
in extraversion and low in social power on average will suppress more on 
average (English & John, 2013; Gross & John, 2003). However, I also 
predict that situation-specific differences in personality will predict 
the situational use of suppression above and beyond these individual 
difference measures. Specifically, I expect that whereas people will use 
situational suppression more in situations where they feel relatively more 
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extraverted than their own average, people will use situational 
suppression less in situations where they feel relatively low in social 
power than they do on average.
Question 3: Why Do People Use Suppression?
Past research and theory on emotion regulation maintain that 
suppression holds negative social consequences because it interferes with 
the emotion generation process and lead to an incongruence between how 
people feel and what they express (English & John, 2013). For example, 
Butler et al. (2003) found that observers report less closeness to others 
who suppress their emotions during a negative film clip, Srivastava et al. 
(2009) reported that people who suppressed their emotions in the 
transition to college reported reduced social satisfaction, Nezlek & 
Kuppens (2008) found that suppression use over the course of a week was 
related to negative emotional and well-being states, and Schlatter & 
Cameron (2010) found that women who used more suppression during 
chemotherapy treatments reported poorer coping and more negative symptoms.
However, social functionalist accounts of emotion don't claim that 
emotion expressions are always good, but instead that it's important to 
consider the consequences of emotion in the social context in which it is 
expressed (Gruber, Mauss, & Tamir, 2013; Keltner & Kring, 1998). In the 
same way that negative emotions such as embarrassment and anger can hold 
adaptive benefits in certain situations (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tamir et 
al., 2008), the use of suppression in certain situations might hold 
positive outcomes. This approach suggests that though the stable use of 
suppression may hold maladaptive functions (e.g., English & John, 2013; 
Gross & John, 2003), the use of suppression in specific situations may be 
less maladaptive.
Several studies are supportive of this functionalist account of 
suppression. Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, and Coifman (2004) found 
that NYU students’ ability to successfully engage in suppression when 
directed to in a prior laboratory session predicted greater psychological 
adjustment in the year of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center. More recently, Le & Impett (2013) found that individuals who 
see themselves as interconnected (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991) exhibited 
increases in personal well-being (measured as the difference between 
positive and negative emotion) and relationship satisfaction on days in 
which they reported suppressing their emotions and making a sacrifice for 
their romantic partner.
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These findings suggest that there will be certain situations in 
which the situational use of suppression is adaptive. That is, the 
consequences associated with situational suppression use should depend on 
features of the situation or emotion that suppression is regulating. 
However, one challenge in testing this prediction is that there are a wide 
variety of possible situations in which suppression use might be employed. 
Rather than try to account for different patterns of outcomes across these 
different situations, or focus on one specific situation (e.g., Srivastava 
et al., 2009), I examine one general feature of situations that has far-
reaching effects on a person's cognition, affect, and behavior: social 
power. 
Past research demonstrates that differences in people's access to 
social resources such as power, status, and class are related to 
differences in people's ability to exert influence over their environment 
in order to obtain rewards (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), make 
them less dependent on others (Piff, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012) and more 
likely to express their true opinions (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; 
Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; 
Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). Thus, the use of suppression would be 
contrary to social norms regarding the expression of desires and interests 
for people high in social power. In contrast, suppression use would be 
consistent for those norms for people low in social power.
I therefore predict that social power will serve as one feature of 
situations that explains when suppression is associated with positive or 
negative consequences (Hypothesis 3). Specifically, I expect that 
suppression use will be less maladaptive for people who tend to be low in 
social power (i.e., low stable social power), as well as in situations 
where people find themselves lower in social power than they find 
themselves to be on average (i.e., low situational social power).
The Current Research
In Table 2, I summarize the predictions derived from questions about 
how, when, and why people use suppression in everyday life. To test these 
predictions, I designed an experience sampling survey for participants to 
answer questions about objective features of their situation, as well as 
their personality and use of emotion regulation in that situation. Unlike 
past research, this method allows me to examine the behaviors, 
antecedents, and consequences of suppression use in everyday life.
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Table 2. 
Summary of Chapter 3 Hypotheses.
Prediction Support?
Question 1: Do people vary in their use of suppression? Sample 1 Sample 2
Hypothesis 1
There will be substantial between- and 
within-person variation in suppression use.
yes yes
Question 2: When do people vary?
Hypothesis 2A
Suppression use varies as a function of the 
situation: the sociality of the situation, 
the emotions participants experience, and 
the situations participants inhabit.
yes yes
Hypothesis 2B
Suppression use varies as a function of the 
person: situation-specific levels of 
extraversion and social power.
mixed mixed
Question 3: Why do people vary?
Hypothesis 3
Suppression use holds different consequences 
for well-being depending on the person's 
level of social power.
yes mixed
To ensure the reliability of these findings, I employed this 
experience sampling procedure across two samples. Below, I describe the 
methods for these two samples; results will be reported for each sample.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from a large public university on the 
West Coast. In Sample 1, 77 participants signed up for the study; in 
Sample 2 164 participants signed up for the study. To be included in the 
study, participants needed to complete at least 40% of the surveys, take 
longer than 20 seconds to complete the survey, and have non-zero variance 
in their ratings. 
Sample 1 included 57 participants (89% Female; 50% Asian, 31% White, 
9% Latino, 4% Middle Eastern, 2% Black, 4% Other), whereas Sample 2 
included 137 participants (64% Female; 53% Asian, 25% White, 11% Latino, 
7% Middle Eastern, 1% Black, 3% Other). Three participants in Sample 1 did 
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not provide demographic information.
Procedures
Experience sampling procedures were identical across the two 
samples. Participants were sent text messages via smartphone six times a 
day for six days. Surveys in both samples were administered on a fixed 
schedule, and sent at 10:00, 12:00, 14:00, 16:00, 18:00, and 20:00. In 
Sample 1, the median completion rate after filtering was 78.2%; in Sample 
2 it was 86.1%. The median completion time for each experience sampling 
survey in Sample 1 was 96 seconds; the median survey completion time was 
67.9 seconds in Sample 2 (The longer completion time in Sample 1 was 
likely due to the presence of additional items. These items were unrelated 
to any of the independent or dependent variables reported in this study; 
see Appendix for a full list of items used.)
Measures
Each text message directed participants to an online survey, in 
which they were asked to answer questions about various features of their 
situation, personality, and behavior in the last thirty minutes.
Features of the Situations. Participants were asked to describe 
what they were doing before taking the survey by selecting from a list of 
different activities and situations. This list was based on previous 
experience sampling research (Kahneman et al., 2004; Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010), and included situations relevant to students such as 
“browsing the internet”, “reading”, “relaxing, doing nothing”, “studying”, 
and “talking, conversation”.
Participants were also asked in both samples to describe “How many 
other people were you directly interacting with in this situation?” 
Participants selected from one of seven response options: “0 (I was 
alone)”, “1”, “2”, “3-4”, “5-10”, “11-20”, and “20+”.
Features of the Person. Participants were then asked to make 
ratings of their personality, based on the situation they described. All 
ratings were made on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Very Much), 
and followed the question stem, “In this situation...”
Extraversion. In Sample 1, participants rated the extent to which 
they were “Extraverted, enthusiastic” and were “Reserved, Quiet” (reverse 
scored). These two extraversion items (r = .62) were selected from the Ten 
Item Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swan, 2003), and were 
combined to form a composite extraversion item. In Sample 2, I assessed 
extraversion with the single item “I was outgoing, sociable”.
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Social Power. In Sample 1, I assessed social power by asking 
participants to rate the extent to which they “Had a lot of power (e.g., 
can exert influence)”, “Had a lot of status (e.g., is respected by 
others)”, and “Had a lot of class (e.g., has high rank in society)”. In 
Sample 2, I assessed social capital by asking participants to rate the 
extent to which they “Had a lot of power (e.g., can exert influence)” and 
“Had a lot of status (e.g., is respected by others)”. Because these items 
were highly related (Sample 1  = .89; Sample 2 α r = .87) and differences 
between power, status, and class were not the focus of this study, I 
combined these constructs into a single item. Effects replicated across 
all three measures.
Emotion Regulation. In both samples, I measured situational emotion 
regulation use by adapting items from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(Gross & John, 2003). To assess suppression use, participants rated the 
extent to which “I controlled my emotions by keeping them to myself.” In 
Sample 1, I also assessed reappraisal with the item, “I controlled my 
emotions by changing the way I thought about the situation I was in.” 
Reappraisal use was not measured in Sample 2.
Well-Being. I assessed participant well-being with a measure of 
self-esteem (“I had high self-esteem”) and positivity “How did you feel in 
this situation”. In Sample 1, the self-esteem measure ranged from 1 (Not 
at All) to 5 (Very Much), whereas the positivity measure used a scale from 
0 (Bad) to 10 (Good), whereas Sample 2 used a scale from 0 (very negative) 
to 10 (very positive). These items were positively correlated (r = .49 in 
Sample 1, r = .51 in Sample 2) and were combined to form a single index of 
well-being. Effects replicated for both self-esteem and positivity when 
analyzed separately.
Estimating Stable and Situational Effects
To distinguish between the stable and situational components of 
psychological phenomena, I calculated two scores for each construct that 
represent the between-person and within-person level of analysis. To 
describe the between-person level of analysis, I calculated an average 
score for each participant that describes his or her stable pattern of 
response across the different situations. This stable measure did not vary 
across the different situations; each person had one average score for 
each construct. A participant with a high between-person effect for 
suppression would tend to use suppression across all situations. 
To describe the within-person level, I subtracted each participant's 
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rating made during the experience sampling assessment from her or his 
average rating across the different situations (i.e., the between-person 
effect calculated above). This mean-centered variable describes whether 
the person was above or below his own mean for each situation. Unlike the 
between-person effect, this variable did vary across the different 
situations. A participant with a positive within-person effect for 
suppression would be someone who used suppression more in that situation 
than they did on average across all the situations they rated.
Means, standard deviations, ranges, and zero-order correlations 
between all variables, including those not reported in the methods section 
of this chapter, are reported in the Appendix.
Results
Question 1: How Do People Use Suppression in Real-Life Situations?
Hypothesis 1: Suppression use is situational. To test the first 
hypothesis that there would be substantial within-person variation in the 
use of suppression, I used multilevel modeling (Snijders, 2011) to predict 
suppression use from a random intercept that varied between-persons. This 
random intercept model estimates the fixed intercept effect (i.e., what 
the average person's suppression was like), a random intercept for each 
participant that describes the amount of variation due to people being 
different (i.e., between-person variance), as well as an error term that 
describes the amount of variation not explained by between-person 
differences (i.e., within-person variation).
As seen in Table 3, there was substantial between-person variance in 
suppression use; individual differences accounted for 26.7 percent of 
total variation in Sample 1, and 35 percent of variation in suppression 
use in Sample 2. The 95% Confidence Intervals for these effects do not 
include zero, and suggest that these variance estimates are significant. 
These results support past research that there are differences in people's 
stable use of suppression across situations (e.g., English & John, 2013; 
Gross & John, 2003).
However, there was also substantial within-person variation in 
suppression use. In fact, in both Sample 1 and Sample 2 the majority of 
variance in how people use suppression was not explained by stable 
individual differences. Instead, there was considerable variance in how 
people used suppression across situations.
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Table 3. 
Variance in Emotion Regulation Explained by Between- and Within-Person Differences.
Between-Person Variance Within-Person Variance
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 Sample 2
Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
Random Effects
Suppression 26.7 19 , 33 35.1 30 , 40 73.3 67 , 81 64.9 60 , 70
Reappraisal 43.6 35 , 50 -- -- 56.4 50 , 65 -- --
Extraversion 21.2 15 , 27 21.7 18 , 25 78.8 73 , 85 78.3 75 , 83
Social Power 50.7 41 , 57 49.1 43 , 54 49.3 43 , 59 50.9 47 , 57
Note. 95% Confidence Interval estimated using bootstrapping (999 simulations; normal approximation). 
Reappraisal was not measured in Sample 2.
The top panel of Figure 11 illustrates this within-person variation 
as density distributions for the 24 participants in Sample 1 who completed 
the greatest number of experience sampling surveys. Each histogram 
represents the distribution of one person's use of suppression across 
situations, centered by her or his average suppression rating. Thus, even 
after removing between-person differences in the stable use of 
suppression, there is substantial variance in people's use of suppression 
relative to their own mean, illustrating that people differ in their 
suppression use across situations.
Figure 11. Density distribution of centered ratings of situational suppression use (top) and reappraisal 
(bottom) for participants in Sample 1 who completed at least 83% of surveys (N = 24).
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In contrast, in Sample 1 I found less within-person and more 
between-person variation in reappraisal. The 95% confidence intervals for 
reappraisal do not overlap with the 95% confidence intervals for 
suppression, suggesting that participants varied less in their use of 
reappraisal across multiple situations than they varied in suppression. 
This effect is illustrated by the bottom panel of Figure 11, where after 
accounting for individual differences there appears to be less variation 
in the situational use of reappraisal.
Within-person variation in extraversion. I also examined within-
person variation in extraversion and social power as a baseline for 
within-person variation in emotion regulation. Individual differences 
explained a significant percentage of variance in extraversion (Sample 1 
σ2 = 21.2%, 95% CI [15, 27]; Sample 2 σ2 = 21.7; 95% CI [18, 25]). This 
pattern closely matches the 22% of variance explained by between-person 
differences reported by Fleeson and Gallagher (2009) in their meta-
analysis of fifteen of their own experience sampling studies. This 
convergent finding not only serves as an external replication of Fleeson & 
Gallagher's (2009) findings, but also suggests that my methodological and 
statistical approach is representative of other experience sampling 
research.
Question 2: When Do People Use Suppression? 
The substantial within-person variance estimates for suppression 
raises the possibility that there are additional situation-specific and 
personality factors beyond stable individual differences that account for 
when people use suppression. Below, I consider the objective features of 
the situation before examining how suppression use varies as a function of 
both stable and situational differences in personality.
Hypothesis 2A: Situational suppression use varies according to 
objective features of the situation. To test the prediction that 
suppression use varies according to objective features of the situation, I 
built a linear multilevel model to predict suppression use from a 
categorical variable of the types of situations participants were in, a 
categorical variable of the number of people participants interacted with 
in each situation, and a random intercept for participant (which controls 
for between-person effects). Below I report the amount of variance in 
suppression explained by each factor relative to the random intercept 
model used to test Hypothesis 1.
Together, what people were doing and how many people they were with 
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explained around 16 percent of the variance in situational suppression use 
in Sample 1, and 11 percent of the variance in Sample 2. Chi-Square tests 
of fit suggest that both what participants were doing (Sample 1 χ2 = 142, 
df = 26, p < .01; Sample 2 χ2 = 123, df = 26, p < .01) and the number of 
people participants were with (Sample 1 χ2 = 109, df = 6, p < .01; Sample 
2 χ2 = 278, df = 6, p < .01) independently contributed to a significant 
improvement in model fit. Both objective features of the situation 
appeared to explain a significant percentage of variance in the 
situational use of suppression. Estimates of the variance inflation factor 
for regression terms reported in this chapter were all less than three, 
which is well beyond the recommended cutoff of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, & 
Neter, 2004), and suggest that multicollinearity was not a problem.
Figure 12 illustrates these effects by graphing situational 
suppression use as a function of what people were doing (top half) and how 
many other people participants were interacting with (bottom half). 
Suppression scores are reported in relation to the average; positive 
scores indicate that participants reported using suppression more in that 
situation than they did on average, whereas negative scores indicate that 
participants reported using suppression less in that situation than they 
did on average. Across both Sample 1 (left side) and Sample 2 (right 
side), participants were more likely to report using suppression when they 
were studying and reading, and less likely to use suppression when they 
were talking, playing, and arguing. 
The number of people participants interacted with also appeared to 
explain variance in the situational use of suppression. Surprisingly, 
participants reported using suppression more when they were alone than 
with others in both samples. This suggests that suppression is not 
exclusively an interpersonal emotion regulation strategy, but might be 
used even in situations where people are alone. 
The error bars for these effects, however, illustrate that the 
objective features of the situation do not necessarily determine whether 
people use suppression or not. Indeed, even when including both what 
participants were doing and who they were with in a model to predict 
situational suppression use, the majority of variance in situational 
suppression use remains unexplained (Sample 1 residual variance = 59%; 
Sample 2 residual variance = 54%).
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Figure 12. Variance in situational suppression explained by what the person was doing (top half) and how many 
people she or he was with (bottom half) in Sample 1 (left panel) and Sample 2 (right panel). 
Note: Effects relative to the average situational use of suppression.
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Hypothesis 2B: Situational Suppression Use Varies According to 
Features of the Person. To determine whether situational suppression use 
might vary as a function of stable and situational differences in a 
person's level of extraversion and social power, I tested several 
additional linear multilevel models. Specifically, I predicted suppression 
use from between-person measures of extraversion and social power (i.e., 
how participants rated their extraversion and social power on average) and 
within-person measures of extraversion and social power (i.e., how 
participants rated their extraversion and social power in specific 
situations, relative to their own average.) As before, I included a random 
intercept to account for individual differences in the use of suppression. 
Table 4. 
Multilevel Models: Predicting Suppression Use from Stable and Situational Individual Difference Measures.
Standardized Regression Estimates
Null Model Full Model Social Power Extraversion
Random Effects
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Individual Differences .27 .34 .13 .31 .13 .34 .22 .32
Residual .73 .63 .62 .53 .62 .60 .73 .53
Fixed Effects
Intercept .00 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01
Stable
Extraversion -- -- -.02 -.29 * -- -- -.21 * -.16 *
Social Power -- -- -.36 * .17 * -.38 * -.01 -- --
Situational
Extraversion -- -- -.01 -.27 * -- -- -.07 * -.30 *
Social Power -- -- -.33 * -.05 * -.33 * -.18 * -- --
Day .02 .00 .02 -.01 .02 .01 .02 -.01
Hour -.07 * -.06 * -.04 * -.02 -.04 * -.05 * -.07 * -.02
Model Fit
Deviance 3729.5 8495 3730 8928 4018 8537
Comparison to Null χ2=315* χ2=650* 
Note. * = 95% Confidence Interval (estimated using bootstrapping; 999 simulations; normal approximation) does 
not include 0. S1 = Sample 1; S2 = Sample 2. All variables standardized (Z-scored) before being entered into 
the regression equation. 
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Table 4 reports the results from a model predicting suppression use 
from the random intercept alone, the full model described above, as well 
as models predicting suppression use from stable and situational effects 
of social power and extraversion separately. 
Across these models, situational social power emerged as the only 
reliable and significant predictor of suppression use. Participants who 
rated themselves as having less power in a specific situation were 
significantly more likely to use suppression in that situation (Sample 1 β 
= -.33, 95% CI [-.37, -.29]; Sample 2   = -.05; β 95% CI [-.07, -.02]) than 
were participants who rated themselves as having more power in the 
situation.
I replicated past research and found that stable individual 
differences in extraversion were negatively related to suppression use 
(Sample 1  = -.21, β 95% CI [-.33, -.09]; Sample 2   = -.15; β 95% CI 
[-.27, -.06]), suggesting that people who tend to be extraverted on 
average tend to use less suppression on average. The situational use of 
extraversion also appeared to be related to situational suppression use 
(Sample 1  = -.07, β 95% CI [-.11, -.03]; Sample 2   = -.30; β 95% CI 
[-.32, -.28]). Replicating work by Anderson, John, and Keltner (2012), 
social power and extraversion were related at the between-person level 
(Sample 1 r = .53; Sample 2 r = .66) and within-person level (Sample 1 r = 
.18; Sample 2 r = .47), and when accounting for stable and situational 
differences in both extraversion and social power, only social power 
explained a significant amount of variance in suppression use in both 
Sample 1 ( χ2 = 259, df = 1, p < .01) and Sample 2 (χ2 = 13, df = 1, p < .
01).
Finally, I tested whether suppression use would be best predicted by 
concurrent changes in social power, or changes in social power from the 
previous assessment. The results of these lagged analyses were non-
supportive of a causal relationship. Situational suppression was best 
explained by concurrent ratings of social power, and this effect remained 
significant even when controlling for the person's situational suppression 
and social power in the previous assessment. This suggests that 
situational suppression use is explained by the person's social power in 
that moment, and is not a product of the person's use of suppression or 
capital in the previous situation.
Question 3: Why Do People Use Suppression?
Together, these findings support my prediction that broad individual 
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differences and situation-specific differences in personality would 
explain when people used suppression in real-life. That social power was 
the strongest predictor of stable and situational suppression use across 
situations suggests that people use suppression in situations where they 
feel low in power, status, and class, and raises the possibility that 
maladaptive consequences of suppression might be driven, in part, by 
features of the situation.
Hypothesis 3: Situational Suppression Use is Adaptive in 
Situations Where Participants Report Being Low Power. To test this 
possibility, I examined whether suppression use might hold adaptive 
functions in situations where people report being low in social power. 
Specifically, I used a multilevel model to predict well-being from stable 
and situational suppression use, social power, and their interaction. As 
before, I included a random intercept to account for individual 
differences. I also included a random slope coefficient for suppression, 
which describes the amount which the relationship between suppression use 
and well-being varies for different people. A substantial percentage of 
variance in this random slope coefficient would mean that the relationship 
between suppression use and well-being varies for certain individuals. 
(Inclusion of this random slope term does not influence the results 
reported below.)
Results from these models are reported in Table 5. Model 1 describes 
the relationship between well-being and stable and situational suppression 
use. Replicating past research (Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Impett et al., 
2012; English & John, 2013), individuals who generally use suppression 
generally have lower well-being (Sample 1  = -.28, β 95% CI [-.39, -.17]; 
Sample 2   = -.17; 95% CI [-.27, -.06])β . However, I also found that 
situational suppression use was negatively related to well-being (Sample 1 
 = -.21, β 95% CI [-.27, -.15]; Sample 2   = -.20; 95% CI [-.15, -.24]), β
suggesting that in situations where people report using suppression more 
than they normally do, they report less well-being than they do on 
average. These effects are illustrated in the top panel of Figure 13, 
which displays the relationship between well-being and stable suppression 
(left panel) and situational suppression (right panel) in Sample 1.
There was also small, but non-zero amount of variance in the 
relationship between suppression use and well-being within-participants 
(Sample 1  = 1%, 95% CI [.1%, 2%]; Sample 2  = 3%, 95% CI [2%, 4%]). σ σ
Thus, the negative relationship between suppression and well-being is not 
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Table 5. 
Multilevel Models: Predicting Well-Being from Stable and Situations Suppression Use and Social Power.
DV: Well-Being
Model 1
(Suppression)
Model 2
(Suppression + 
Power)
Model 3
(Suppression * 
Power)
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Random Effects (Variances)
Participant .33 .63 .21 .38 .22 .36
Suppression Slope .01 .03 .01 .02 .01 .02
Residual .72 .58 .65 .46 .64 .46
Fixed Effects (Standardized Betas)
Intercept .02 -.01 .02 -.02 -.06 -.03
Day -.08 * -.06 * -.09 * -.07 * -.08 * -.07 *
Hour .04 * .02 * .02 .00 .02 .00
Suppression Use
Stable (.X) -.28 * -.17 * -.08 -.14 * -.07 -.15 *
Situational (.S) -.21 * -.20 * -.10 * -.12 * -.11 * -.12 *
Social Power
Stable (.X) -- -- .31 * .31 * .30 * .31 *
Situational (.S) -- -- .28 * .36 * .27 * .36 *
Interaction
Suppression.S * Power.S -- -- -- -- -.08 * -.03 *
Suppression.S * Power.X -- -- -- -- -.01 -.01
Suppression.X * Power.S -- -- -- -- .01 .02
Suppression.X * Power.X -- -- -- -- -.07 * .01
Model Fit
Deviance 3955 8818 3758 7953 3733 7940
Note. * = bootstrapped 95% CI does not include 0. S1 = Sample 1; S2 = Sample 2
fixed for every person, but varies somewhat depending on the person. As 
seen in Model 2, variation in well-being was also explained both by stable 
and situational differences in social power. People who tend to be high in 
social power have greater overall well-being (Sample 1  = .31, β 95% CI 
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[.19, .45]; Sample 2   = .31; 95% CI [.23, .40]), and people report β
having more well-being than they do on average in situations where they 
have more social power than they do on average (Sample 1  = .28, β 95% CI 
[.24, .32]; Sample 2   = .36; 95% CI [.33, .38]). Critically, including β
these parameters in the model diminished the relationship between well-
being and both stable suppression use (Sample 1  = -.08, β 95% CI [-.21, 
+.06]; Sample 2  = -.14; 95% CI [-.24, -.06]) and situational suppressionβ  
use (Sample 1  = -.10, β 95% CI [-.16, -.05]; Sample 2   = -.12; 95% CI β
[-.16, -.09]). This substantial reduction in variance in well-being 
explained by suppression when accounting for the effects of social power 
on well-being is illustrated in the middle panels of Figure 13. One reason 
suppression holds negative consequences is that people who tend to 
suppress tend to be low in social power, and people tend to use 
suppression in situations where they tend to be low in social power.
In Model 3, I tested whether the negative relationship between 
suppression use and well-being would be moderated as a function of 
people's stable or situational social power. As predicted, I found a small 
but statistically significant interaction effect between situational 
suppression and situational social power in both samples (Sample 1  = β
-.08, 95% CI [-.11, -.05]; Sample 2   = -.03; β 95% CI [-.05, -.01]). 
The bottom right-hand panel of Figure 13 illustrates this 
interaction effect as simple slope estimates that describe the 
relationship between situational suppression use and well-being for 
participants in Sample 1 who scored one standard deviation above the mean 
in social power (solid line) and participants who scored one standard 
deviation below the mean in their situational social power (dashed line). 
When participants are in situations where they are lower in social power 
they they are on average, the relationship between suppression use and 
well-being (Sample 1  = -.03; Sample 2  = -.09) than when participants β β
are in situations where they are higher in social power than they were on 
average (Sample 1   = -.19; Sample 2  = -.15). (The bottom left-hand β β
panel illustrates the between-person interaction effect in Sample 1, 
although it bears repeating that this interaction effect did not replicate 
in Sample 2.)
I also found marginal evidence that stable individual differences in 
social power moderated the relationship between stable suppression use and 
well-being in Sample 1 (  = -.07, β 95% CI [-.14, .01]). This effect is 
illustrated on the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 13, and demonstrates 
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Figure 13. Predicting well-being from stable (left side) and situational (right side) use of suppression (top 
panel); suppression controlling for effects of social power (middle panel); suppression moderated by social 
power (bottom panel) for participants one standard deviation above the mean in social power (solid line) and 
one standard deviation below the mean in social power (dashed line).
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that the relationship between people's stable use of suppression and 
stable self-esteem is negative only for people who tend to be high in 
social power. However, the 95% Confidence Interval for this effect 
included zero, and this pattern of effects did not replicate in Sample 2 
(Sample 1  = .01, β 95% CI [-.08, .08]).
Additional analyses demonstrate that these interaction effects 
remain significant when included in the model alone, that the relationship 
between suppression and well-being does not seem to be significantly 
moderated by extraversion nor does well-being appear to moderate the 
relationship between situational power and suppression use. Only 
situational social power significantly moderated the relationship between 
situational suppression use and well-being in both samples.
Finally, I conducted lagged analyses to test whether the use of 
suppression in situations where participants feel low in social power 
would predict changes in future well-being. These lagged interaction 
effects were not significant: situational suppression use does not lead to 
subsequent changes in well-being.
General Discussion
Across two samples, I found evidence for considerable variation in 
how people use suppression in everyday life situations. Whereas past 
research has identified ways in which suppression can be used in response 
to specific situations (Srivastava et al., 2009; McRae et al., 2011) or on 
a day-to-day basis (e.g., Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; Le & Impett, 2013), 
these findings are the first to demonstrate the extent to which 
suppression use varies across real-life situations. This variation in 
suppression use does not appear to be random error, but instead is 
explained both by objective features of the situation as well as the 
person's subjective appraisal and personality across situations. These 
results suggest that although stable individual differences in suppression 
use exist and predict important social and well-being outcomes, they 
appear to only describe a moderate percentage of variation in how people 
use suppression. 
My goal in conducing these analyses was not to provide a 
comprehensive and definitive account of the features of situations in 
which people suppress. Rather, my findings provide empirical evidence that 
describes suppression more as a dynamic processes than as a static process 
that people use indiscriminately across situations or social interactions. 
Below, I discuss the implications of these findings, and describe future 
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research directions that might address limitations of the current approach 
and help advance the science of emotion regulation research.
Is Suppression Bad, or Does it Happen in Bad Situations? 
In this chapter, I present converging evidence across two samples 
that suppression use is not always maladaptive. Rather, I found that 
suppression use is likely to occur in situations where people feel low in 
social power, and that when the effects of social power are taken into 
consideration, suppression use appears to be less maladaptive. That the 
relationship between suppression use and well-being was explained, in 
part, by the relationship between suppression and social power provides 
empirical evidence in support of social functionalist accounts of emotion 
(e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999). 
These findings, however, are not inconsistent with the considerable 
body of past research on emotion regulation that demonstrates the negative 
intra- and interpersonal consequences associated with stable individual 
differences or experimentally manipulated suppression use (e.g., Gross & 
Levenson, 1993; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004; Butler et al., 
2003; Nezlek & Kuppens, 2008; English & John, 2013). Indeed, I replicated 
past work by showing that the stable use of suppression is related to 
reduced well-being. However, these findings suggest that suppression use 
might be an important regulation strategy that helps certain people in 
certain situations avoid punishments. Future research on emotion 
regulation might examine whether people strategically use suppression in 
certain situations or relationship contexts in order to achieve certain 
outcomes. For example, although past research suggests that people who 
tend to use suppression tend to have less close relationships with others, 
it is possible that people use suppression in part because they feel less 
close to those others.
Testing for causality of suppression's effects. One limitation 
of the current study is that I was not able to establish causality for the 
relationship between suppression and social power, or for the moderating 
effect of social power on the relationship between suppression and well-
being. Multilevel regression analyses using lagged effects for predictors 
and dependent variables yielded consistent results – the effects of social 
power on suppression (and on suppression's relationship to well-being) 
appear to be best described by concurrent effects. The null results of 
these lagged analyses hold three different possibilities.
First, it is possible that relationships between suppression and 
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social power are simply correlational artifacts of general response 
tendencies. Supplementary analyses refute this idea by demonstrating that 
1) the relationship between suppression and social power remains 
significant even when accounting for extraversion, 2) that the 
relationship between suppression and well-being is not moderated by 
extraversion, but only by social power, and 3) that well-being did not 
moderate the relationship between situational capital and suppression use. 
Together, these results suggest that the correlational relationships are 
specific to social power and suppression.
Second, it is possible that the experience sampling methods used in 
this study were not properly calibrated to identify lagged effects of 
suppression on well-being. Participants were assessed at two hour 
intervals; the consequences of using suppression on future well-being 
might be more immediate (which would require more frequent assessments) or 
less immediate (which would require less frequent assessments). Indeed, I 
did not find any lagged effects of suppression alone on well-being. Future 
research might employ other kinds of repeated measures designs, such as 
the day reconstruction method (Kahneman et al., 2004), or a more intensive 
experience sampling approach in order to account for more nuanced causal 
processes.
Third, it is possible that the effects of social power on 
suppression are concurrent; that is, suppression is used in situations 
where people feel low in social power. It's unclear, then, whether changes 
in social power at one time point would lead people to use suppression at 
another time point.
Although lagged effects are often used to make claims about causal 
processes (e.g., Bolger & Laurenceau, 2013), experimental manipulation is 
considered the gold standard for determining causal relationships. Thus, 
even in the presence of null lagged effects, it remains is unclear whether 
social power causes people to use suppression, or whether suppression use 
causes people to feel low in social power. Future research might employ 
social psychological techniques to determine whether experimentally 
manipulating a participant's social power. Like most things in life, it's 
likely that the exists a bi-directional relationship, in which expressive 
suppression is not only used by people low in social power, but also 
functions to keep people there.
Can suppression be “good”? I did not find evidence that 
suppression had positive outcomes; at best suppression use appears to be 
59
non-negatively related to well-being. This suggests that suppression might 
act more as a buffer against negative outcomes than as a beneficial 
emotion regulation strategy like reappraisal. Although reappraisal still 
remains the gold-standard for an effective and beneficial emotion 
regulation strategy, it's not clear that every situation can be 
reappraised in an adaptive way. Suppression might therefore serve as a 
“handbrake” that helps prevent people from suffering negative consequences 
as a result of expressing certain emotions in certain situations.
Future research might examine other individual difference and 
situations-specific features to determine when, where, and for whom 
suppression use can be adaptive. Another limitation of this study is that 
I did not measure people's goals for using suppression in specific 
situations, though emerging research suggests that suppression use can 
have different outcomes depending on the person's culture or relationship 
specific goals (Impett et al., 2012; English & John, 2013; Le & Impett, 
2013). Future research might seek to help people learn to identify the 
kinds of situations and social interactions in which it is adaptive and 
maladaptive to use suppression. Such research might allow clinicians to 
help people more effectively regulate their emotions by identifying the 
kinds of situations in which it is more or less beneficial to use 
suppression.
Understanding Who and When People Use Emotion Regulation in Real-
Life Contexts
Whereas past approaches define emotion regulation in terms of the 
component of emotion that each strategy affects (Gross, 1998b), this 
chapter also demonstrates that emotion regulation strategies can differ in 
the way that they are used across different situations. For example, 
reappraisal appears to be used more consistently across situations that 
suppression, although I was not able to test whether this effect would 
replicate in Sample 2. 
Across both samples, I also found replicating patterns in the kinds 
of situations in that people reported using suppression. For example, 
although past research has emphasize the interpersonal nature of 
expressive suppression (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006; Campos et al., 
2011), these results suggest that people also use suppression in non-
social situations. Future research might examine differential consequences 
associated with using suppression in social vs. non-social situations. 
Researchers seeking to better understand how emotion regulatory processes 
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differ might borrow methods from emotion appraisal literature to identify 
whether there are certain situations in which strategies like suppression 
and reappraisal are more or less likely to be used. 
Although understanding within-person variation in suppression was 
the focus of this study, the situation-specific framework used in this 
chapter might also be applied to address new and existing questions about 
reappraisal and other emotion regulation strategies. For example, while 
reappraisal exhibited substantially more stability across situations than 
suppression, I found evidence that people varied in their use of 
reappraisal across situations. What situations do people use reappraisal 
in? Are people always able to use reappraisal when they want to, or are 
there some situations in which they want to reappraise but cannot find a 
way to reframe the situation? In the same way that a maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategy like suppression can serve adaptive social functions, 
are there ways and situations in which reappraisal might hold negative 
intra- or interpersonal consequences? 
Furthermore, the experience sampling method used in this chapter 
might be adapted to study other emotion regulatory processes. Though 
suppression and reappraisal dominate the emotion regulation literature 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007), other emotion regulation strategies operate by 
changing the way people interact with their situations. Future research 
might examine how people approach or avoid situations in order to change 
their emotions (Gross, 2009).  These findings suggest that researchers 
seeking to understand why people use a maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategy might examine how people use suppression in specific situations.
61
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
The goal of this dissertation has been to demonstrate how a within-
person approach to personality enables researchers to ask and answer new 
questions about psychological processes. In Chapter 1, I introduced this 
dissertation with a description of the conceptual reasons for studying 
within-person variation, a summary of the assessment and analytic methods 
that underlie the within-person approach to research, and an outline of 
three broad research questions that can be tested through within-person 
methods. In Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrated the relevance of within-
person variation to different psychological phenomenon by testing 
hypotheses related to how a person varies in her or his level of social 
hierarchy or use of suppression across different situations. In this final 
chapter, I summarize the major findings from Chapters 2 and 3 as they 
relate to the three broad research questions outlined in Chapter 1, and 
discuss the broader contributions and limitations of this dissertation 
research. I then conclude with a discussion future research directions.
Three Within-Person Research Questions
How Much Within-Person Variation is There?
In Chapter 2, I found that three related hierarchical dimensions – 
social power, status, and class – exhibited different patterns of within-
person variation. Social power was the least stable dimension of social 
hierarchy, and exhibited the most within-person variation compared to 
social status and social class. In contrast, social class was the most 
stable dimension of social hierarchy, and exhibited significantly less 
within-person variation compared to social power. Social status, in turn, 
fell in between social power and class in its degree of within-person 
variation.
In Chapter 3, I found substantial within-person variation in 
people's use of expressive suppression – a response-focused strategy that 
regulates the way a person displays his or her emotion in the face and 
body. In contrast, I found less within-person variation in people's use of 
cognitive reappraisal – an antecedent-focused strategy that regulates 
emotion by changing a person's construal of a situation. Someone who uses 
reappraisal in one situation is more likely to use it in other situations 
than someone who uses suppression in one situation. This finding suggests 
that cognitive reappraisal represents more of a stable individual 
difference in ability than expressive suppression, which appears to vary 
from situation to situation.
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That ratings of social class still exhibited substantial within-
person variation (albeit significantly less variation than social power) 
suggests that even broad psychological dimensions that are influenced by 
relatively stable background characteristics are dynamic at the level of a 
person's self-perceptions. In fact, every variable reported in this 
dissertation, along with variables from other research on emotion and 
personality, demonstrate substantial within-person variation in other 
psychological dimensions.
Such research raises the possibility that all psychological 
processes operate within-persons. This idea is falsifiable using 
conventional research methods, and researchers may one day uncover some 
psychological process that is entirely stable across situations. However 
it's difficult to imagine a domain of human thought, feeling, or behavior 
that is invariant across all social contexts. Human life is complex, our 
situations and relationships change from moment to moment, and self-
perceptions are likely to be dynamic to the extent that they are shaped by 
these varying environmental factors.
Rather than seek to determine if a specific psychological domain 
varies within persons, researchers might instead focus on how that domain 
varies within-persons compared to other related psychological domains. In 
this dissertation, I took this approach by contrasting the amount of 
within-person variation in suppression use to reappraisal, and comparing 
the amount of within-person variation among related dimensions of social 
hierarchy. Researchers interested in examining within-person processes in 
their own fields of research will need to identify relevant dimensions for 
comparison that are based on existing theory and research.
What Predicts Within-Person Variation?
A second goal of this dissertation was to describe the sources of 
within-person variation in expressive suppression and social hierarchy. 
Specifically, I examined whether within-person variation would be 
explained by features of the situation (i.e., what the person was doing 
and who the person was with) as well as features of the person (i.e., what 
the person was like in a specific situation.)
In Chapter 2, I found that hierarchical dimensions like social 
power, status, and class differ in their sources of within-person 
variation. Furthermore, this differentiation followed patterns consistent 
with past theory on social hierarchy For example, whereas the situation a 
person was in was a strong source of within-person variation in social 
power (which is based on a person's construal of his or her ability to 
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influence a situation), the number of other people in the situation was a 
stronger source of within-person variation in social status (which is 
based on others' evaluations of the self) than either social power or 
class.
In Chapter 3, I found that suppression use varied as a function of 
both what the person was doing and with whom the person was. However, one 
of the strongest sources of variation in expressive suppression was the 
person's level of social power in a specific situation. More specifically, 
I found that people are more likely to report using suppression in 
situations where they feel low in social power and status than in 
situations where they feel high in these hierarchical dimensions.
In both chapters, I identified specific features of the situation 
and relationship context that influenced whether a person felt more or 
less of a psychological dimension than she or he did on average. Although 
these effects replicated across both sample, it's unclear to what extent 
these effects of specific social and relationship context self-perceived 
social hierarchy or suppression use will generalize to populations outside 
of the Berkeley undergraduate students sampled in this dissertation. For 
example, I found that ratings of social class were significantly higher 
than average when participants were talking with another person. These 
conversations were likely between Berkeley students aware of their 
relative privilege in society; social class during conversations might 
very well be significantly lower than average when measured for other 
groups of people.
I place somewhat more confidence in effect of the broader 
relationship between what the person was doing and social class. In 
contrast to the effect of “having a conversation” (a specific level of the 
broader factor) on social class, the effect of “what the person was doing” 
(the broader factor) on social class is more likely to generalize to other 
populations because it aggregates the noise associated with specific 
situations. That is, low-level employees at a large corporation may not 
feel high in class when on the phone (inconsistent with my research), but 
will be more likely to vary little in class as a function of what they are 
doing (consistent with my research). 
For the same reason, I would expect that relationships between 
people's self-perceptions will generalize between populations, since these 
self-perceptions are likely to be less dependent on the specific 
population. An undergraduate student may feel lower in power when working 
than a corporate executive would feel, however the experience of low power 
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is likely to be similar for each.
Regardless of my confidence (which both social psychological 
research and real-life experience informs me can often be a poor metric to 
place faith in), these expectations can be tested empirically. To 
determine how these effects generalize in other populations, I might use 
experience sampling methods (or other methods of within-person assessment) 
with non-student populations, and evaluate not only whether my effects 
replicate, but also whether the effects of specific situations are more or 
less likely to replicate than the effects of more general features of 
situations or persons.
What Does Within-Person Variation Predict?
The third goal of this dissertation was to examine the ways in which 
within-person variation might itself predict behavior. The repeated 
measurement required for studies of within-person variation allows 
researchers to conduct cross-lagged analyses, in which they test whether 
changes in one construct predict later changes in another. 
In Chapter 2, I found that changes in social class predicted 
subsequent changes in social power and status, but changes in social power 
and status did not predict subsequent changes in social class. When 
someone feels like she or he climbs the social ladder, the benefit she or 
he receives “trickles down” to his or her feeling of power and status in 
later interactions.
In Chapter 3, I found that the situational use of suppression was 
less negatively related to well-being than the stable use of suppression. 
Furthermore, I found evidence that when people use suppression in 
situations where they feel low power, they suffer no negative consequences 
for well-being. However, cross-lagged analyses were not significant: the 
interaction effect only held for variables measured at the same time. This 
raises two alternative explanations: either this pattern of associations 
is not causal, or the experience sampling method used in this study did 
not have the needed power or precision to detect a causal relationship.
Together, these findings demonstrate the ways in which within-person 
methods of assessment can challenge existing ideas and advance 
understanding about psychological processes. Though cross-lagged analyses 
are often used to make claims about causal processes, experimental 
manipulation remains the “gold standard” for establishing causality in 
scientific research. These correlational findings should therefore be 
supplemented with experimental research.
Future Research Directions
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Mapping Uncharted Domains of Within-Person Variation
Like past research, this dissertation focuses on psychological 
variables that historically have been studied through between-person 
methods. However, future research should examine the potential for within-
person methods of assessment to examine variables that are difficult to be 
studied through broad individual difference measures or experimental 
manipulations.
For example, one emotion regulation strategy that has received 
little attention in psychological research is situation selection – a 
strategy in which people regulate their emotions by changing the situation 
they are in. (The example that I use with my students is that since I 
don't like being startled, I don't go to scary movies.) Using experience 
sampling methods, researchers might be able to ask participants about the 
extent to which they used situation selection to seek out their current 
situation (or avoid their previous situation.) 
Other research might examine the utility of using experience 
sampling methods to administer interventions. Researchers might use a 
series of “if-then” commands to trigger a relevant message in the context 
of certain situations, emotions, or self-appraisals. For example, 
researchers interested in helping people avoid digital distractions might 
remind people to turn off their computer if the person is online and 
experiencing low self-esteem.
Best Practices
Research insights are only as valid and reliable as their methods, 
and within-person methods of assessment require researchers to make many 
decisions about how to collect data. For example, in terms of 
administering surveys to participants, researchers need to decide when to 
schedule assessments, how many assessments to schedule, and whether the 
schedule should be consistent, random, or determined based on some feature 
of the situation (e.g., when the person is detected to be with others). 
Each decision has the potential to influence the researchers' 
results. For example, asking participants to rate their use of suppression 
each day over the course of a month (for a total of 30 assessments) may 
not provide the level of precision required to study the kinds of 
situations in which suppression use holds adaptive consequences.
What are the best-practices of experience sampling research? Though 
some researchers have outlined the decisions that are possible or offered 
suggestions based on their own experiences, no research has yet conducted 
a methodological meta-analysis to evaluate the decisions researchers make 
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about how many surveys to administer, that are likely to influence effect 
estimates and the power to detect them.
On Learning More About Persons.
Potential insights gained from an attempt to document “best-
practices” in experience sampling methods may be short-lived. By the time 
this dissertation is published and read, new methods of within-person 
assessment will likely have been developed. Advances in technology have 
reduced the cost of acquiring participant data, and academic and industry 
researchers of the future will be able to learn about what people are like 
with increasing levels of precision. Existing devices and techniques can 
already measure a person's exact location (GPS), real-time emotion (vocal 
data), and physiological behavior (heart rate monitors on watches). 
Researchers can expect that other variables will soon be available for 
analysis, and as real-life moves into the digital environment, every 
click, movement, and behavior will be logged for future analysis.
Only time will tell what consequences this trend toward total 
quantification of the self will hold for society. For psychologists, these 
methods will provide a level of precision and access to populations that 
were previously inconceivable. Indeed, “big data” approaches to psychology 
are beginning to analyze large sets of data to answer new questions about 
between-person effects; researchers and data scientists will likely soon 
begin to examine precise patterns of consistency and change in people's 
behavior using within-person methods. With enough participants and precise 
measures of human behavior, psychological science may be able to develop 
models that predict human behavior with startling accuracy in real-time.
Yet it is unclear whether this endeavor is possible, or even good 
for the field. Allport (1955) felt that the failure among psychologists to 
take an interest in “the existential richness of human life” wasn't just a 
matter of methodological limitations. In the quotation I introduced this 
dissertation with, Allport continues to write:
Methods, they say, are lacking. Or, more exactly stated, the methods 
available fall short of the stringent requirements laid down by 
modern positivism. In their desire to emulate the established 
sciences psychologists are tempted to tackle only those problems, 
and to work on only those organisms, that yield to acceptable 
mathematical psychology highly developed. So dominant is the 
positivistic ideal that other fields of psychology came to be 
regarded as not quite reputable. Special aversion attaches to 
problems having to do with complex motives, high-level integration, 
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with conscience, freedom, self hood. As we have said, in large part 
it is the relative lack of objective methods of study that accounts 
for this aversion. But the explanation lies also in the preference 
of positivism for externals rather than internals, for elements 
rather than patterns, for geneticist, and for a passive or reactive 
organism rather than for one that is spontaneous and active. (p. 
11-12)
In the modern era of “big data”, social and personality 
psychologists are closer to emulating the hard sciences today than they 
were fifty years ago. To what extent should researchers' questions be 
guided by information made available to them by companies that promote 
modern technologies? What aspects of human life are ignored by such 
methods? Might effects in psychology fail to replicate in part because 
human life does not reduce to statistical models? To ensure psychology 
captures the full extent of human life, future research should balance 
this march toward positivistic progress with qualitative approaches.
In this dissertation, I sought to capitalize on recent 
methodological advances to advance psychologists understanding of social 
hierarchy and emotion regulation processes. However, it is unclear whether 
these insights were dependent on these new methods. Do researchers need to 
be convinced by quantitative data that there are contexts in which hiding 
emotions from others can be adaptive? Would qualitative methods (or even 
anecdotes that resonate with readers) allow for similar insights?
Summary
People are not static, but exhibit remarkable change as they go from 
one situation, relationship context, or moment in time to another. In 
order to model this change, researchers need methods that allow for 
multiple assessments of people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors across 
a variety of real-life situations and social interactions. This within-
person approach has the potential to not only advance researchers' 
understanding of complex psychological processes, but also allow 
researchers to develop tools that might help people learn how to best 
navigate what Allport called the “existential richness of everyday life.”
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Appendix: Complete List of Measures
Samples A and B: 
sid What is your ID (Initials + birth month + day: eg. NC0401)?
sit What were you doing in the last 30 minutes (before taking this survey)?
--choose an activity-- 
(1)
Online social 
networking (11)
Talking, conversation 
(22)
Browsing the internet 
(27)
On the computer 
(offline) (12)
Walking, taking a walk 
(23)
Commuting (2) On a mobile device. 
(13)
Watching television 
(24)
Cooking / Eating (3) Outdoors (14) Working (25)
Exercising (4) Playing (15) Other (26)
Fighting, Arguing (5) Praying, meditation 
(16)
Grooming, self-care (6) Reading (17)
Hanging out with 
friends (7)
Relaxing, doing nothing 
(18)
Housework (8) Shopping, errands (19)
In a meeting (9) Sleep (20)
Listening to music, 
podcast (10)
Studying (21)
emo  What primary emotion were you feeling in this situation?
--choose an emotion-- (4) embarrassed (20)
accomplished (3) excited (21)
afraid (5) focused (22)
amused (6) frustrated (23)
angry (7) grateful (24)
annoyed (8) guilty (25)
anxious (9) happy (26)
arrogant (10) inspired (27)
ashamed (11) interested (28)
bored (12) jealous (29)
calm (13) lonely (30)
confident (14) loving (31)
confused (15) sad (32)
contemptuous (16) superior (33)
determined (17) surprised (34)
disgusted (18) sympathetic (35)
dismissive (19) tired (36)
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int How intense was this emotion?
--choose an intensity-- (1)
0 - Very Weak (2)
1 (3)
2 (4)
3 (5)
4 (6)
5 - Moderate (7)
6 (8)
7 (9)
8 (10)
9 (11)
10 - Very Strong (12)
val How pleasant was this emotion?
--choose a valence (pos/neg)-- (1)
0 - Very Negative (2)
1 (3)
2 (4)
3 (5)
4 (6)
5 - Fair (7)
6 (8)
7 (9)
8 (10)
9 (11)
10 - Very Positive (12)
soc How many other people were you directly interacting with in this situation?
--choose a number of people-- (1)
0 (I was alone) (2)
1 (3)
2 (4)
3-4 (5)
5-10 (6)
11-20 (7)
20+ (8)
sis In this situation...
Not at 
All 1 
(1)
2 (2) Some3 
(3)
4   (4) Very 
Much5 
(5)
I was extraverted, enthusiastic. (1)     
I was sympathetic, warm. (2)     
I was dependable, self-disciplined. (3)     
I was open to new experiences, complex. 
(4)
    
I was reserved, quiet. (5)     
I was critical, quarrelsome. (6)     
I was disorganized, careless. (7)     
I had high self-esteem. (8)     
I feared others' negative evaluations. 
(9)
    
I had a great deal of power (e.g., can 
exert influence). (11)
    
I sought out people or situations to feel 
a certain way. (19)
    
I had a lot of social status (e.g., is     
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respected by others). (12)
I controlled my emotions by keeping them 
to myself.(20)
    
I avoided people or situations to feel a 
certain way. (21)
    
I was high in social class (e.g., has 
high rank in society). (13)
    
I controlled my emotions by changing the 
way I thought about the situation I was 
in. (16)
    
oid What were the initials of the person you were interacting with?
rel How do you know this person?
 --choose relationship type-- (1)
 Close friend (9)
 Friend / other student (8)
 Family member (2)
 Romantic partner (3)
 Colleague / co-worker (4)
 Boss / teacher (5)
 Employee / student (6)
 Acquaintance; stranger (7)
ois The person I was interacting with in this situation...
Not at All1 
(1)
2 (2) Some3 (3) 4   (4) Very Much5 
(5)
Was extraverted, 
enthusiastic. (1)
    
Had a lot of social power 
(e.g., can exert influence). 
(6)
    
Had high self-esteem. (2)     
Had a lot of social status 
(e.g., is respected by 
others). (3)
    
Is someone I felt close to. 
(4)
    
Keeps her/his emotions to 
her/himself. (5)
    
Was high in social class 
(e.g., has high rank in 
society). (7)
    
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Sample C
Q9 What is your ID (Initials + birth month + birth day)?
do What were you doing just before you received this survey?
Browsing the internet (1) Outdoors (14)
Commuting (2) Playing (15)
Cooking / Eating (3) Praying, meditation (16)
Exercising (4) Reading (17)
Fighting, Arguing (5) Relaxing, doing nothing (18)
Grooming, self-care (6) Shopping, errands (19)
Hanging out with friends (7) Sleep (20)
Housework (8) Studying (21)
In a meeting (9) Talking, conversation (22)
Listening to music, podcast (10) Walking, taking a walk (23)
Online social networking (11) Watching television (24)
On the computer (offline) (12) Working (25)
On a mobile device. (13) Other (26)
feel How did you feel in this situation?
 0 - Very Negative (1)
 1 (2)
 2 (3)
 3 (4)
 4 (5)
 5 - Fair (6)
 6 (7)
 7 (8)
 8 (9)
 9 (10)
 10 - Very Positive (11)
with How many other people were you interacting with?
 0 (1)
 1 (2)
 2 (3)
 3-4 (4)
 5-10 (5)
 11-20 (6)
 20+ (7)
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self In this situation...
Not at 
All1 (1)
2 (2) Some3 (3) 4   (4) Very 
Much5 (5)
I controlled my 
emotions by keeping 
them to myself. (1)
    
I sought out people 
or activities to feel 
a certain way. (2)
    
I was outgoing, 
sociable. (3)
    
I had high self-
esteem. (4)
    
I was authentic. (5)     
I had a lot of 
status. (6)
    
I had a lot of power. 
(7)
    
oth (Skip these questions if you were alone.)The people I was interacting with in this 
situation...
Not at 
All1 (1)
2 (2) Some3 (3) 4   (4) Very Much5 
(5)
Were outgoing. (1)     
Had high self-
esteem. (2)
    
Had a lot of status. 
(3)
    
Had a lot of power. 
(4)
    
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Samples A and B
Methods
Participants filled out a pre-questionnaire containing self-reports of personality and 
nominated peers to rate their personality; participants were then contacted via 
smartphone 6 times a day for 6 days, and asked to complete a variety of ratings about the 
situation they were in, and their emotions, behaviors, personality, and social 
interactions within that specific situation.
Participants
Sample Size:
 77 participants completed the pre-questionnaire. 
 69 participants answered at least one experience smapling.
 56 participants remain after cleaning procedures.
Sample Size = 77 ppts (pre-questionnaire)
 Gender: 87% female (n = 67); 13% Male (n = 10)
 Age: Mean = 20.97; Median = 21; SD = 2.07; Range = 18 - 28
 Ethnicity: 56% Asian; 25% White; 8% Latino; 5% Middle Eastern; 5% Other; 1% Black
Sample Size = 56 ppts (after cleaning); 2 ppts did not provide demographic information.
 Gender: 89% female (n = 48); 11% male (n = 6)
 Age: Mean = 21.13; Median = 21; SD = 2.19; Range = 18-28
 Ethnicity: 50% Asian; 32% White; 9% Latino; 4% Middle Eastern; 4% Other; 2% Black
Procedures
Experience Sampling Filtering
 Time Spent on the Assessment: 
◦ Mean = 4.46; Median = 1.65; SD = 27.86; Range = .11 – 1004.68
◦ Filtered by: 30 seconds - 3X SD (88 minutes); removed: 21 assessments; 0 
participants
 Responses with a low standard deviation across the items
◦ Mean = 1.07; Median = 1.08; SD = .42; Range = 0 – 2.1
◦ Filtered: greater than .01; removed: 80 assessments; 0 ppts.
 Percent of Surveys Completed:
◦ Mean = 67.2%; Median = 77.8; SD = 28.43; Range = 5.6 – 108.33
◦ Filtered: Completed more than 40%; removed: 92 assessments; 13 participants
 Final N = 56 participants. Two participants did not complete pre-Questionnaire.
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Measures
 Educational background: 59% Cal (n = 32); 41% CC (n = 22)
 Family income: 
    mom.inc dad.inc
<15k       27.78   14.81
15-25k      7.41    7.41
25-35k      5.56    7.41
35-50k     12.96   12.96
50-75k     16.67    7.41
75-100k     7.41   14.81
100-150k   12.96   11.11
>150k       3.70   16.67
NA's        5.56    7.41  
 Family level of education:
    mom.ed dad.ed
hs       5      5
HS       8      5
c        3      4
AD       4      1
C       17     20
gs       1      0
M       11     14
PhD      5      5
Self-Report Questionnaires:
Measure Mean SD Range Alpha
Big Five Inventory (44-item)
Extraversion 4.3 1.2 1.2 – 6.8 .89
Agreeableness 5 .86 3.3 – 6.9 .80
Conscientiousness 4.7 .76 2.6 – 6.6 .76
Neuroticism 4.1 1.2 1.8-6.6 .87
Openness 4.5 .84 2.7-6.5 .79
Sense of Power Scale (8-item) 4.7 .89 2.1-7 .87
Social Status Measure (5-item) 4.3 1.1 1-7 .95
Emotion
Positive Affect Scale (13-items) 4.7 .75 2.5 – 6.1 .86
Negative Affect Scale (18-items) 3.4 .92 1.7 – 5.0 .90
Ambivalence over Expressivity 4.3 1.2 1 - 6.9 .89
Emotion Regulation
Suppression (4-item) 3.5 1.2 1 - 6.3 .72
Reappraisal (6-item) 5 1 2.5 - 7 .88
Situation Selection –Approach (7-item) 5 .88 2.9 - 6.7 .73
Situation Selection–Avoidance (3-item) 4.9 1.1 2 - 7 .76
Well-Being
Rosenberg Self-Esteem (10-item) 4.7 1.2 2 - 6.8 .93
Fear of Negative Evaluations (6-item) 4.7 1.1 2.2 - 7 .83
Interpersonal Support (12 - items) 5.3 1 3 - 6.8 .90
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Authenticity (6-item) 4.6 1.1 1.7 - 6.3 .84
Zero-Order Correlations Among Self-Rated Personality Constructs
Descriptive Statistics: Experience Sampling Questionnaire
Measure Mean SD Range
Self-Ratings
Extraversion (2-item) 2.8 1.3 1 – 5
Agreeableness (2-item) 3.6 .84 1 – 5
Conscientiousness (2-item) 3.7 .86 1 – 5
Openness 3.0 1.3 1 – 5
Self-Esteem 3.0 1.1 1 – 5
Fear of Negative Evaluations 2.0 1.2 1 – 5
Power 2.6 1.2 1 – 5
Status 2.5 1.2 1 – 5
Class 2.4 1.2 1 – 5
Reappraisal 2.5 1.2 1 – 5
Suppression 3.2 1.3 1 – 5
Situation Selection (Approach) 2.2 1.2 1 – 5
Situation Selection (Avoid) 2.2 1.2 1 – 5
Ratings of Others
Extraversion 3.6 1.1 1 – 5
Self-Esteem 3.7 .89 1 – 5
Status 3.4 1.0 1 – 5
Power 3.3 1.0 1 – 5
Class 3.0 1.0 1 – 5
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Suppression 3.7 1.0 1 – 5
Closeness 3.7 1.3 1 – 5
Zero-Order Correlations Among Experience Sampling Measures
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Sample C
Data Cleaning:
Step 1: Merge together separate ESM time-points and re-label variables. 
Step 2: Remove Duplicated Rows
 Duplicates due to the following:
a) Errors in online submission.
b) Merging in R
c) Participant re-submissions (novelty; show to friend) → First submission used.
 105 duplicate responses removed
Data Filtering:
Step 1: Filter by time spent on response (in seconds)
 Mean = 106.4 sec; Median = 53 sec; 50% between 41 and 74 sec.; Max = 25850 sec.
 Fleeson: Exclude > .5 seconds per item.
 Inclusion Criteria: > 20 seconds & < 600 seconds → 77 responses deleted.
92
Step 2: Filter by responses with low standard deviation.
 Mean = 1.09, Median = 1.07; Range = 0 – 2.29; 50% Between .77 and 1.41.
 Fleeson: Exclude when 90% of responses are identical.
 Inclusion Criteria: SD > 0 → 368 responses deleted (361 responses in addition to 
last filter)
Step 3: Filter by participants with low completion rate.
 Mean = 76.6; Median = 86.1; 50% between 75 and 88.9; Range 2.8 – 100.
 Fleeson: N/A
 My inclusion: Greater than 40% → 12 participants removed.
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 Wave 1 N = 164 Participants
 Wave 2 N = 154 Participants
 Wave 3 N = 140 Participants
 Age:
◦ Mean = 21.74
◦ Median = 21
◦ Range = 19 – 40
◦ SD = 3.14
◦ NA = 7
◦ ** Participants over the age 
of 30 removed (N = 134)
▪ Mean = 21
▪ Median = 21
▪ Range = 19-28
▪ SD = 1.7
 Sex
◦ Male = 46 (34%)
◦ Female = 83 (62%)
◦ NA = 5
 Ethnicity - Asian v. Non-Asian
◦ 34 White (25%)
◦ 2 Black (1%)
◦ 13 Latino (10%)
◦ 69 Asian (51%)
◦ 9 Middle Eastern (7%)
◦ 2 Other (1%)
◦ 5 NA  (4%)
 Year in School - Upper v. Lower
◦ Sophomore = 3
◦ Junior = 87
◦ Senior = 45
◦ 5th Year = 8
◦ 6th Year = 1
◦ N/A = 23
 Transfer Student - CC vs. UCB
◦ No = 69
◦ Yes, CC = 46
◦ NA = 19
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Descriptive Statistics
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R Code: Data Cleaning – Sample A
## Steps not completed in R
## check for mispelled SIDs
## delete single / researcher responses (ADC / GOMI / TEST)
## use IP to fill-in missing SIDs
## check for mispelled oIDs
## Libraries
library(lme4)
library(psych)
library(chron)
## Load data
setwd('~/Downloads/Dropbox/Research/Dissertation/V3/')
data <- read.csv('ESM_v3_021015_IDclean.csv')
## Remove and Rename variables.
## done in excel.
## CREATE NEW VARIABLES
## TIME SPENT ON SURVEY
time.spent <- as.numeric((as.POSIXlt(data$end) - as.POSIXlt(data$start)))
data$time.sec <- time.spent/60
summary(data$time.sec)
sd(data$time.sec)
## ASSESSMENT NUMBER (TIME)
# Create time variables.
time.frame <- t(as.data.frame(strsplit(as.character(data$start), ' ')))
data$time.date <- chron(time.frame[,1], time.frame[,2], format = c(dates = 'y-m-d', times = 'h:m:s'))
data$time.days <- as.numeric(as.factor(as.numeric(days(data$time.date)))) # assessment day 
data$time.hour <- as.numeric(hours(data$time.date)) # assessment hour
hist(as.numeric(data$time.date), breaks = 100,
     col = 'black', border = 'white') # XXX: Relabel X values.
hist(data$time.days, xlim = c(1,6), breaks = 24,
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
hist(data$time.hour, breaks = 24, xlim = c(8,24),
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
## ESM Data Filter
## FILTER by three times the sd for time spent.
dataX1 <- subset(data, data$time.sec < (mean(data$time.sec) + 3* sd(data$time.sec)))
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nrow(data) - nrow(dataX1) # 11 rows removed.
## 2. filter by responses with low SD.
colnames(dataX1)
dataX1 <- transform(dataX1, sd.response=apply(dataX1[,10:21], 1, sd, na.rm = TRUE))
summary(dataX1$sd.response)
hist(dataX1$sd.response, breaks = 30)
dataX2 <- subset(dataX1, dataX1$sd.response > .01)
hist(dataX2$sd.response, breaks = 30) # better
## Step 3. filter by % completed.
complete <- stats:::aggregate.formula(time.date ~ sid, dataX2, length)
complete$completed <- complete$time.date
summary(complete$completed/.36)
hist((complete$completed), breaks = 40, xlim = c(0, 36),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
#comp.filt <- subset(complete, completed >= 14) # only ppts who completed 40% or more.
#comp.filt
#comp.filt <- comp.filt[,-2]
complete <- complete[,-2]
dataX3 <- merge(dataX2, complete, by = "sid")
nrow(dataX3) - nrow(dataX2)
summary(dataX3$completed)
dataX3F <- subset(dataX3, completed >=14)
nrow(dataX3F) - nrow(dataX3)
dataX3F$sid <- as.factor(as.character(dataX3F$sid))
length(levels(dataX3F$sid)) - length(levels(dataX3$sid))
dataX3F$IDX <- as.factor(as.numeric(as.factor(dataX3F$sid)))
write.csv(dataX3F, 'esm_V3_filtered.csv', row.names = F)
####
#################################################
## Create full time frame.
data <- read.csv('esm_V3_filtered.csv')
#0. Create assessment number for each participant
summary(as.factor(data$time.days)) # day of assessment
summary(as.factor(data$time.hour)) # time of assessment
# combine day and time; 
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data$code <- paste(as.factor(as.character(data$time.days)), as.factor(as.character(data$time.hour)), sep = '')
data$code <- as.factor(paste(data$time.days, data$time.hour, sep = ''))
code <- data$code
length(code) # check to make sure same length as data frame.
code.time <- as.character(code)
summary(as.factor(as.numeric(as.character(code)))) # orders the codes
code.time[code.time == "110"] <- 1
code.time[code.time == "111"] <- 1
code.time[code.time == "112"] <- 2
code.time[code.time == "113"] <- 2
code.time[code.time == "114"] <- 3
code.time[code.time == "115"] <- 3
code.time[code.time == "116"] <- 4
code.time[code.time == "117"] <- 4
code.time[code.time == "118"] <- 5
code.time[code.time == "119"] <- 5
code.time[code.time == "120"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "121"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "122"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "123"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "210"] <- 7
code.time[code.time == "211"] <- 7
code.time[code.time == "212"] <- 8
code.time[code.time == "213"] <- 8
code.time[code.time == "214"] <- 9
code.time[code.time == "215"] <- 9
code.time[code.time == "216"] <- 10
code.time[code.time == "217"] <- 10
code.time[code.time == "218"] <- 11
code.time[code.time == "219"] <- 11
code.time[code.time == "220"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "221"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "222"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "223"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "38"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "39"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "310"] <- 13
code.time[code.time == "311"] <- 13
code.time[code.time == "312"] <- 14
code.time[code.time == "313"] <- 14
code.time[code.time == "314"] <- 15
code.time[code.time == "315"] <- 15
code.time[code.time == "316"] <- 16
code.time[code.time == "317"] <- 16
code.time[code.time == "318"] <- 17
code.time[code.time == "319"] <- 17
code.time[code.time == "320"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "321"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "322"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "323"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "40"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "48"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "410"] <- 19
code.time[code.time == "411"] <- 19
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code.time[code.time == "412"] <- 20
code.time[code.time == "413"] <- 20
code.time[code.time == "414"] <- 21
code.time[code.time == "415"] <- 21
code.time[code.time == "416"] <- 22
code.time[code.time == "417"] <- 22
code.time[code.time == "418"] <- 23
code.time[code.time == "419"] <- 23
code.time[code.time == "420"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "421"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "422"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "423"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "50"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "53"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "510"] <- 25
code.time[code.time == "511"] <- 25
code.time[code.time == "512"] <- 26
code.time[code.time == "513"] <- 26
code.time[code.time == "514"] <- 27
code.time[code.time == "515"] <- 27
code.time[code.time == "516"] <- 28
code.time[code.time == "517"] <- 28
code.time[code.time == "518"] <- 29
code.time[code.time == "519"] <- 29
code.time[code.time == "520"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "521"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "522"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "523"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "60"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "61"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "69"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "610"] <- 31
code.time[code.time == "611"] <- 31
code.time[code.time == "612"] <- 32
code.time[code.time == "613"] <- 32
code.time[code.time == "614"] <- 33
code.time[code.time == "615"] <- 33
code.time[code.time == "616"] <- 34
code.time[code.time == "617"] <- 34
code.time[code.time == "618"] <- 35
code.time[code.time == "619"] <- 35
code.time[code.time == "620"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "621"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "622"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "623"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "70"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "75"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "710"] <- 36
length(levels(as.factor(code.time))) # got all the possible time combinations.
data$code.time <- as.numeric(code.time)
hist(data$code.time)
data$idx <- as.factor(as.character(as.numeric(data$sid)))
time.frame <- data.frame(idx = rep(1:length(levels(data$idx)), each = 36), 
                         code.time = rep(1:36))
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data2 <- merge(data, time.frame, by = c('idx', 'code.time'), all.y = T)
nrow(data2) - sum(duplicated(cbind(data2$idx, data2$code.time))) # some duplicates.
data3 <- data2[duplicated(cbind(data2$idx, data2$code.time)) == F,]
with(data2[data2$idx=='1',], cbind(idx, code.time, time.days, time.hour))
with(data3[data2$idx=='1',], cbind(idx, code.time, time.days, time.hour))
as.factor(data3$idx)
write.csv(data3, 'esm_V3_filtered_expandedTimeCode.csv')
names(data3)
data3$code.time
##########################
# GRAPHS
# Filter by time to complete; before/after:
hist(data$time.sec, breaks = 1000) # BEFORE: filtered by timestamp
hist(dataX3F$time.sec, breaks = 1000) # AFTER: filterd by timestamp
# Filter by SD, before/after:
hist(dataX1$sd.response, breaks = 50, # BEFORE: filtering by SD
     main = "Histogram of SD within Survey (Across Items)",
     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400))
hist(dataX3F$sd.response, breaks = 50, 
     xlab = "Item SD")
## Filter by % completed; before / after:
hist((complete$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0, 120),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
hist((dataX3F$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0,120),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Sample 1 Completion")
#################
## MERGE AND DE-IDENTIFY
self <- read.csv('v3_self_deID_clean.csv')
data <- read.csv('esm_V3_filtered_expandedTimeCode.csv.csv')
names(data)
names(self)
## match SID mispellings / capitalizations
levels(data$sid)
levels(self$sid)
levels(self$sid)[1] <- NA
levels(self$sid)[4] <- "ac1111"
levels(self$sid)[6] <- "AJ0429"
levels(self$sid)[9] <- "Aw0209"
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levels(self$sid)[11] <- "bk0317"
levels(self$sid)[14] <- "CG0819"
levels(self$sid)[17] <- "dq0504"
levels(self$sid)[20] <- "ES0416"
levels(self$sid)[23] <- "GP0525"
levels(self$sid)[26] <- "HG0723"
levels(self$sid)[34] <- "JK0301"
levels(self$sid)[36] <- "js310"
levels(self$sid)[38] <- "LC0320"
levels(self$sid)[39] <- "LL1021"
levels(self$sid)[50] <- "RL0413"
levels(self$sid)[51] <- "RM0123"
levels(self$sid)[52] <- "Rzs1012"
levels(self$sid)[54] <- "sr0602"
levels(self$sid)[56] <- "STY0612"
levels(self$sid)[60] <- "tg0130"
levels(self$sid)[61] <- "TH0428"
levels(self$sid)[62] <- "TT0726"
## merge it.
nrow(data)
nrow(self)
woop <- merge(data, self, by.X = 'sid', all.x = T, all.y = F)
nrow(woop)
length(levels(woop$sid))
length(levels(data$sid))
woop$IDX <- as.factor(as.numeric(woop$sid))
names(woop[,-c(1,2)])
write.csv(woop[,-c(1,2)], 'esm_V3_all_clean_deID.csv', row.names = F)
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R Code: Data Cleaning – Sample B
## Steps not completed in R
  ## check for mispelled SIDs
  ## delete single / researcher responses (ADC / GOMI / TEST)
  ## use IP to fill-in missing SIDs
  ## check for mispelled oIDs
## Load data
setwd('~/Dropbox/Research/Dissertation/V2/data/')
d2x <- read.csv('ESM_S2_clean_10152014.csv')
## Load Libraries
library(chron)
## Remove and Rename variables.
d2x <- d2x[,-2]
colnames(d2x) <- c("IP", "start", "end", "sid", "sit", "emo", "int", "val", "numsoc", 
                  "s.e", "s.a", "s.c", "s.o", 
                  "s.eR", "s.aR", "s.cR", "s.sise",
                  "s.fne", "s.pow", "s.stat", "s.clas",
                  "s.rea", "s.sitA", "s.sup", "s.sitI",
                  "oid", "rel", "o.ext", "o.sise", "o.stat",
                  "o.close", "o.sup", "o.pow", "o.clas")
d2x$s.sup <- 6 - d2x$s.sup # suppression item was reverse coded.
names(d2x)
## CREATE NEW VARIABLES
  # Number of People Interacting
names(d2x)
d2x$socF <- d2x$numsoc
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 1] <- "NA"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 2] <- "alone"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 3] <- "1"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 4] <- "2"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 5] <- "3-4"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 6] <- "5-10"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 7] <- "11-20"
d2x$socF[d2x$socF == 8] <- "20+"
d2x$socF <- as.factor(as.character(d2x$socF))
d2x$socF <- factor(d2x$socF, levels(d2x$socF)[c(7,1,3,5,6,2,4)])
plot(d2x$socF)
  # Situations.
names(d2x)
d2x$doF <- d2x$sit
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summary(as.factor(d2x$doF))
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 1] <- NA
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 2] <- "commute"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 3] <- "cook.eat"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 4] <- "exercize"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 5] <- "arguing"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 6] <- "grooming"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 7] <- "hanging"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 8] <- "housework"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 9] <- "in.meeting"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 10] <- "listen.music"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 11] <- "online.social"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 12] <- "offline.comp"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 13] <- "mobile"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 14] <- "outdoors"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 15] <- "playing"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 16] <- "praying"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 17] <- "reading"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 18] <- "relaxing"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 19] <- "shopping"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 20] <- "sleeping"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 21] <- "studying"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 22] <- "talking"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 23] <- "walking"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 24] <- "tv.watch"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 25] <- "working"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 26] <- "other"
d2x$doF[d2x$doF == 27] <- "internet"
plot(as.factor(d2x$doF))
d2x$emoF <- d2x$emo
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 3] <- 'accomplished'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 4] <- NA
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 5] <- 'afraid'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 6] <- 'amused'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 7] <- 'angry'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 8] <- 'annoyed'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 9] <- 'anxious'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 10] <- 'arrogant'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 11] <- 'ashamed'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 12] <- 'bored'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 13] <- 'calm'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 14] <- 'confident'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 15] <- 'confused'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 16] <- 'contempt'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 17] <- 'determined'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 18] <- 'disgust'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 19] <- 'dismissive'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 20] <- 'embarrassed'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 21] <- 'excited'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 22] <- 'focused'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 23] <- 'frustrated'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 24] <- 'grateful'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 25] <- 'guilty'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 26] <- 'happy'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 27] <- 'inspired'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 28] <- 'interested'
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d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 29] <- 'jealous'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 30] <- 'lonely'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 31] <- 'loving'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 32] <- 'sad'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 33] <- 'superior'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 34] <- 'surprised'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 35] <- 'sympathetic'
d2x$emoF[d2x$emoF == 36] <- 'tired'
d2x$emoF <- as.factor(d2x$emoF)
plot(d2x$emoF)
summary(d2x$emoF)
## Intensity
names(d2x)
d2x$eInt <- d2x$int
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 1] <- NA
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 2] <- '0'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 3] <- '1'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 4] <- '2'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 5] <- '3'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 6] <- '4'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 7] <- '5'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 8] <- '6'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 9] <- '7'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 10] <- '8'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 11] <- '9'
d2x$eInt[d2x$eInt == 12] <- '10'
d2x$eInt <- as.numeric(d2x$eInt)
## Valence
names(d2x)
d2x$eVal <- d2x$val
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 1] <- NA
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 2] <- '0'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 3] <- '1'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 4] <- '2'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 5] <- '3'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 6] <- '4'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 7] <- '5'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 8] <- '6'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 9] <- '7'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 10] <- '8'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 11] <- '9'
d2x$eVal[d2x$eVal == 12] <- '10'
d2x$eVal <- as.numeric(d2x$eVal)
## Relationship Type
names(d2x)
d2x$relF <- d2x$rel
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 1] <- NA
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 2] <- 'family'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 3] <- 'romantic'
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d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 4] <- 'colleague'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 5] <- 'boss'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 6] <- 'employee'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 7] <- 'stranger'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 8] <- 'friend/student'
d2x$relF[d2x$relF == 9] <- 'close friend'
## TIME SPENT ON SURVEY
time.spent <- as.numeric((as.POSIXlt(d2x$end) - as.POSIXlt(d2x$start)))
d2x$time.min <- time.spent/60
summary(d2x$time.min)
range(d2x$time.min)
sd(d2x$time.min)
hist(d2x$time.min, xlim = c(0,5), breaks = 10000)
## ASSESSMENT NUMBER (TIME)
  # Create time variables.
time.frame <- t(as.data.frame(strsplit(as.character(d2x$start), ' ')))
d2x$time.date <- chron(time.frame[,1], time.frame[,2], format = c(dates = 'y-m-d', times = 'h:m:s'))
d2x$time.days <- as.numeric(as.factor(as.numeric(days(d2x$time.date)))) # assessment day 
d2x$time.hour <- as.numeric(hours(d2x$time.date)) # assessment hour
## ESM Data Filter
## FILTER by three times the sd for time spent.
summary(d2x$time.min)
d2X1 <- subset(d2x, d2x$time.min < (mean(d2x$time.min, na.rm = T) + 3* sd(d2x$time.min, na.rm = T)))
d2X1 <- subset(d2X1, d2X1$time.min > .5)
nrow(d2x) - nrow(d2X1) # 15 assessments removed.
length(levels(d2x$sid)) - length(levels(as.factor(as.character(d2X2$sid)))) # no participants removed
## 2. filter by responses with low SD.
d2X1 <- transform(d2X1, sd.response=apply(d2X1[,10:25], 1, sd, na.rm = TRUE))
summary(d2X1$sd.response)
sd(d2X1$sd.response)
range(d2X1$sd.response)
d2X2 <- subset(d2X1, d2X1$sd.response > .01)
nrow(d2X2) - nrow(d2X1)
length(levels(as.factor(as.character(d2X2$sid)))) - length(levels(as.factor(as.character(d2X1$sid))))
## Step 3. filter by % completed.
complete <- stats:::aggregate.formula(time.date ~ sid, d2X2, length)
complete$completed <- complete$time.date
summary(complete$completed/.36)
sd(complete$completed/.36)
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range(complete$completed/.36)
#hist((complete$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0, 120),
#     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
#     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
complete <- complete[,-2]
d2X3 <- merge(d2X2, complete, by = "sid")
nrow(d2X3) - nrow(d2X2)
d2X3F <- subset(d2X3, completed >=14)
nrow(d2X3F) - nrow(d2X3)
d2X3F$sid <- as.factor(as.character(d2X3F$sid))
length(levels(d2X3F$sid))
length(levels(d2X3F$sid)) - length(levels(d2X2$sid))
names(d2X3F)
#################################################
## Create full time frame.
data <- d2X3F
#0. Create assessment number for each participant
summary(as.factor(data$time.days)) # day of assessment
summary(as.factor(data$time.hour)) # time of assessment
# combine day and time; 
data$code <- paste(as.factor(as.character(data$time.days)), as.factor(as.character(data$time.hour)), sep = '')
data$code <- as.factor(paste(data$time.days, data$time.hour, sep = ''))
code <- data$code
length(code) # check to make sure same length as data frame.
code.time <- as.character(code)
summary(as.factor(as.numeric(as.character(code)))) # orders the codes
code.time[code.time == "110"] <- 1
code.time[code.time == "111"] <- 1
code.time[code.time == "112"] <- 2
code.time[code.time == "113"] <- 2
code.time[code.time == "114"] <- 3
code.time[code.time == "115"] <- 3
code.time[code.time == "116"] <- 4
code.time[code.time == "117"] <- 4
code.time[code.time == "118"] <- 5
code.time[code.time == "119"] <- 5
code.time[code.time == "120"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "121"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "123"] <- 6
code.time[code.time == "210"] <- 7
code.time[code.time == "211"] <- 7
code.time[code.time == "212"] <- 8
code.time[code.time == "213"] <- 8
code.time[code.time == "214"] <- 9
code.time[code.time == "215"] <- 9
code.time[code.time == "216"] <- 10
code.time[code.time == "217"] <- 10
code.time[code.time == "218"] <- 11
code.time[code.time == "219"] <- 11
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code.time[code.time == "220"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "221"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "222"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "223"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "38"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "39"] <- 12
code.time[code.time == "310"] <- 13
code.time[code.time == "311"] <- 13
code.time[code.time == "312"] <- 14
code.time[code.time == "313"] <- 14
code.time[code.time == "314"] <- 15
code.time[code.time == "315"] <- 15
code.time[code.time == "316"] <- 16
code.time[code.time == "317"] <- 16
code.time[code.time == "318"] <- 17
code.time[code.time == "319"] <- 17
code.time[code.time == "320"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "321"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "322"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "323"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "40"] <- 18
code.time[code.time == "410"] <- 19
code.time[code.time == "411"] <- 19
code.time[code.time == "412"] <- 20
code.time[code.time == "413"] <- 20
code.time[code.time == "414"] <- 21
code.time[code.time == "415"] <- 21
code.time[code.time == "416"] <- 22
code.time[code.time == "417"] <- 22
code.time[code.time == "418"] <- 23
code.time[code.time == "419"] <- 23
code.time[code.time == "420"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "421"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "422"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "423"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "50"] <- 24
code.time[code.time == "510"] <- 25
code.time[code.time == "511"] <- 25
code.time[code.time == "512"] <- 26
code.time[code.time == "513"] <- 26
code.time[code.time == "514"] <- 27
code.time[code.time == "515"] <- 27
code.time[code.time == "516"] <- 28
code.time[code.time == "517"] <- 28
code.time[code.time == "518"] <- 29
code.time[code.time == "519"] <- 29
code.time[code.time == "520"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "521"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "522"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "523"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "60"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "61"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "69"] <- 30
code.time[code.time == "610"] <- 31
code.time[code.time == "611"] <- 31
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code.time[code.time == "612"] <- 32
code.time[code.time == "613"] <- 32
code.time[code.time == "614"] <- 33
code.time[code.time == "615"] <- 33
code.time[code.time == "616"] <- 34
code.time[code.time == "617"] <- 34
code.time[code.time == "618"] <- 35
code.time[code.time == "619"] <- 35
code.time[code.time == "620"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "621"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "622"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "623"] <- 36
code.time[code.time == "70"] <- 36
data$code.time <- as.numeric(code.time)
data$idx <- as.factor(as.character(as.numeric(data$sid)))
time.frame <- data.frame(idx = rep(1:length(levels(data$idx)), each = 36), 
                         code.time = rep(1:36))
data2 <- merge(data, time.frame, by = c('idx', 'code.time'), all.y = T)
nrow(data2) - sum(duplicated(cbind(data2$idx, data2$code.time))) # some duplicates.
data3 <- data2[duplicated(cbind(data2$idx, data2$code.time)) == F,]
with(data2[data2$idx=='1',], cbind(idx, code.time, time.days, time.hour))
with(data3[data2$idx=='1',], cbind(idx, code.time, time.days, time.hour))
as.factor(data3$idx)
write.csv(data3, 'esm_V2_filtered.csv', row.names = F)
##########################
## GRAPHS
hist(as.numeric(d2x$time.date), breaks = 100,
     col = 'black', border = 'white') # XXX: Relabel X values.
hist(d2x$time.days, xlim = c(1,6), breaks = 24,
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
hist(d2x$time.hour, breaks = 24, xlim = c(8,24),
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
# Filter by time to complete; before/after:
hist(d2x$time.sec, breaks = 100000) # BEFORE: filtered by timestamp
hist(d2X3F$time.sec, breaks = 1000) # AFTER: filterd by timestamp
# Filter by SD, before/after:
hist(d2X1$sd.response, breaks = 50, # BEFORE: filtering by SD
     main = "Histogram of SD within Survey (Across Items)",
     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400))
hist(d2X3F$sd.response, breaks = 500, 
     xlab = "Item SD")
## Filter by % completed; before / after:
hist((complete$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0, 120),
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     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
hist((d2X3F$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0,120),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Sample 1 Completion")
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R Code: Data Cleaning – Sample C
# combine power & status
esm <- read.csv("~/Desktop/ESM_merge_test", sep = ";")
names(esm)
corr.test(esm$pow, esm$stat)
corr.test(esm$opow, esm$ostat)
esm$opwst <- (esm$opow + esm$ostat)/2
esm$pwst <- (esm$pow + esm$stat)/2
write.csv(esm, "~/Desktop/ESM_merge_test.csv")
## Remove Duplicates
  ## SORT BY ID, THEN TIME, THEN START.
esmX <- read.csv("~/Desktop/Dissertation/ESM_merge_test.csv", sep = ";")
head(esmX)
length(esmX$ID)
  ## remove duplicate rows.
any(duplicated(esm[c("ID", "time")])) ## Tests for presence of duplicates.
del.list <- which(duplicated(esm[c("ID", "time")])) ## Finds which rows are dups.
del.list
## Compare dup to pre-dup 
esm[del.list, ]
esm[del.list-1, ]
dedup.data <- esm[-del.list, ]
any(duplicated(dedup.data[c("ID", "time")]))
length(esmX$ID) - length(esm$ID)
levels(dedup.data$ID)
write.csv(dedup.data, "~/Desktop/esm_dedup.csv")
## FILTERS:
esm <- read.csv("~/Desktop/esm_dedup.csv")
  ## 1. filter by time spent on response
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
par(mfrow = c(1,1))
esm$time.spent <- as.numeric(as.POSIXlt(esm$end) - as.POSIXlt(esm$start))
summary(esm$time.spent)
par(mfrow = c(1,1))
hist(esm$time.spent, breaks = 10000, xlim = c(0,1200),
     main = "Histogram of ESM Response Time", xlab = "Seconds Spent")
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
hist(esm$time.spent, xlim = c(0,60), breaks = 30000,
     main = "Histogram of Response Time (Lower Tail)", xlab = "Seconds Spent")
hist(esm$time.spent, xlim = c(60,800), breaks = 30000,
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     main = "Histogram of Response Time (Upper Tail)", xlab = "Seconds Spent")
esmF1 <- subset(esm, time.spent < 500 & time.spent > 20)
hist(esmF1$time.spent, xlim = c(20, 500), breaks = 300)
length(esmF1$ID) - length(esm$ID)
  ## 2. filter by responses with low SD.
duplicated(esm[,11:23])
esm[1,]
head(esm)
names(esm)
esm <- transform(esm, sd.response=apply(esm[,12:23],1, sd, na.rm = TRUE))
head(esm)
par(mfrow = c(1,1))
hist(esm$sd.response, breaks = 50, main = "Histogram of SD within Survey (Across Items)",
     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400), xlim = c(0,2.5))
esmF2 <- subset(esm, esm$sd.response > .01)
length(esmF2$ID) - length(esm$ID)
length(esmF2$ID) - length(esmF1$ID)
length(esmF12$ID) - length(esmF1$ID)
## filter the filtered dataset.
esmF1 <- transform(esmF1, sd.response=apply(esmF1[,12:23],1, sd, na.rm = TRUE))
esmF12 <- subset(esmF1, esmF1$sd.response > .01)
length(esmF12$ID) - length(esm$ID)
  ## Step 3. filter by % completed.
completed <- aggregate(time ~ ID, esm, length)
summary(completed$time/.36)
hist((completed$time/.36), breaks = 40, xlim = c(0,100),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
head(completed)
14/36
comp.filt <- subset(completed, time >= 14)
hist((comp.filt$time/.36), breaks = 10, xlim = c(0,100),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Sample 1 Completion")
length(comp.filt$ID) - length(levels(esm$ID))
    ## post-filter filter.
completedF <- aggregate(time ~ ID, esmF12, length)
comp.filt <- subset(completedF, time >= 14)
esmFF <- merge(esmF12, comp.filt, by = "ID")
length(esmFF$ID) - length(esmF12$ID)
length(esmFF$ID) - length(esm$ID)
length(esmFF$ID) / length(esm$ID)
names(esmFF)
colnames(esmFF)[3] <- "time"
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colnames(esmFF)[27] <- "comp"
colnames(esmFF)[26] <- "sd.resp"
write.csv(esmFF, "~/Desktop/esm_pilot_filtered.csv", row.names = F)
  ## POST FILTER VISUALIZAITONS
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
hist(esm$time.spent, breaks = 6000, xlim = c(0,500), ylim = c(0,500),
     main = "Histogram of Response Time - Un-Filtered", xlab = "Seconds Spent")
hist(esmFF$time.spent, breaks = 100, xlim = c(0,500), ylim = c(0,500),
     main = "Histogram of Response Time - Filtered", xlab = "Seconds Spent")
hist(esm$sd.response, breaks = 50, main = "Histogram of SD Across Items - Un-Filtered",
     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400), xlim = c(0,2.5))
hist(esmFF$sd.resp, breaks = 50, main = "Histogram of SD Across Items - Filtered",
     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400), xlim = c(0,2.5))
hist((completed$time/.36), breaks = 40, xlim = c(0,100),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Completion Rates - Un-Filtered")
hist((esmFF$comp/.36), breaks = 40, xlim = c(0,100),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Completion Rates - Filtered")
## NO NEED TO FILTER?
## 3. filter participants with low total SD.
esm.sd <- aggregate(cbind(feel, social, sup, sit, ext, sise, auth, stat, pow,
                          oext, osise, ostat, opow, opwst, pwst)
                    ~ ID, esm, sd, na.action = "na.pass", na.rm = T)
head(esm.sd)
esm.sd <- transform(esm.sd, sd.t =apply(esm.sd[,2:16],1, mean, na.rm = TRUE))
summary(esm.sd$sd.t)
hist(esm.sd$sd.t, breaks = 40, main = "Histogram of Participant SD Across Items and Surveys",
     xlab = "Standard Deviation", xlim = c(0,1.5))
esm.sdF <- subset(esm.sd, sd.t > .2)
hist(esm.sd$sd.t)
esmF3 <- merge(esm, esm.sdF, by = "ID", all.y = T)
length(esmF3$ID) - length(esm$ID)
length(esmF3$ID) - length(esmF2$ID)
## 3. filter by participants with low response SD.
ppt_respSD <- aggregate(sd.response ~ ID, esmF2, mean)
summary(ppt_respSD$sd.response)
hist(ppt_respSD$sd.response, breaks = 50, main = "Histogram of Ppt's Average Response SD",
     xlab = "Standard Deviation")
ppt_respSDF <- subset(ppt_respSD, ppt_respSD$sd.response > .25)
esmF3 <- merge(esm, ppt_respSDF, by = "ID", all.y = T)
head(esmF3)
length(esmF3$ID) - length(esm$ID)
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length(esmF3$ID) - length(esmF2$ID)
## MERGE PRE-SCREENING & POST-SCREENING
pre <- read.csv("~/Desktop/Dissertation/ESM - Raw Pilot Data/catterson_ESM__PreQuest.csv")
names(pre)
post <- read.csv("~/Desktop/Dissertation/catterson_ESM__PostQuest.csv")
names(post)
length(post$ID)
self.data <- merge(pre, post, by = "student.ID", all.x = T, all.y = T)
write.csv(self.data, "~/Desktop/ESM-self.csv")
####################
## Steps not completed in R
## check for mispelled SIDs
## delete single / researcher responses (ADC / GOMI / TEST)
## use IP to fill-in missing SIDs
## check for mispelled oIDs
## Load data
names(s2)
## CREATE NEW VARIABLES
# Number of People Interacting
names(s2)
hist(s2$social)
s2$socF <- s2$social
s2$socF[s2$socF == 1] <- "alone"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 2] <- "1"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 3] <- "2"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 4] <- "3-4"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 5] <- "5-10"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 6] <- "11-20"
s2$socF[s2$socF == 7] <- "20+"
s2$socF <- as.factor(as.character(s2$socF))
s2$socF <- factor(s2$socF, levels(s2$socF)[c(7,1,3,5,6,2,4)])
plot(s2$socF)
# Situations.
names(s2)
s2$doF <- s2$do
summary(as.factor(s2$doF))
s2$doF[s2$doF == 1] <- 'internet'
s2$doF[s2$doF == 2] <- "commute"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 3] <- "cook.eat"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 4] <- "exercize"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 5] <- "arguing"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 6] <- "grooming"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 7] <- "hanging"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 8] <- "housework"
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s2$doF[s2$doF == 9] <- "in.meeting"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 10] <- "music"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 11] <- "facebook"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 12] <- "offline.comp"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 13] <- "mobile"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 14] <- "outdoors"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 15] <- "playing"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 16] <- "praying"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 17] <- "reading"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 18] <- "relaxing"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 19] <- "shopping"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 20] <- "sleeping"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 21] <- "studying"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 22] <- "talking"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 23] <- "walking"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 24] <- "tv"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 25] <- "working"
s2$doF[s2$doF == 26] <- "other"
plot(as.factor(s2$doF))
## TIME SPENT ON SURVEY
time.spent <- as.numeric((as.POSIXlt(s2$end) - as.POSIXlt(s2$start)))
s2$time.min <- time.spent/60
summary(s2$time.min)
range(s2$time.min)
sd(s2$time.min)
hist(s2$time.min, xlim = c(0,5), breaks = 10000)
## ASSESSMENT NUMBER (TIME)
# Create time variables.
time.frame <- t(as.data.frame(strsplit(as.character(s2$start), ' ')))
s2$time.date <- chron(time.frame[,1], time.frame[,2], format = c(dates = 'y-m-d', times = 'h:m:s'))
s2$time.days <- as.numeric(as.factor(as.numeric(days(s2$time.date)))) # assessment day 
s2$time.hour <- as.numeric(hours(s2$time.date)) # assessment hour
## ESM Data Filter
## FILTER by three times the sd for time spent.
summary(s2$time.min)
s21 <- subset(s2, s2$time.min < (mean(s2$time.min, na.rm = T) + 3* sd(s2$time.min, na.rm = T)))
s21 <- subset(s21, s21$time.min > .5)
nrow(s2) - nrow(s21) # 15 assessments removed.
length(levels(s2$sid)) - length(levels(as.factor(as.character(s22$sid)))) # no participants removed
## 2. filter by responses with low SD.
s21 <- transform(s21, sd.response=apply(s21[,10:25], 1, sd, na.rm = TRUE))
summary(s21$sd.response)
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sd(s21$sd.response)
range(s21$sd.response)
s22 <- subset(s21, s21$sd.response > .01)
nrow(s22) - nrow(s21)
length(levels(as.factor(as.character(s22$sid)))) - length(levels(as.factor(as.character(s21$sid))))
## Step 3. filter by % completed.
complete <- stats:::aggregate.formula(time.date ~ sid, s22, length)
complete$completed <- complete$time.date
summary(complete$completed/.36)
sd(complete$completed/.36)
range(complete$completed/.36)
#hist((complete$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0, 120),
#     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
#     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
complete <- complete[,-2]
s23 <- merge(s22, complete, by = "sid")
nrow(s23) - nrow(s22)
s23F <- subset(s23, completed >=14)
nrow(s23F) - nrow(s23)
s23F$sid <- as.factor(as.character(s23F$sid))
length(levels(s23F$sid))
length(levels(s23F$sid)) - length(levels(s22$sid))
names(s23F)
write.csv(s23F, 'esm_V2_filtered.csv', row.names = F)
##########################
## GRAPHS
hist(as.numeric(s2$time.date), breaks = 100,
     col = 'black', border = 'white') # XXX: Relabel X values.
hist(s2$time.days, xlim = c(1,6), breaks = 24,
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
hist(s2$time.hour, breaks = 24, xlim = c(8,24),
     col = 'black', border = 'white')
# Filter by time to complete; before/after:
hist(s2$time.sec, breaks = 100000) # BEFORE: filtered by timestamp
hist(s23F$time.sec, breaks = 1000) # AFTER: filterd by timestamp
# Filter by SD, before/after:
hist(s21$sd.response, breaks = 50, # BEFORE: filtering by SD
     main = "Histogram of SD within Survey (Across Items)",
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     xlab = "Item SD", ylim = c(0,400))
hist(s23F$sd.response, breaks = 500, 
     xlab = "Item SD")
## Filter by % completed; before / after:
hist((complete$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0, 120),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Participant Completion Rates")
hist((s23F$completed/.36), breaks = 20, xlim = c(0,120),
     xlab = "Percentage of Completed ESM Reports",
     main = "Histogram of Sample 1 Completion")
######################
time.frame <- data.frame(idx = rep(1:length(levels(s2$idx)), each = 36), 
                         time = rep(1:36))
nrow(time.frame) - length(levels(s2$idx)) * 36 # making sure it is the right length.
head(time.frame)
test <- merge(s2, time.frame, by = c('idx', 'time'), all.y = T)
nrow(test)
head(test)
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R Code: Chapter Figures and Analyses – Chapter 1
## Sample Figures
## FIGURE 1A
high <- c(4,5,6)
low <- c(1,2,3)
barplot(cbind("High Power" = mean(high, na.rm = T), 
              "Low Power" = mean(low, na.rm = T)),
        ylim = c(0,7), col = 'black', ylab = "Talkativeness", xlab = "Manipulated Power",
        main = "Fig 1A: Mean-Level Difference")
## FIGURE 1B
ext1 <- c(1,2,3)
plot(low, ext1, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "Social Power", pch = 19,
     ylab = "Talkativeness",
     main = "Fig 1B: Correlational Relationship")
clip(1,3,1,3)
abline(lm(ext1~low), lwd = 3, col = 'black')
## FIGURE 1C
## DATA FROM CAPITAL_ANALYSES.R
dataex0 <- data[data$idx == 2,] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
dataex1 <- data[data$idx == c(2,3),] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
dataex2 <- data[data$idx == 3,]
fig0ex1 <- ggplot(dataex1, aes(pow, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .1) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Power (Within-Person)") + ylim(0,1.5) + xlim(1,5) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 10, base_family = 'Ariel') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(5, "lines")) + guides(fill = F) +   
  ggtitle("Fig. 1C: Within-Person Variation") + theme(plot.title = element_text(vjust = 2, face="bold"))
fig1C <- fig0ex1 + geom_vline(xintercept = 4, size = 1.15) + 
  geom_vline(xintercept = 2.5, size = 1.15, linetype = 'dashed')
fig1C
?ggtitle
## FIGURE 1D
x11()
ext <- c(1,2,3,0,1,2,1,2,3,2,3,4)
pow <- c(1,2,3,2,1,0,3,2,1,4,3,2)
plot(pow, ext, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "Social Power", pch = 1,
     ylab = "Talkativeness",
     main = "")
opar <- par(new = TRUE)
plot(low, ext1, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "", pch = 19,
     ylab = "",
     main = "")
clip(1,3,1,3)
abline(lm(ext1~low), lwd = 3, col = 'black')
clip(0,2,2,0)
abline(a = 2, b = -1, lwd = 3, lty = 'dashed')
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clip(1,3,3,1)
abline(a = 4, b = -1, lwd = 3, lty = 'dashed')
clip(2,4,4,2)
abline(a = 6, b = -1, lwd = 3, lty = 'dashed')
### PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
library(gridBase)
x11()
par(mfrow=c(2, 2))
barplot(cbind("High Power" = mean(high, na.rm = T), 
              "Low Power" = mean(low, na.rm = T)),
        ylim = c(0,7), col = 'black', ylab = "Talkativeness", xlab = "Manipulated Power",
        main = "Fig. 1A: Mean-Level Difference")
plot(low, ext1, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "Social Power", pch = 19,
     ylab = "Talkativeness",
     main = "Fig. 1B: Correlational Relationship")
clip(1,3,1,3)
abline(lm(ext1~low), lwd = 3, col = 'black')
plot.new()              ## suggested by @Josh
vps <- baseViewports()
pushViewport(vps$figure) ##   I am in the space of the autocorrelation plot
vp1 <-plotViewport(c(1.8,1,1,1)) ## create new vp with margins, you play with this values 
acz <- acf(y, plot=F)
acd <- data.frame(lag=acz$lag, acf=acz$acf)
p <- fig1C
plot(pow, ext, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "Social Power", pch = 1,
     ylab = "Talkativeness",
     main = "Fig. 1D: Between and Within-Person Effects")
opar <- par(new = TRUE)
plot(low, ext1, xlim = c(0,4), ylim = c(0,4),
     xlab = "", pch = 19,
     ylab = "",
     main = "")
clip(1,3,1,3)
abline(lm(ext1~low), lwd = 2, col = 'black')
clip(0,2,2,0)
abline(a = 2, b = -1, lwd = 2, lty = 'dashed')
clip(1,3,3,1)
abline(a = 4, b = -1, lwd = 2, lty = 'dashed')
clip(2,4,4,2)
abline(a = 6, b = -1, lwd = 2, lty = 'dashed')
print(p,vp = vp1)        ## suggested by @bpatiste
################
fig0ex1 <- ggplot(dataex1, aes(pow, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .1) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Power (Within-Person)") + ylim(0,1.5) + xlim(1,5) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 12, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(5, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig1C <- fig0ex1 + geom_vline(xintercept = 4, size = 1.15) + 
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  geom_vline(xintercept = 2.5, size = 1.15, linetype = 'dashed')
x11()
fig1C
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R Code: Chapter Figures and Analyses – Chapter 2
library(lme4)
library(car)
library(psych)
library(ggplot2)
library(ggthemes)
library(grid)
library(gridExtra)
library(reshape)
set.seed(12345) # ensures reproducability of bootstrapped results.
## Variance Inflation Factor Function 
## Function written by Austin Frank: https://github.com/aufrank/R-hacks/blob/master/mer-utils.R 
vif.mer <- function (fit) {
  ## adapted from rms::vif
  
  v <- vcov(fit)
  nam <- names(fixef(fit))
  
  ## exclude intercepts
  ns <- sum(1 * (nam == "Intercept" | nam == "(Intercept)"))
  if (ns > 0) {
    v <- v[-(1:ns), -(1:ns), drop = FALSE]
    nam <- nam[-(1:ns)]
  }
  
  d <- diag(v)^0.5
  v <- diag(solve(v/(d %o% d)))
  names(v) <- nam
  v
}
########################################################
## LOAD DATA: And some merging / de-identifying       ##
########################################################
setwd('~/Dropbox/Research/Dissertation/Chapter: Social Power, Status, and Capital/')
# Sample 1
s1 <- read.csv('data//esm_sample1_deID.csv')
s1S <- read.csv('data//dem_sample1_deID.csv')
# Sample 2
s2 <- read.csv('data//esm_sample2_deID.csv')
s2S <- read.csv('data//dem_sample2_deID.csv')
########################################################
## Sample Demographics:                               ##
########################################################
names(s1S)
samp1 <- with(s1S, data.frame(age, sex, eth))
s2S$age[35] <- 22
s2S$age[72] <- 19
s2S$age <- as.numeric(as.character(s2S$age))
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samp2 <- with(s2S, data.frame(age, sex, eth))
summary(samp1) / nrow (samp1)
summary(samp2) / nrow (samp2)
self.data <- rbind(samp1, samp2)
nrow(self.data)
## Merging it together
# make sure IDs don't overlap
levels(as.factor(s1$idx))
s1$idx <- as.factor(s1$idx)
s2$idx <- as.factor(s2$IDX + 57)
# extract variables for shared analysis
names(s1)
s1m <- s1[,c(1, 49:51, 2, 6, 7, 10, 20:22)]
names(s1m) <- c("idx", "age", "sex", "eth", "code.time", "sit", "emo", "numsoc", "pow", "stat", "clas")
names(s2)
s2m <- s2[,c(29, 30:32, 28, 3:4, 7, 13:15)]
names(s2m) <- c("idx", "age", "sex", "eth", "code.time", "sit", "emo", "numsoc", "pow", "stat", "clas")
data <- rbind(s1m, s2m)
names(data)
nrow(data)
length(levels(data$idx))
## Get participant descriptive statistics.
data$sex
data$eth
data$sexN <- as.numeric(data$sex)
data$ethN <- as.numeric(data$eth)
age.X <- (with(data, tapply(age, INDEX = idx, FUN = mean, na.rm = T)))
eth.X <- (with(data, tapply(ethN, INDEX = idx, FUN = mean, na.rm = T)))
sex.X <- (with(data, tapply(sexN, INDEX = idx, FUN = mean, na.rm = T)))
self <- data.frame(age.X, eth.X, sex.X)
self$sex.X <- as.factor(self$sex.X)
levels(self$sex.X) <- c(levels(data$sex), NA)
self$eth.X <- as.factor(self$eth.X)
levels(self$eth.X) <- c(levels(data$eth), NA)
summary(self$age.X)
sd(self$age.X, na.rm = T)
summary(self$sex.X) / nrow(self)
summary(self$eth.X) / nrow(self)
########################################################
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## DATA CLEAN: Calculating Situational Variables      ##
########################################################
data$doF <- data$sit ###### CHECK THIS FOR EACH SAMPLE, YO!!
summary(as.factor(data$doF))
data$doF[data$doF == 1] <- NA
data$doF[data$doF == 2] <- "commute"
data$doF[data$doF == 3] <- "cook.eat"
data$doF[data$doF == 4] <- "exercize"
data$doF[data$doF == 5] <- "arguing"
data$doF[data$doF == 6] <- "grooming"
data$doF[data$doF == 7] <- "hanging"
data$doF[data$doF == 8] <- "housework"
data$doF[data$doF == 9] <- "in.meeting"
data$doF[data$doF == 10] <- "listen.music"
data$doF[data$doF == 11] <- "online.social"
data$doF[data$doF == 12] <- "offline.comp"
data$doF[data$doF == 13] <- "mobile"
data$doF[data$doF == 14] <- "outdoors"
data$doF[data$doF == 15] <- "playing"
data$doF[data$doF == 16] <- "praying"
data$doF[data$doF == 17] <- "reading"
data$doF[data$doF == 18] <- "relaxing"
data$doF[data$doF == 19] <- "shopping"
data$doF[data$doF == 20] <- "sleeping"
data$doF[data$doF == 21] <- "studying"
data$doF[data$doF == 22] <- "talking"
data$doF[data$doF == 23] <- "walking"
data$doF[data$doF == 24] <- "tv.watch"
data$doF[data$doF == 25] <- "working"
data$doF[data$doF == 26] <- "other"
data$doF[data$doF == 27] <- "internet"
data$doF[data$doF == 53] <- "studying"
data$doF <- as.factor(data$doF)
## Emotion
data$emoF <- data$emo
data$emoF[data$emoF == 3] <- 'accomplished'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 4] <- NA
data$emoF[data$emoF == 5] <- 'afraid'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 6] <- 'amused'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 7] <- 'angry'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 8] <- 'annoyed'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 9] <- 'anxious'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 10] <- 'arrogant'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 11] <- 'ashamed'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 12] <- 'bored'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 13] <- 'calm'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 14] <- 'confident'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 15] <- 'confused'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 16] <- 'contempt'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 17] <- 'determined'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 18] <- 'disgust'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 19] <- 'dismissive'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 20] <- 'embarrassed'
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data$emoF[data$emoF == 21] <- 'excited'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 22] <- 'focused'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 23] <- 'frustrated'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 24] <- 'grateful'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 25] <- 'guilty'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 26] <- 'happy'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 27] <- 'inspired'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 28] <- 'interested'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 29] <- 'jealous'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 30] <- 'lonely'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 31] <- 'loving'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 32] <- 'sad'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 33] <- 'superior'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 34] <- 'surprised'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 35] <- 'sympathetic'
data$emoF[data$emoF == 36] <- 'tired'
data$emoF <- as.factor(data$emoF)
##
# Number of People Interacting
data$socF <- data$numsoc
data$socF[data$socF == 1] <- "NA"
data$socF[data$socF == 2] <- "alone"
data$socF[data$socF == 3] <- "1"
data$socF[data$socF == 4] <- "2"
data$socF[data$socF == 5] <- "3-4"
data$socF[data$socF == 6] <- "5-10"
data$socF[data$socF == 7] <- "11-20"
data$socF[data$socF == 8] <- "20+"
data$socF <- as.factor(as.character(data$socF))
data$socF <- factor(data$socF, levels(data$socF)[c(7,1,3,5,6,2,4)])
########################################################
## Descriptive Statistics: Ratings                    ##
########################################################
# Objective features of the situation
summary(data$doF)
length(levels(data$doF)) # 26 situations
plot(data$doF)
round(summary(data$socF)/nrow(data[na.omit(data$socF),]), 2)
# Social hierarchy
hier.df <- with(data, data.frame(pow, stat, clas))
summary(hier.df)
sapply(hier.df, FUN = sd, na.rm = T)
########################################################
## DATA CLEAN: Calculating Multilevel Effects         ##
########################################################
# CALCULATE between-person effects.
data <- within(data, pow.X <- ave(pow, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
data <- within(data, stat.X <- ave(stat, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
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data <- within(data, clas.X <- ave(clas, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
# CALCULATE within-person effects.
data <- within(data, pow.C <- (pow - pow.X))
data <- within(data, stat.C <- (stat - stat.X))
data <- within(data, clas.C <- (clas - clas.X))
# CALCULATE Lagged Effects
data$idx <- as.factor(data$idx)
data <- data[with(data, order(idx, code.time)),] # sort
data$pow.CL <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
data$stat.CL <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
data$clas.CL <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
data$pow.L <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
data$stat.L <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
data$clas.L <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(data), ncol = 1)
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$pow.CL <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), pow.C)[1 : length(pow.C)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$stat.CL <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), stat.C)[1 : length(stat.C)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$clas.CL <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), clas.C)[1 : length(clas.C)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$pow.L <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), pow)[1 : length(pow)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$stat.L <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), stat)[1 : length(stat)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(data$idx))) {
  data[data$idx == i,]$clas.L <- with(data[data$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), clas)[1 : length(clas)])
}
## Figure 1: Distributions of Social Hierarchy. 
fig1th <- theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans')
fig1P <- ggplot(data, aes(x = pow)) + xlab('Social Power') + ylim(0,1200) + geom_histogram(binwidth = .5) + 
fig1th
fig1S <- ggplot(data, aes(x = stat)) + xlab('Social Status') + ylim(0,1200) + geom_histogram(binwidth = .5) + 
fig1th
fig1C <- ggplot(data, aes(x = clas)) + xlab('Social Class') + ylim(0,1200) + geom_histogram(binwidth = .5) + 
fig1th
x11()
grid.arrange(fig1P, fig1S, fig1C, ncol = 3)
#####################################################################################
## Q1: How much do people vary in their social capital across different contexts?  ##
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#####################################################################################
# Sample 1
pow.M1 <- lmer(pow ~ (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F)
stat.M1 <- lmer(stat ~ (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F)
clas.M1 <- lmer(clas ~ (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F)
# Sample 2
pow.M1 <- lmer(pow ~ (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F)
stat.M1 <- lmer(stat ~ (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F)
clas.M1 <- lmer(clas ~ (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F)
# ALL
pow.M1 <- lmer(pow ~ (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F)
stat.M1 <- lmer(stat ~ (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F)
clas.M1 <- lmer(clas ~ (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F)
pow.M1boot <- confint.merMod(pow.M1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
stat.M1boot <- confint.merMod(stat.M1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
clas.M1boot <- confint.merMod(clas.M1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
# Extract variance explained
pow.mod1s <- summary(pow.M1)
stat.mod1s <- summary(stat.M1)
clas.mod1s <- summary(clas.M1)
pow.ranFX1 <- VarCorr(pow.M1)
stat.ranFX1 <- VarCorr(stat.M1)
clas.ranFX1 <- VarCorr(clas.M1)
pow.fx <- pow.ranFX1$idx[1] / (pow.mod1s$sigma^2 + pow.ranFX1$idx[1])
pow.ci <- pow.M1boot[1,]^2/(pow.M1boot[1,]^2 + pow.M1boot[2,]^2)
pow.between <- (cbind(pow.fx, t(pow.ci)))
stat.fx <- stat.ranFX1$idx[1] / (stat.mod1s$sigma^2 + stat.ranFX1$idx[1])
stat.ci <- stat.M1boot[1,]^2/(stat.M1boot[1,]^2 + stat.M1boot[2,]^2)
stat.between <- (cbind(stat.fx, t(stat.ci)))
clas.fx <- clas.ranFX1$idx[1] / (clas.mod1s$sigma^2 + clas.ranFX1$idx[1])
clas.ci <- clas.M1boot[1,]^2/(clas.M1boot[1,]^2 + clas.M1boot[2,]^2)
clas.between <- (cbind(clas.fx, t(clas.ci)))
capital.bw.t <- rbind(pow.between, stat.between, clas.between)
row.names(capital.bw.t) <- c('power', 'status', 'class')
colnames(capital.bw.t) <- c('estimate', '2.5%', '97.5%')
round(capital.bw.t, 2)*100 # TABLE 1.
100 - round(capital.bw.t, 2)*100 # 
# FIGURE 0: CALL-OUT OF THE STUFF.
dataex0 <- data[data$idx == 2,] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
dataex1 <- data[data$idx == c(2,3),] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
dataex2 <- data[data$idx == 3,]
## GRAPH COUNT, NOT DENSITY!
x11()
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par(mfrow = c(2,1))
fig0ex0a <- with(dataex0, plot(code.time, pow, type = 'b', pch = 19,
                               xlab = "time", ylab = 'power', main = 'Participant #2'))
fig0ex0b <- with(dataex2, plot(code.time, pow, type = 'b', pch = 19,
                               xlab = "time", ylab = 'power', main = 'Participant #3'))
fig0ex0 <- ggplot(dataex0, aes(pow, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_freqpoly(alpha = .1) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Power (Within-Person)") + xlim(1,5) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(5, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig0ex1 <- ggplot(dataex1, aes(pow, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .1) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Power (Within-Person)") + ylim(0,1.5) + xlim(1,5) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(5, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig0ex0
fig0ex1
x11()
fig0ex1 + geom_vline(xintercept = 4) + geom_vline(xintercept = 2.5)
# FIGURE 1: SUMMARY OF WITHIN-PERSON VARIATION: VISUALIZED.
dimension <- c("Power", "Status", "Class")
between <- c(pow.fx, stat.fx, clas.fx)
within <- 1 - c(pow.fx, stat.fx, clas.fx)
effect <- data.frame(t(rbind(between, within)), dimension)
effect2 <- melt(effect, id.var = 'dimension', variable_name = 'Variance')
levels(effect2[,2]) <- c("Between-Person", "Within-Person")
conf <- rbind(pow.ci, stat.ci, clas.ci)
fig1t <- data.frame(effect2)
fig1t$dimension <- factor(fig1t$dimension, levels(fig1t$dimension)[c(2,3,1)])
cols <- c('Between-Person'="darkgrey",'Within-Person'="lightgrey")
fig1g <- ggplot(fig1t, aes(x = dimension, y = 100*value, fill = Variance)) + 
  geom_bar(position = position_stack(), stat = 'identity') + xlab("Dimension of Social Hierarchy") +
  ylab("Percentage of Explained Variance") + ylim(c(0,100)) +
  geom_errorbar(data = fig1t[1:3,], aes(ymax = conf[,2]*100, ymin = conf[,1]*100), 
                width=0.15, size = 2, colour = 'black') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + theme(legend.position='top')+
  scale_fill_manual(values = cols)
x11()
fig1g
# FIGURE 2: ACTUAL WITHIN-PERSON VARIATION: VISUALIZED!
x11()
names(data)
length(levels(as.factor(data[data$completed >20,]$idx))) # 24 ppts in Sample 1 completed > 75% of surveys
datag <- data[data$completed > 20,] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
#datag <- datag[!(datag$idx=="13"),] # remove  
length(levels(as.factor(datag$idx)))
fig1pW <- ggplot(data, aes(pow.C, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .0) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Power (Within-Person)") + ylim(0,4) + xlim(-4,4) +
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  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(3, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig1sW <- ggplot(data, aes(stat.C, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .0) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Status (Within-Person)") +ylim(0,4) + xlim(-4,4) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(3, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig1cW <- ggplot(data, aes(clas.C, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .0) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSocial Class (Within-Person)") + ylim(0,4) +xlim(-4,4) +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(3, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
grid.arrange(fig1g, fig1pW, fig1sW, fig1cW, ncol = 2)
#dev.off()
############################################################################
## Q2: Do these factors differ in terms of their situational predictors?  ##
############################################################################
summary(pow.stat <- lmer(scale(stat) ~ scale(pow.C) + scale(pow.X) + (1 | idx), data = data))
summary(pow.clas <- lmer(scale(clas) ~ scale(pow.C) + scale(pow.X) + (1 | idx), data = data))
summary(stat.clas <- lmer(scale(clas) ~ scale(stat.C) + scale(stat.X) + (1 | idx), data = data))
summary(pow.stat <- lmer(stat ~ pow.C + pow.X + (1 | idx), data = data))
summary(pow.clas <- lmer(clas ~ pow.C + pow.X + (1 | idx), data = data))
summary(stat.clas <- lmer(clas ~ stat.C + stat.X + (1 | idx), data = data))
#pow.clasBoot <- confint.merMod(pow.clas, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
## FIGURE 3: RELATION BETWEEN STATUS, POWER, CLASS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS: VISUALIZED!
x11() ### NEED 2 FIX ONE OF THE REGRESSION LINES!!
par(mfrow = c(3,2))
plot(data$pow.X, data$stat.X, xlab = "Power (Between-Person)", ylab = "Status (Between-Person)", pch = 19, cex 
= .8,
     main = "", xlim = c(1,5), ylim = c(1,5))
abline(a = fixef(pow.stat)[1], b = fixef(pow.stat)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
plot(data$pow.C, data$stat.C, xlab = "Power (Within-Person)", ylab = "Status (Within-Person)", pch = 19, cex 
= .8,
     main = "", xlim = c(-4,4), ylim = c(-4,4))
abline(a = fixef(pow.stat)[1], b = fixef(pow.stat)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
plot(data$pow.X, data$clas.X, xlab = "Power (Between-Person)", ylab = "Class (Between-Person)", 
     main = "", pch = 19, cex = .8, xlim = c(1,5), ylim = c(1,5))
abline(a = fixef(pow.clas)[1], b = fixef(pow.clas)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
plot(data$pow.C, data$clas.C, xlab = "Power (Within-Person)", ylab = "Class (Within-Person)", 
     pch = 19, cex = .8, xlim = c(-4,4), ylim = c(-4,4))
abline(a = fixef(pow.clas)[1], b = fixef(pow.clas)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
plot(data$stat.X, data$clas.X, xlab = "Status (Between-Person)", ylab = "Class (Between-Person)", 
     main = "", pch = 19, cex = .8, xlim = c(1,5), ylim = c(1,5))
abline(a = fixef(stat.clas)[1], b = fixef(stat.clas)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
plot(data$stat.C, data$clas.C, xlab = "Status (Within-Person)", ylab = "Class (Within-Person)", 
     pch = 19, cex = .8, xlim = c(-4,4), ylim = c(-4,4))
abline(a = fixef(stat.clas)[1], b = fixef(stat.clas)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 8)
127
## Calculating Residual Variables for Power, Status, and Class
pow.resid <- lmer(scale(pow) ~ scale(clas) + scale(stat) + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F, 
na.action=na.exclude)
stat.resid <- lmer(scale(stat) ~ scale(clas) + scale(pow) + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F, 
na.action=na.exclude)
clas.resid <- lmer(scale(clas) ~ scale(stat) + scale(pow) + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F, 
na.action=na.exclude)
pow.resid # plenty of variance left to be explained!
.21^2 + .65^2 + .28^2 + .45^2
stat.resid
clas.resid
vif.mer(pow.resid) # Making sure there's not too much autocorrelation.
vif.mer(stat.resid)
vif.mer(clas.resid)
pow.R <- residuals(pow.resid)
stat.R <- residuals(stat.resid)
clas.R <- residuals(clas.resid)
x11()
par(mfrow = c(1,3))
hist(pow.R, col = 'black', bor = 'white', main = "", xlab = "Social Power (Residual)")
hist(stat.R, col = 'black', bor = 'white', main = "", xlab = "Social Status (Residual)")
hist(clas.R, col = 'black', bor = 'white', main = "", xlab = "Social Class (Residual)")
###########################################################################
# POWER, STATUS, CLASS DIFFER AS A FUNCTION OF FEATURES OF THE SITUATION ##
###########################################################################
# What the Person Was Doing and Who the Person was With
## modeling
summary(pow.sitFX <- lmer(pow.R ~ -1 + doF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
summary(stat.sitFX <- lmer(stat.R ~ -1 + doF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
summary(clas.sitFX <- lmer(clas.R ~ -1 + doF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
summary(pow.socFX <- lmer(pow.R ~ -1 + socF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
summary(stat.socFX <- lmer(stat.R ~ -1 + socF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
summary(clas.socFX <- lmer(clas.R ~ -1 + socF + (1 | idx), data = data, REML = F))
## do features of the situation explain variance?
Anova(pow.sitFX) # definitely power !
Anova(stat.sitFX) # and status
Anova(clas.sitFX) # to a lesser (but still significant extent; class)
anova(clas.sitFX, pow.sitFX)
Anova(stat.socFX) # definitely!
Anova(pow.socFX) # yeah
Anova(clas.socFX) # not really!
## ALSO MEASURED WHO PARTICIPANTS WERE WITH IN S1, BUT:.
summary(s1$relF) # not enough participants rated who they were with.
## FIGURE 4: SITUATIONAL PREDICTORS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: VISUALIZED
## Graphing
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pow.sitFXX <- fixef(pow.sitFX) # extract fixed effects estimates
stat.sitFXX <- fixef(stat.sitFX)
clas.sitFXX <- fixef(clas.sitFX)
pow.sitSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(pow.sitFX))) # extract fixed effects standard errors
stat.sitSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(stat.sitFX)))
clas.sitSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(clas.sitFX)))
# calculate error bars
pow.sit.lim <- aes(ymax = pow.sitFXX + pow.sitSE, ymin= pow.sitFXX - pow.sitSE)
stat.sit.lim <- aes(ymax = stat.sitFXX + stat.sitSE, ymin= stat.sitFXX - stat.sitSE)
clas.sit.lim <- aes(ymax = clas.sitFXX + clas.sitSE, ymin= clas.sitFXX - clas.sitSE)
hier.sit.lim <- aes(ymax = c(pow.sitFXX + pow.sitSE, 
                             stat.sitFXX + stat.sitSE,
                             clas.sitFXX + clas.sitSE),
                    ymin = c(pow.sitFXX - pow.sitSE, 
                             stat.sitFXX - stat.sitSE,
                             clas.sitFXX - clas.sitSE))
hier.sit <- melt(cbind(Power = pow.sitFXX, Status = stat.sitFXX, Class = clas.sitFXX))
colnames(hier.sit) <- c('sit', 'Dimension', 'effect')
situations <- factor(levels(data$doF), levels = levels(data$doF)) # creates labels for axis.
levels(hier.sit$sit) <- levels(situations)
## ALL SITUATIONS
cols <- c(Power = '#636363', Status = '#bdbdbd', Class = '#f0f0f0')
x11()
hier.sit.G <- ggplot(hier.sit, aes(x = sit, y = effect, fill = dimension)) +
  geom_bar(position = position_dodge(.9), stat = 'identity')  + coord_flip() +
  geom_errorbar(hier.sit.lim, position = position_dodge(.9), 
                width = .5, size = .3, colour = 'black') + 
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)\n') + ylab("Unique Effect") +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  scale_fill_manual(values = cols)
  #scale_fill_brewer(palette="OrRd")
hier.sit.G
## SUBSETTED SITUATIONS
data[data$Code %in% selected,]
sitSUB <- levels(hier.sit$sit)[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)]
hier.sit$sitSUB <- levels(hier.sit$sit)[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)]
hier.sitSUB <- hier.sit[hier.sit$sit %in% sitSUB,]
hier.sit.limSUB <- aes(ymax = c(pow.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] + pow.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)], 
                             stat.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] + stat.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)],
                             clas.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] + clas.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)]),
                    ymin = c(pow.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] - pow.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)], 
                             stat.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] - stat.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)],
                             clas.sitFXX[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)] - clas.sitSE[c(6, 7, 13, 16, 19, 26)]))
x11()
hier.sit.G <- ggplot(hier.sitSUB, aes(x = sit, y = effect, fill = Dimension)) +
  geom_bar(position = position_dodge(.9), stat = 'identity')  + coord_flip() +
  geom_errorbar(hier.sit.limSUB, position = position_dodge(.9), 
                width = .5, size = .3, colour = 'black') + 
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  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)\n') + ylab("Unique Effect") +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  scale_fill_manual(values = cols)
#scale_fill_brewer(palette="OrRd")
hier.sit.G
## THIS GRAPH, SEPARATELY
pow.sit.G <- qplot(situations, pow.sitFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Power\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(pow.sit.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
stat.sit.G <- qplot(situations, stat.sitFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Status\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(stat.sit.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
clas.sit.G <- qplot(situations, clas.sitFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Class\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(clas.sit.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
## FIGURE 5: Graphing: Who the Person was With
pow.socFXX <- fixef(pow.socFX) # extract fixed effects estimates
stat.socFXX <- fixef(stat.socFX)
clas.socFXX <- fixef(clas.socFX)
pow.socSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(pow.socFX))) # extract fixed effects standard errors
stat.socSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(stat.socFX)))
clas.socSE <- sqrt(diag(vcov(clas.socFX)))
# calculate error bars
pow.soc.lim <- aes(ymax = pow.socFXX + pow.socSE, ymin= pow.socFXX - pow.socSE)
stat.soc.lim <- aes(ymax = stat.socFXX + stat.socSE, ymin= stat.socFXX - stat.socSE)
clas.soc.lim <- aes(ymax = clas.socFXX + clas.socSE, ymin= clas.socFXX - clas.socSE)
hier.soc.lim <- aes(ymax = c(pow.socFXX + pow.socSE, 
                             stat.socFXX + stat.socSE,
                             clas.socFXX + clas.socSE),
                    ymin = c(pow.socFXX - pow.socSE, 
                             stat.socFXX - stat.socSE,
                             clas.socFXX - clas.socSE))
hier.soc <- melt(cbind(Power = pow.socFXX, Status = stat.socFXX, Class = clas.socFXX))
colnames(hier.soc) <- c('soc', 'Dimension', 'effect')
social <- factor(levels(data$socF), levels = levels(data$socF)) # creates labels for axis.
levels(hier.soc$soc) <- rev(levels(social))
cols <- c(Power = '#636363', Status = '#bdbdbd', Class = '#f0f0f0')
#x11()
hier.soc.G <- ggplot(hier.soc, aes(x = soc, y = effect, fill = Dimension)) +
  geom_bar(position = position_dodge(.9), stat = 'identity')  + coord_flip() +
  geom_errorbar(hier.soc.lim, position = position_dodge(.9), 
                width = .5, size = .3, colour = 'black') + 
  xlab('\nSituation (Number of Others the Person Was With)\n') + ylab("Unique Effect") +
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  theme_tufte(base_size = 14, base_family = 'HersheySans') + 
  geom_hline(aes(xintercept = 0)) + 
  scale_fill_manual(values = cols)
hier.soc.G
pow.soc.G <- qplot(social, pow.socFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Power\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (# of Other People in Interaction)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(pow.soc.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
stat.soc.G <- qplot(social, stat.socFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Status\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (# of Other People in Interaction)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(stat.soc.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
clas.soc.G <- qplot(social, clas.socFXX, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity') + 
  ylab('\nSituational Class\n') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (# of Other People in Interaction)\n') + 
  geom_errorbar(clas.soc.lim, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'HersheySans')
x11()
grid.arrange(stat.sit.G, pow.sit.G, clas.sit.G, ncol = 3)
grid.arrange(stat.soc.G, pow.soc.G, clas.soc.G, ncol = 3)
#####################################################################################
## Q3: Do these factors differ in terms of their outcomes?  ##
#####################################################################################
## Class predicts changes in power.
summary(mod1 <- lmer(scale(pow.L) ~ scale(clas) + scale(pow) + scale(stat) + scale(code.time) + (1 | idx), data 
= data, REML = F))
summary(mod2 <- lmer(scale(stat.L) ~ scale(clas) + scale(pow) + scale(stat) + scale(code.time) + (1 | idx), 
data = data, REML = F))
summary(mod3 <- lmer(scale(clas.L) ~ scale(clas) + scale(pow) + scale(stat) + scale(code.time) + (1 | idx), 
data = data, REML = F))
mod1boot <- confint.merMod(mod1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
mod2boot <- confint.merMod(mod2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
mod3boot <- confint.merMod(mod3, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
mod1boot
mod2boot
mod3boot
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R Code: Chapter Figures and Analyses – Chapter 3
########################################################
## LOAD LIBRARIES                                   ####
########################################################
library(lme4)
library(car)
library(psych)
library(ggplot2)
library(ggthemes)
library(grid)
library(gridExtra)
set.seed(12345) # ensures reproducability of bootstrapped results.
setwd('~/Downloads/Dropbox/Research/Dissertation/Chapter: Suppression in Everyday Life/')
########################################################
## LOAD DATA: And some merging / de-identifying       ##
########################################################
# Sample 1
s1 <- read.csv('data//esm_sample1_deID.csv')
s1S <- read.csv('data//dem_sample1_deID.csv')
names(s1)
s1$idx
names(s1S)
# Sample 2
s2 <- read.csv('data/esm_sample2_deID.csv')
s2S <- read.csv('data//dem_sample2_deID.csv')
names(s2)
names(s2S)
#########################################################
## Demographics                                       ###
#########################################################
# sample size
nrow(s1S)
nrow(s2S)
nrow(s2S) + nrow(s1S)
# gender
summary(s1S$sex)
summary(s1S$sex) / nrow(s1S)
summary(as.factor(s2S$sex)) # 1 = male; 2 = femalte
summary(as.factor(s2S$sex)) / nrow(s2S)
# ethnicity
summary(s1S$eth) / nrow(s1S)
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summary(s2S$ethF) / nrow(s2S)
########################################################
## DATA CLEAN: Calculate within and between-person FX ##
########################################################
# CALCULATE  composite ratings for related constructs
alpha(with(s1, data.frame(s.pow, s.stat, s.clas))) 
s1 <- within(s1, s.POW <- (s.pow + s.stat + s.clas)/3) 
with(s2, cor.test(pow, stat))
s2 <- within(s2, pwst <- (pow + stat)/2)
with(s1, cor.test(s.e, s.eR))
s1 <- within(s1, s.E <- (s.e + s.eR)/2) # reverse scored personality items.
## Well-Being
with(s1, cor.test(s.sise, eVal))
with(s2, cor.test(sise, feel))
s1 <- within(s1, s.WB <- (s.sise + eVal)/2)
s2 <- within(s2, s.WB <- ((sise + feel)/2))
# CALCULATE  between-person effects.
# Emotion and Emotion Regulation Measures
s1 <- within(s1, s.sup.X <- ave(s.sup, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.rea.X <- ave(s.rea, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, sup.X <- ave(sup, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
# Personality, Power, and Well-Being
s1 <- within(s1, s.pow.X <- ave(s.POW, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.power.X <- ave(s.pow, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.status.X <- ave(s.stat, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, pwst.X <- ave(pwst, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.e.X <- ave(s.E, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, e.X <- ave(ext, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.WB.X <- ave(s.WB, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, s.WB.X <- ave(s.WB, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, sise.X <- ave(s.sise, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, feel.X <- ave(eVal, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, sise.X <- ave(sise, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, feel.X <- ave(feel, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s2 <- within(s2, auth.X <- ave(auth, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
# CALCULATE  within-person effects.
# Emotion and Emotion Regulation Measures
s1 <- within(s1, s.sup.C <- (s.sup - s.sup.X))
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s1 <- within(s1, s.rea.C <- (s.rea - s.rea.X))
s2 <- within(s2, sup.C <- (sup - sup.X))
# Personality, Status, Self- and Other-Evaluation Measures
s1 <- within(s1, s.pow.C <- s.POW - s.pow.X)
s1 <- within(s1, s.e.C <- s.E - s.e.X)
s1 <- within(s1, s.WB.C <- s.WB - s.WB.X)
s1 <- within(s1, s.sise.C <- s.sise - sise.X)
s1 <- within(s1, feel.C <- eVal - feel.X)
s2 <- within(s2, pwst.C <- pwst - pwst.X)
s2 <- within(s2, e.C <- ext - e.X)
s2 <- within(s2, s.WB.C <- s.WB - s.WB.X)
s2 <- within(s2, sise.C <- sise - sise.X)
s2 <- within(s2, feel.C <- feel - feel.X)
s2 <- within(s2, auth.C <- auth - auth.X)
#########################################################
## Q1: How Much Within-Person Variation?              ###
#########################################################
summary(sup.s1 <- lmer(s.sup ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
sup.s1boot <- confint.merMod(sup.s1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.s1boot
summary(sup.s2 <- lmer(sup ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
sup.s2boot <- confint.merMod(sup.s2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.s2boot
summary(rea.s1 <- lmer(s.rea ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
rea.s1boot <- confint.merMod(rea.s1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
rea.s1boot
summary(ext.s1 <- lmer(s.E ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
ext.s1boot <- confint.merMod(ext.s1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
ext.s1boot
summary(ext.s2 <- lmer(ext ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
ext.s2boot <- confint.merMod(ext.s2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
ext.s2boot
summary(pow.s1 <- lmer(s.POW ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
pow.s1boot <- confint.merMod(pow.s1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
pow.s1boot
summary(pow.s2 <- lmer(pwst ~ 1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
pow.s2boot <- confint.merMod(pow.s2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
pow.s2boot
## Calculating the Percentage of Between-Person Variation
## Suppression
sup.s1O <- summary(sup.s1)  # extract % variance explained by between-person differences in suppression
sup.s1.ran <- VarCorr(sup.s1)
s1.q0 <- sup.s1.ran$idx[1] / (sup.s1O$sigma^2 + sup.s1.ran$idx[1])
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s1.q1 <- sup.s1boot[1,]^2/(sup.s1boot[1,]^2 + sup.s1boot[2,]^2)
s1.wi <- sup.s1O$sigma^2 / (sup.s1O$sigma^2 + sup.s1.ran$idx[1])
s1.wiCI <- sup.s1boot[2,]^2 / (sup.s1boot[1,]^2 + sup.s1boot[2,]^2)
sup.s2O <- summary(sup.s2)  # extract % variance explained by between-person differences in suppression
sup.s2.ran <- VarCorr(sup.s2)
s2.q0 <- sup.s2.ran$idx[1] / (sup.s2O$sigma^2 + sup.s2.ran$idx[1])
s2.q1 <- sup.s2boot[1,]^2/(sup.s2boot[1,]^2 + sup.s2boot[2,]^2)
s2.wi <- sup.s2O$sigma^2 / (sup.s2O$sigma^2 + sup.s2.ran$idx[1])
s2.wiCI <- sup.s2boot[2,]^2 / (sup.s2boot[1,]^2 + sup.s2boot[2,]^2)
## Reappraisal
rea.s1O <- summary(rea.s1) # extract % variance explained by between-person differences in reappraisal
rea.s1.ran <- VarCorr(rea.s1)
r1.q0 <- rea.s1.ran$idx[1] / (rea.s1O$sigma^2 + rea.s1.ran$idx[1])
r1.q1 <- rea.s1boot[1,]^2/(rea.s1boot[1,]^2 + rea.s1boot[2,]^2)
## Extraversion
ext.s1O <- summary(ext.s1)  # extract % variance explained by between-person differences in extraversion
ext.s1.ran <- VarCorr(ext.s1)
e1.q0 <- ext.s1.ran$idx[1] / (ext.s1O$sigma^2 + ext.s1.ran$idx[1])
e1.q1 <- ext.s1boot[1,]^2/(ext.s1boot[1,]^2 + ext.s1boot[2,]^2)
ext.s2O <- summary(ext.s2)  # extract % variance explained by between-person differences in extraversion
ext.s2.ran <- VarCorr(ext.s2)
e2.q0 <- ext.s2.ran$idx[1] / (ext.s2O$sigma^2 + ext.s2.ran$idx[1])
e2.q1 <- ext.s2boot[1,]^2/(ext.s2boot[1,]^2 + ext.s2boot[2,]^2)
## Power
pow.s1O <- summary(pow.s1)  # powract % variance explained by between-person differences in powraversion
pow.s1.ran <- VarCorr(pow.s1)
p1.q0 <- pow.s1.ran$idx[1] / (pow.s1O$sigma^2 + pow.s1.ran$idx[1])
p1.q1 <- pow.s1boot[1,]^2/(pow.s1boot[1,]^2 + pow.s1boot[2,]^2)
pow.s2O <- summary(pow.s2)  # powract % variance explained by between-person differences in powraversion
pow.s2.ran <- VarCorr(pow.s2)
p2.q0 <- pow.s2.ran$idx[1] / (pow.s2O$sigma^2 + pow.s2.ran$idx[1])
p2.q1 <- pow.s2boot[1,]^2/(pow.s2boot[1,]^2 + pow.s2boot[2,]^2)
q1.between.tab <- rbind('suppression' = c('estimate' = s1.q0, 'CI' = s1.q1), 
                        'reappraisal' = c(r1.q0, r1.q1),
                        'extraversion' = c(e1.q0, e1.q1),
                        'power' = c(p1.q0, p1.q1))
q1.between.tab2 <- rbind('suppression' = c('estimate' = s2.q0, 'CI' = s2.q1),
                         'reappraisal' = c(NA, NA),
                         'extraversion' = c(e2.q0, e2.q1),
                         'power' = c(p2.q0, p2.q1))
between.fx.t1 <- round(q1.between.tab*100, 1)
between.fx.t2 <- round(q1.between.tab2*100, 1)
cbind(between.fx.t1, between.fx.t2) # Table 2: Between-Person Variance
cbind(100-between.fx.t1, 100-between.fx.t2) # Table 2: Within-Person Variance (flip 2.5 & 97.5% CI)
##### WITHIN-PERSON VARIANCE; VISUALIZED!! ######
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length(levels(as.factor(s1[s1$completed >30,]$idx))) # 41 ppts in Sample 1 completed > 75% of surveys
s1g <- s1[s1$completed > 30,] # create subset of ppts for graphing.
s1g <- s1g[!(s1g$idx=="13"),] # remove  
length(levels(as.factor(s1g$idx)))
fig1s <- ggplot(s1g, aes(s.sup.C, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .0) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSituational Suppression (Within-Person)") + 
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(3, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
fig1r <- ggplot(s1g, aes(s.rea.C, fill = as.factor(idx))) + geom_density(alpha = .0) + 
  ylab("Density\n") + xlab("\nSituational Reappraisal (Within-Person)") + 
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond') + 
  theme(panel.margin = unit(3, "lines")) + guides(fill = F)
x11()
grid.arrange(fig1s, fig1r)
#########################################################
## Q2: When Do People Vary in Suppression?            ###
#########################################################
# Some data-cleaning:
s2$doF <- as.factor(s2$doF) # situations are the same; but have different labels.
levels(s1$doF)[c(10, 13, 24)] <- c("music", "facebook", "tv")
levels(s1$doF)<- levels(as.factor(as.character(s1$doF)))
## Null Models:
summary(sup.sit.m0.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.m0.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Features of the Situation: What the Person Was Doing
summary(sup.sit.m1.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ doF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.m1.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ doF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Features of the Situation: Who the Person Was With
summary(sup.sit.m2.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ socF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.m2.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ socF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Combined Model
summary(sup.sit.m3.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ doF + socF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.m3.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ doF + socF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Compare models
Anova(sup.sit.m3.1)
Anova(sup.sit.m3.2)
## Variance Inflation Factor Function 
## Function written by Austin Frank: https://github.com/aufrank/R-hacks/blob/master/mer-utils.R 
vif.mer <- function (fit) {
  ## adapted from rms::vif
  
  v <- vcov(fit)
  nam <- names(fixef(fit))
  
  ## exclude intercepts
  ns <- sum(1 * (nam == "Intercept" | nam == "(Intercept)"))
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  if (ns > 0) {
    v <- v[-(1:ns), -(1:ns), drop = FALSE]
    nam <- nam[-(1:ns)]
  }
  
  d <- diag(v)^0.5
  v <- diag(solve(v/(d %o% d)))
  names(v) <- nam
  v
}
vif.mer(sup.sit.m3.1)
vif.mer(sup.sit.m3.2)
## Graphs: Features of the situation
situations1 <- factor(levels(s1$doF), levels = levels(s1$doF)) # creates labels for axis.
situations2 <- factor(levels(as.factor(s2$doF)), levels = levels(as.factor(s2$doF))) # creates labels for axis.
cbind(levels(situations1), levels(situations2)) # making sure they are the same
social1 <- factor(levels(s1$socF), levels = levels(s1$socF))
social2 <- factor(levels(s2$socF), levels = levels(s2$socF))
cbind(levels(social1), levels(social2)) # not the same! need to re-level.
# s1$socF <- factor(s1$socF, levels(s1$socF)[c(7,1,3,5,6,2,4)]) # relevel factor.
sup.sitFX1 <- fixef(sup.sit.m1.1) # extract fixed effects estimates
sup.sitFX2 <- fixef(sup.sit.m1.2)
sup.socFX1 <- fixef(sup.sit.m2.1)
sup.socFX2 <- fixef(sup.sit.m2.2)
sup.sitSE1 <- sqrt(diag(vcov(sup.sit.m1.1))) # extract fixed effects standard errors
sup.sitSE2 <- sqrt(diag(vcov(sup.sit.m1.2)))
sup.socSE1 <- sqrt(diag(vcov(sup.sit.m2.1)))
sup.socSE2 <- sqrt(diag(vcov(sup.sit.m2.2)))
# calculate error bars
sup.sit.lim1 <- aes(ymax = sup.sitFX1 + sup.sitSE1, ymin= sup.sitFX1 - sup.sitSE1)
sup.sit.lim2 <- aes(ymax = sup.sitFX2 + sup.sitSE2, ymin= sup.sitFX2 - sup.sitSE2)
sup.soc.lim1 <- aes(ymax = sup.socFX1 + sup.socSE1, ymin= sup.socFX1 - sup.socSE1)
sup.soc.lim2 <- aes(ymax = sup.socFX2 + sup.socSE2, ymin= sup.socFX2 - sup.socSE2)
sit.sup.G1 <- qplot(situations1, sup.sitFX1, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity',) + 
  ylab('Situational Suppression Use\n\nSample 1') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)') + 
  geom_errorbar(sup.sit.lim1, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond')
sit.sup.G2 <- qplot(situations2, sup.sitFX2, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity',) + 
  ylab('\nSituational Suppression Use\n\nSample 2') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSituation (What the Person Was Doing)') + 
  geom_errorbar(sup.sit.lim2, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond')
soc.sup.G1 <- qplot(social1, sup.socFX1, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity',) + 
  ylab('Situational Suppression Use\n\nSample 1') + coord_flip() +
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  xlab('\nSocial Interaction (Who the Person Was With)') + 
  geom_errorbar(sup.soc.lim1, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond')
soc.sup.G2 <- qplot(social2, sup.socFX2, geom = 'bar', stat = 'identity',) + 
  ylab('Situational Suppression Use\n\nSample 2') + coord_flip() +
  xlab('\nSocial Interaction (Who the Person Was With)') + 
  geom_errorbar(sup.soc.lim2, width=0.5, colour = 'gray') +
  theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond')
x11()
grid.arrange(sit.sup.G1, sit.sup.G2, ncol = 2)
grid.arrange(soc.sup.G1, soc.sup.G2, ncol = 2)
## Trying to merge together for single graph...failed to make this look good.
#sup.sitFXall <- rbind(data.frame(FX = sup.sitFX1, sample = "s1", situation = situations1),
#                      data.frame(FX = sup.sitFX2, sample = "s2", situation = situations2))
#sup.sitSEall <- rbind(data.frame(SE = sup.sitSE1, sample = "s1"),
#                      data.frame(SE = sup.sitSE2, sample = "s2"))
#sup.sitLIM <- rbind(data.frame(LIM = sup.sit.lim1, sample = "s1"),
#                    data.frame(LIM = sup.sit.lim2, sample = "s2"))
#sup.sitSEall <- cbind(Sample1 = sup.sitSE1, Sample2 = sup.sitSE2)
#sup.sitLIM <- cbind(Sample1 = sup.sit.lim1, Sample2 = sup.sit.lim2)
#sit.supG <- ggplot(sup.sitFXall) +
#              geom_bar(aes(y = FX, x = situation, fill = sample), stat = "identity",
#                       position = "dodge", width = .5) + coord_flip() + 
#              theme_tufte(base_size = 11, base_family = 'Garamond') + 
#              geom_errorbar(sup.sitLIM, width = .5, color = 'gray')
## Features of the Person: Extraversion and Social Capital
## Descriptive Statistics of the Predictor Variables
pers.df1 <- with(s1, data.frame(s.e.X, s.e.C, s.pow.X, s.pow.C))
pers.df2 <- with(s2, data.frame(e.X, e.C, pwst.X, pwst.C))
summary(pers.df1)
summary(pers.df2)
corr.test(pers.df1)
corr.test(pers.df2)
## Null Model:
summary(sup.pers.m0.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m0.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Extraversion
summary(sup.pers.m1.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(s.e.X) +  scale(s.e.C) + 
                                scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m1.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ scale(e.X) +  scale(e.C) + 
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                                scale(day) + scale(hr) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Social Capital:
summary(sup.pers.m2.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(s.pow.X) +  scale(s.pow.C) + 
                                scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m2.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ scale(pwst.X) +  scale(pwst.C) + 
                                scale(day) + scale(hr) +.34
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Full Model:
summary(sup.pers.m3.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(s.e.X) +  scale(s.e.C) + 
                                scale(s.pow.X) +  scale(s.pow.C) + 
                                scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m3.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ scale(e.X) +  scale(e.C) + 
                                scale(pwst.X) +  scale(pwst.C) + 
                                scale(day) + scale(hr) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m3.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(s.e.X) +  scale(s.e.C) + 
                                scale(s.pow.X) +  scale(s.pow.C) + scale(s.fne)+
                                scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m3.2 <- lmer(scale(sup) ~ scale(e.X) +  scale(e.C) + 
                                scale(pwst.X) +  scale(pwst.C) +
                                scale(day) + scale(hr) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## Bootstrapping CIs
sup.pers.boot11 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m1.1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot12 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m1.2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot21 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m2.1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot22 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m2.2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot31 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m3.1, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot32 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m3.2, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot11
sup.pers.boot12
sup.pers.boot21
sup.pers.boot22
sup.pers.boot31
sup.pers.boot32
## Model Diagnostics
anova(sup.pers.m3.1, sup.pers.m0.1)
anova(sup.pers.m3.2, sup.pers.m0.2)
vif.mer(sup.pers.m3.1)
vif.mer(sup.pers.m3.2)
Anova(sup.pers.m3.1)
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Anova(sup.pers.m3.2)
sup.pers.boot3.1 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m3.1, method = 'b', nsim = 999)
sup.pers.boot3.2 <- confint.merMod(sup.pers.m3.2, method = 'b', nsim = 999)
## Create Organized Table from These Effects
ranFX.m3s <- VarCorr(sup.pers.m3.1)
fixFX.m3s <- data.frame(fixef(sup.pers.m3.1))
ranFX.m3s <- data.frame(ranFX.m3s)[,c(1,4)]
row.names(ranFX.m3s) <- ranFX.m3s$grp
colnames(ranFX.m3s) <- c('grp', 'estimate')
colnames(fixFX.m3s) <- 'estimate'
sup.pers.booter1 <- rbind(sup.pers.boot3.1[c(1:2),]^2, sup.pers.boot3.1[c(3:9),])
est.m3s <- rbind(ranFX.m3s[2], fixFX.m3s)
ranFX.m2s <- VarCorr(sup.pers.m3.2)
fixFX.m2s <- data.frame(fixef(sup.pers.m3.2))
ranFX.m2s <- data.frame(ranFX.m2s)[,c(1,4)]
row.names(ranFX.m2s) <- ranFX.m2s$grp
colnames(ranFX.m2s) <- c('grp', 'estimate')
colnames(fixFX.m2s) <- 'estimate'
sup.pers.booter2 <- rbind(sup.pers.boot3.2[c(1:2),]^2, sup.pers.boot3.2[c(3:9),])
est.m2s <- rbind(ranFX.m2s[2], fixFX.m2s)
round(cbind(est.m3s, sup.pers.booter1), 2) # export to LaTEX
round(cbind(est.m2s, sup.pers.booter2), 2) # export to LaTEX
## LAGGED EFFECTS?
summary(sup.pers.m4.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup.1) ~ scale(s.pow.C1) + scale(s.pow.X) +
                                scale(s.pow.C) + scale(s.sup) + scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m4.2 <- lmer(scale(sup.1) ~ scale(pwst.C1) + scale(pwst.X) +
                                scale(pwst.C) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.pers.m3.1 <- lmer(scale(s.sup) ~ scale(s.pow.X1) +  scale(s.pow.C1) + 
                                scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
### GRAPHS!!
names(s1)
s1 <- within(s1, s.power.X <- ave(s.pow, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.status.X <- ave(s.stat, idx, FUN = function(x) mean(x, na.rm = T)))
s1 <- within(s1, s.power.C <- s.pow - s.power.X)
s1 <- within(s1, s.status.C <- s.stat - s.status.X)
summary(sup.power <- lmer(s.pow ~ s.sup.X +  s.sup.C + 
                                time.days + time.hour +
                                (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
with(s1, plot(s.power.X ~ s.sup.X, xlab = "Stable Suppression", ylab = "Stable Power",
              xlim = c(1,5), ylim = c(1,5), pch = 19, cex = .8, 
              main = ""))
abline(a = fixef(sup.power)[1], b = fixef(sup.power)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
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with(s1, plot(s.power.C ~ s.sup.C, xlab = "Contextual Suppression", ylab = "Contextual Power",
              xlim = c(-5,5), ylim = c(-5,5), pch = 19, cex = .8))
abline(a = 0, b = fixef(sup.power)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
summary(wb.power <- lmer(s.WB ~ s.power.X +  s.power.C + 
                            time.days + time.hour +
                            (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = F))
with(s1, plot(s.WB.X ~ s.power.X, xlab = "Stable Power", ylab = "Stable Well-Being",
              xlim = c(1,5), ylim = c(1,5), pch = 19, cex = .8, 
              main = ""))
abline(a = fixef(wb.power)[1], b = fixef(wb.power)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
with(s1, plot(s.WB.C ~ s.power.C, xlab = "Contextual Power", ylab = "Contextual Well-Being",
              xlim = c(-5,5), ylim = c(-5,5), pch = 19, cex = .8))
abline(a = 0, b = fixef(wb.power)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
#########################################################
## Q3: Why Do People Vary in Suppresion?              ###
#########################################################
## Features of the Person
summary(sup.wellB.11 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X) + 
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.11 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X) + 
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.12 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C) +
                               scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                               (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.21 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X)) + 
                               (scale(s.pow.C) + scale(s.pow.X)) +  
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.22 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(sup.C) + scale(sup.X)) + 
                               (scale(pwst.X) + scale(pwst.C)) + 
                               scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                               (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.31 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X)) * 
                               (scale(s.pow.C) + scale(s.pow.X)) +  
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.32 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(sup.C) + scale(sup.X)) * 
                              (scale(pwst.X) + scale(pwst.C)) +
                              scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                              (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
sup.wellB.boot11 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.11, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.wellB.boot12 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.12, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
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sup.wellB.boot21 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.21, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.wellB.boot22 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.22, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.wellB.boot31 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.31, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.wellB.boot32 <- confint.merMod(sup.wellB.32, method = 'boot', nsim = 999)
sup.wellB.boot11^2
sup.wellB.boot12^2
sup.wellB.boot21
sup.wellB.boot22
sup.wellB.boot31
sup.wellB.boot32
## Features of the Situation: Who they are with.
summary(sup.wellB.11 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X) + 
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.11 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + scale(s.sup.C) *
                               as.factor(socF) -1 + 
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) + 
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.12 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C) * socF +
                               scale(day) + scale(hr) -1 + 
                               (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
# Features of the Situation: What they are doing.
summary(sup.sit.wb.m0.1 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + scale(s.sup.C) + (1 | idx), data = s1, REML = 
F))
summary(sup.sit.wb.m1.1 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + scale(s.sup.C) + doF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, 
REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.wb.m2.1 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + scale(s.sup.C) * doF -1 + (1 | idx), data = s1, 
REML = F))
anova(sup.sit.wb.m1.1, sup.sit.wb.m2.1) # not significant
summary(sup.sit.wb.m0.2 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C) + -1 (1 | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.sit.wb.m1.2 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C) -1 + doF + (1 | idx), data = s2, REML 
= F))
summary(sup.sit.wb.m2.2 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C) * doF + -1 + (1 | idx), data = s2, 
REML = F))
anova(sup.sit.wb.m1.2, sup.sit.wb.m2.2)
## Model Fit
Anova(sup.wellB.11)
Anova(sup.wellB.12)
vif.mer(sup.wellB.11)
vif.mer(sup.wellB.12)
###################
# GRAPHS!
###################
par(mfrow = c(1,2))
# Model 1: Sample 1
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fixef(sup.wellB.11)
with(s1, plot(scale(s.WB.X) ~ scale(s.sup.X), xlab = "Stable Suppression", ylab = "Stable Well-Being",
              xlim = c(-3,3), ylim = c(-3,3), pch = 19, cex = .8, 
              main = ""))
abline(a = fixef(sup.wellB.11)[1], b = fixef(sup.wellB.11)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
with(s1, plot(s.WB.C ~ s.sup.C, xlab = "Situational Suppression", ylab = "Situational Well-Being",
              xlim = c(-5,5), ylim = c(-5,5), pch = 19, cex = .8))
abline(a = fixef(sup.wellB.11)[1], b = fixef(sup.wellB.11)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
# Model 2: Sample 1
## Create residual variables to estimate unique effects of suppression on well-being:
### Estimate effect of power on suppression & well-being
mod1 <- lm(s.sup.X ~ s.pow.X, data = s1, na.action=na.exclude)
mod2 <- lm(s.WB.X ~ s.pow.X, data = s1, na.action=na.exclude)
mod3 <- lmer(s.sup.C ~ s.pow.C + (1 | idx), data = s1, na.action=na.exclude)
mod4 <- lmer(s.WB.C ~ s.pow.C + (1 | idx), data = s1, na.action=na.exclude)
### Save residuals from above models as a new variable.
s.sup.X2 <- residuals(mod1)
s.WB.X2 <- residuals(mod2)
s.sup.C2 <- residuals(mod3) 
s.WB.C2 <- residuals(mod4)
## Graph these residual scores
fixef(sup.wellB.21)
plot(s.WB.X2 ~ s.sup.X2, xlab = "Stable Suppression", ylab = "Stable Well-Being",
     xlim = c(-2,2), ylim = c(-2,2), pch = 19, cex = .8, 
     main = "")
abline(a = fixef(sup.wellB.21)[1], b = fixef(sup.wellB.21)[3], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
plot(s.WB.C2 ~ s.sup.C2, xlab = "Situational Suppression", ylab = "Situational Well-Being",
              xlim = c(-5,5), ylim = c(-5,5), pch = 19, cex = .8)
abline(a = fixef(sup.wellB.21)[1], b = fixef(sup.wellB.21)[2], lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 4)
# Model 3 (Interaction Plots); Sample 1
fixef(sup.wellB.31)
plot(s.WB.X2 ~ s.sup.X2, xlab = "Stable Suppression", ylab = "Stable Well-Being",
     xlim = c(-2,2), ylim = c(-2,2), pch = 19, cex = .8, 
     main = "")
abline(a = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[1] + fixef(sup.wellB.31)[5]), 
       b = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[2] + fixef(sup.wellB.31)[11]), lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 3) # High Power
abline(a = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[1] - fixef(sup.wellB.31)[5]), 
       b = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[2] - fixef(sup.wellB.31)[11]), lty = 2, col = 'red', lwd = 3) # Low Power
plot(s.WB.C2 ~ s.sup.C2, xlab = "Situational Suppression", ylab = "Situational Well-Being",
     xlim = c(-5,5), ylim = c(-5,5), pch = 19, cex = .8)
abline(a = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[1] + fixef(sup.wellB.31)[4] + fixef(sup.wellB.31)[4]), 
       b = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[2] + fixef(sup.wellB.31)[8]), lty = 1, col = 'red', lwd = 3) # High Power
abline(a = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[1] - fixef(sup.wellB.31)[4]), 
       b = (fixef(sup.wellB.31)[2] - fixef(sup.wellB.31)[8]), lty = 2, col = 'red', lwd = 3) # Low Power
##################
## Discriminant Analyses
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## NOT EXTRAVERSION.
summary(sup.wellB.X11 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(s.sup.C) + scale(s.sup.X)) * 
                               (scale(s.pow.C) + scale(s.pow.X)) +  
                               scale(s.e.X) + scale(s.e.C) +
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.X12 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(sup.C) + scale(sup.X)) * 
                               (scale(pwst.X) + scale(pwst.C)) + 
                                scale(e.X) + scale(e.C) +
                               scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                               (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.X21 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(s.sup.C) * scale(s.e.C)) + 
                               (scale(s.sup.X) * scale(s.e.X)) +  
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.X22 <- lmer(scale(s.WB) ~ (scale(sup.C) * scale(e.C)) + 
                              (scale(e.X) * scale(sup.X)) + 
                              scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                              (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## WELL-BEING DOESN'T MODERATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUPPRESSION & POWER
summary(sup.wellB.X31 <- lmer(scale(s.pow) ~ (scale(s.sup.C) * scale(s.WB.C)) + 
                               (scale(s.WB.X) * scale(s.sup.X)) +  
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellB.X32 <- lmer(scale(pwst) ~ (scale(sup.C) * scale(s.WB.C)) + 
                              (scale(s.WB.X) * scale(sup.X)) + 
                              scale(day) + scale(hr) + 
                              (sup | idx), data = s2, REML = F))
## DOES IT LAG??
summary(sup.wellBS1C <- lmer(scale(s.WB.T1) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + 
                               (scale(s.sup.C1) * scale(s.pow.C1)) + 
                               (scale(s.sup.C) * scale(s.pow.C)) + 
                               scale(s.pow.X) + scale(time.days) + 
                               scale(time.hour) + (s.sup |idx), 
                             data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellBLag1 <- lmer(scale(s.WB.T1) ~ scale(s.sup.X) + 
                               (scale(s.sup.C) * scale(s.pow.C)) + 
                               (scale(s.sup.C1) * scale(s.pow.C1)) +
                               scale(s.pow.X) + scale(s.WB) +
                               scale(time.days) + scale(time.hour) +
                               (s.sup |idx), data = s1, REML = F))
summary(sup.wellBLag2 <- lmer(scale(WB.T1) ~ scale(sup.X) + scale(sup.C1) + scale(sup.C) +
                               (sup |idx), data = s2, REML = F))
# LAGGED VARIABLES
s1 <- s1[with(s1, order(idx, code.time)),]
s1$s.WB.T1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
s1$s.sup.1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
s1$s.sup.X1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
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s1$s.pow.X1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
s1$s.sup.C1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
s1$s.pow.C1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s1), ncol = 1)
s1$idx <- as.factor(s1$idx)
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.sup.1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.sup)[1 : length(s.sup)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.WB.T1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.WB)[1 : length(s.WB)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.sup.X1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.sup.X)[1 : length(s.sup.X)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.pow.X1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.pow.X)[1 : length(s.pow.X)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.sup.C1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.sup.C)[1 : length(s.sup.C)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s1$idx))) {
  s1[s1$idx == i,]$s.pow.C1 <- with(s1[s1$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.pow.C)[1 : length(s.pow.C)])
}
####### STUDY TWO
## Fill in missing data to create lagged variable.
time.frame2 <- data.frame(idx = rep(1:length(levels(s2$idx)), each = 36),
                          time = rep(1:36))
nrow(time.frame) - length(levels(s2$idx)) * 36 # making sure it is the right length.
s2 <- merge(s2, time.frame2, by = c('idx', 'time'), all.y = T)
nrow(s2) # making sure it's the right length.
## Create Lagged Effects
s2 <- s2[with(s2, order(idx, time)),] # sort dataframe by id, then time.
# create shell for time-lagged variables.
s2$WB.T1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s2), ncol = 1)
s2$sup.1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s2), ncol = 1)
s2$sup.C1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s2), ncol = 1)
s2$pwst.C1 <- matrix(data = NA, nrow = nrow(s2), ncol = 1)
s2$idx <- as.factor(as.numeric(as.factor(as.character(s2$idx))))
## Create time-lagged variable.
for (i in 1:length(levels(s2$idx))) {
  s2[s2$idx == i,]$sup.1 <- with(s2[s2$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), sup)[1 : length(sup)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s2$idx))) {
  s2[s2$idx == i,]$WB.T1 <- with(s2[s2$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), s.WB)[1 : length(s.WB)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s2$idx))) {
  s2[s2$idx == i,]$sup.C1 <- with(s2[s2$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), sup.C)[1 : length(sup.C)])
}
for (i in 1:length(levels(s2$idx))) {
  s2[s2$idx == i,]$pwst.C1 <- with(s2[s2$idx == i,], c(rep(NA, 1), pwst.C)[1 : length(pwst.C)])
}
145
Vita
Arman Daniel Catterson was born in Austin, Texas on July 3, 1986 to Shirin 
Khosropour and Donald Edwin Catterson. Daniel grew up in Austin, attended 
Stephen F. Austin High School, and graduated with a B.A. from the 
University of Texas at Austin. He majored in Psychology as a Plan II 
Honor's student, and worked with Dr. Sam Gosling on a thesis project to 
examine the accuracy of personality impressions among friends who only 
knew each other from online interactions. In 2008 he began his graduate 
training at the University of California, Berkeley with Dr. Oliver P. 
John. In early 2012, he married Amy Elizabeth Koehler. In the summer of 
2013, he worked at Google as a People Analyst. In the fall of 2013 he 
started to learn guitar. After graduating from Berkeley in May 2015, 
Daniel will lecture at UC Berkeley and Berkeley City College, research at 
the Institute for Personality and Social Research at Berkeley, consult 
with a company in Emeryville, and continue to live in Oakland, CA with his 
wife and cat.
146
